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This research analyses Australia’s statutory recognition of the common law 
principle of open justice at civil commitment review hearings and whether its 
operation complies with the current United Nations human rights framework. 
The phrase ‘civil commitment’ describes a process in which the law authorises 
medical practitioners to detain and to administer medical treatment to a person in 
the absence of a person’s consent, and extant criminal proceedings. The primary 
method of accountability in each jurisdiction is the establishment of a tribunal, 
which must review the statutory criteria to ensure commitment processes, are 
lawful. Tribunals have authority to confirm, revoke or vary a person’s 
involuntary status.  
The common law principle of open justice is one of the most accepted and 
conceptually entrenched methods of accountability because the transparency that 
ensues enables public scrutiny of decision-making processes and outcomes. At 
its core, open justice provides that criminal and civil proceedings should be 
accessible to public observation. However, Australia’s mental health statutory 
frameworks effectively restrict public attendance at review hearings and the free 
the flow of information deriving from them. This is a problem because, although 
it is important that confidential health information remains private, it is also 
important that processes and decisions that encroach a person’s liberty and 
autonomy be highly accountable.  
This thesis argues that Australia’s statutory approaches are inconsistent with 
current human rights obligations regarding the operation of the open justice 
principle. Accordingly, each Australian state and territory should implement a 
supported decision-making framework to enable mental health involuntary 
patients, should they wish, to make autonomous decisions to waive rights to 




In addition, reviewing tribunals are obliged to publish reasons statements 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH 
I INTRODUCTION 
This research analyses Australia’s statutory recognition of the common law 
principle of open justice at mental health civil commitment review hearings, and 
whether its recognition and application in the review-hearing context conforms to 
an applicable international human rights normative framework. The first chapter 
provides background to the research by introducing the main institutions and 
concepts, including civil commitment in the mental health context and the 
important role of review hearings as a procedural safeguard, the principle of open 
justice, and an introduction to the human rights normative and analytical 
framework this research engages.  
II BACKGROUND: KEY INSTITUTIONS AND CONCEPTS 
A Civil Commitment in Australia 
The phrase civil commitment describes a process in which the law authorises 
medical practitioners to detain and to administer medical treatment to a person in 
the absence of a person’s consent. In the mental health context, this process can 
only be initiated according to prescribed statutory criteria in each mental health 
statutory framework in the relevant Australian state or territory. The civil 
element refers to the fact that this process may be initiated and maintained in the 
absence of alleged criminal responsibility. The civil commitment process 
therefore operates largely outside the scope of the criminal justice system. 
However, civil commitment can be initiated and maintained, where criminal 
responsibility may be proven, but a prosecuting authority has, for whatever 
reason, decided not to prosecute, or have decided to withdraw criminal 
proceedings. For instance, it is conceivably a much less onerous process for 
police to institute civil commitment processes rather than institute criminal 
procedures with stricter due process requirements and legal safeguards. A police 




establishing criminal culpability may be onerous. Rather, a police officer may be 
tempted to take a person to a relevant mental health unit where a mental health 
assessment may be made on a less onerous basis by an authorised medical 
practitioner under mental health legislation without any form of hearing required 
for up to eight weeks, depending on the jurisdiction. Apprehension for 
assessment can also arise in emergencies by ambulance officers, or other 
authorised persons in situations where another person’s behaviour leads to a 
suspicion that he or she has a mental illness and may be at risk of harming to him 
or herself or others. This research focuses on the nature of the civil commitment 
review jurisdiction and the serious decisions therein that impact the liberty and 
autonomy interests of certain persons for potentially indeterminate periods, often 
in the absence of criminal proceedings pending against that person. 
The rationale for the imposition of civil commitment arises first, from 
governments’ interests in protecting the community from harm (the police 
power), given that some persons suffering from mental illness may pose a danger 
to others; and second, from governments’ interests in promoting the best interests 
of individuals considered incapable of making reasonable treatment decisions 
(the parens patriae power).1  
1 Civil commitment includes detention and medical treatment without consent 
Most persons who receive medical treatment for mental illness in Australia do so 
as voluntary patients. Unless a person becomes classified as an involuntary status 
patient, 2  the law deals with the administration of a patient’s mental health 
treatment in a similar way as it regulates the administration of any other medical 
treatment. That is to say, as a general principle, a person must have consented to 
the provision of treatment for its administration to be lawful.3  Common law 
courts have asserted that the overriding principle is that a person is entitled to 
                                                
1 See, eg, Lawrence O Gostin, ‘Beyond Moral Claims: A Human Rights Approach in Mental 
Health’ (2001) 10 Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 264, 266-7. 
2 Chapter three considers Australia’s statutory criteria to civilly commit (to formally classify as a 
person as involuntary status patient).   




make choices concerning his or her own life experiences, which includes the 
choice to consent to medical treatment, withdraw consent or refuse medical 
treatment.4 A mentally competent person has a common law right to the respect 
of these decisions, notwithstanding that others might consider a person’s decision 
to be objectively unreasonable.5 Voluntary patients in mental health systems are 
thus entitled to refuse and withdraw mental health treatment, and are entitled to a 
presumption of mental competence to make those decisions.6 The principle of 
autonomy underpins the general right of individuals to make personal decisions, 
including decisions relating to the release and dissemination of a patient’s 
personal and health-related information obtained in the provision of health 
services.7  
Although mental health legislation is applicable to those persons who access 
mental health treatment as voluntary patients, the overarching purpose of mental 
health legislation is to authorise the detention and administration of involuntary 
medical treatment in certain circumstances. In short, its function is to legitimise 
the provision of mental health treatment in the absence of a patient’s consent.  
2 The Requirement of Mental Illness 
First and foremost, civil commitment processes in the mental health context 
apply only to persons who are considered to have a professionally recognised 
mental illness. The World Health Organization has estimated that at any one time 
up to half a billion people worldwide may be experiencing a mental illness.8 The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, too, has reported that at least one in five 
                                                
4 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
5 See, eg, Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 652–653, 786; Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 
Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB and SMB (1991) 175 CLR 
218; Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 652-3.  
6 See, eg, Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649.  
7 See, eg, Moira Paterson and Ea Mulligan, ‘Disclosing Health Information Breaches of 
Confidence, Privacy and the Notion of the “Treating Team”’ (2003) 10 (4) Journal of Law & 
Medicine 460. 
8 World Health Organization, Close the Gap, Dare to Care: Mental Health Global Action 
Programme (2002) http://www.who.int/mental_health/media/en/265.pdf Accesses 7 February 




Australians will experience one or more forms of mental illness in a lifetime.9 
Moreover, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) has concluded 
that in any one year, one in five Australians will experience symptoms of mental 
illness.10  
Conceptually, mental illness is broad, encompassing a diverse range of 
behavioural and psychological symptoms of various natures, intensities and 
durations.11 Diagnostically, the most common mental illnesses include anxiety 
disorders (such as agoraphobia), affective or mood disorders (such as depression) 
and substance use disorders (such as alcohol or drug dependence).12 However, 
the priority under each Australian mental health statute (although not expressly 
articulated) is to regulate the involuntary treatment of persons who display the 
most acute symptoms of mental illness.13 They include psychotic illnesses such 
as schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder (formerly known as manic depression).14 
A report published in 2011 by the Australian Productivity Commission suggests 
that such acute illnesses are present in 2-3% of the Australian adult population.15 
The annual reports of Australia’s mental health tribunals identify that acute 
psychotic illnesses are the primary diagnostic group associated with civil 
                                                
9 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘National Survey on Mental Illness and Well Being: Profile of 
Adults’ (1997).    
10 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2010) Mental Health Services in Australia 2007–
08, Mental health series no 12, cat no, HSE 88, 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/publications/hse/88/11415.pdf, iii.  
11 See, eg, American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (5th ed, Text Revision) (2013); World Health Organization, International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (10th ed), ch V. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Bernadette McSherry, ‘Mental Health and Human Rights: The Role of the Law in Developing 
a Right to Enjoy the Highest Attainable Standard of Mental Health in Australia’ (2008) 15 
Journal of Law and Medicine 773, 777; Terry Carney and David Tait, ‘Mental Health Tribunals – 
Rights, Protection or Treatment? Lessons from the ARC Linkage Grant Study?’  (2011) 18(1) 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 137, 139. 
14 See, eg, American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (4th ed, Text Revision) (2000); World Health Organization, International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (10th ed), ch V.  
15 See Australian Government, ‘Disability Care and Support’, Productivity Commission Draft 
Report, (Vol 1 February 2011), [3.23]. The report published results of a study the Disability 
Insurance Scheme: a national public insurance policy that intends to insure the treatment, care 




commitment.16 The most common mental illnesses associated with commitment 
include schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, manic depression, dementia, 
delusional disorder, depression and drug-induced psychoses. It is, therefore, 
persons with these diagnoses who represent most involuntary status patients, and 
it is these persons who are more likely to become subject to Australia’s mental 
health statutory frameworks regulating the civil commitment process.   
3 Mental Health Civil Commitment Review Hearings 
Each Australian mental health statute establishes a tribunal, or provides original 
jurisdiction to a generalist tribunal, which is responsible for monitoring the 
lawfulness of the civil commitment process. It is the review function of these 
tribunals that underpins this research, it being the principal mechanism of 
accountability in the civil commitment process. It is each reviewing tribunal’s 
responsibility to ensure satisfaction of the prescribed statutory criteria required to 
initiate and maintain the civil commitment process.17  Mental health tribunals 
constitute the initial and on-going statutory review mechanism, each with the 
power to confirm, revoke or vary a patient’s involuntary status. A conservative 
estimate reveals over 25 000 civil commitment review hearings occur throughout 
Australia annually. 18  Review hearings are somewhat unique for a tribunal 
jurisdiction (opposed to a court’s jurisdiction) because the outcome has 
potentially serious consequences not only for a patient who is the subject of 
review, but also potentially for the wider community. For instance, the 
confirmation of a person’s involuntary status means that his or her liberty and 
autonomy interests will be substantially restricted. Alternatively, a revocation of 
involuntary status may risk the deterioration of a patient’s psychological health 
or risk the safety of the community.  
                                                
16 See, eg, Mental Health Review Board, Victoria, Annual Report, (2014/15), 26.  
17 See, eg, In the matter of XY unreported VSC, March 6, 1992, (1992) 2 MHRBD (Vic) 501; 
Kracke v Mental Health Review Board and Ors (No 2) (General) [2009] VCAT 1548 (13 August 
2009). 




4 Open Justice At Civil Commitment Review Hearings  
This research is primarily concerned with the recognition of the open justice 
principle in Australian mental health legislation, and its administrative operation 
at civil commitment review hearings. Open justice is a fundamental principle of 
common law.19 In addition to a party’s rights of appeal (or review), the operation 
of open justice constitutes a fundamental mechanism of accountability 
recognised by the common law.20 It is the idea that the administration of justice 
should be transparent; that proceedings should be public because the community 
has a legitimate interest in witnessing and scrutinising legal proceedings. In Lord 
Hewitt’s words ‘…it is not merely of some importance but it is of fundamental 
importance, that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to 
be done’.21 In the early English case of Daubney v Cooper the Court stated:  
...it is one of the essential qualities of a Court of Justice that its proceedings should be public, and 
that all parties who may be desirous of hearing what is going on, if there be room in the place for 
that purpose, (provided they do not interrupt the proceedings, and provided there is no specific 
reason why they should be removed), have a right to be present for the purpose of hearing what is 
going on.22 
Shapiro has opined that the rationale for including the right to a public trial in the 
United States Constitution23 was to translate the common law of England, and to 
guard against the development of an American style ‘Star Chamber’.24 Open 
justice is said to guard against this because the procedural arrangements set out 
by the principle are considered to contribute to the provision of a fair hearing.25 
Those procedural arrangements are contained in the principle’s five elements:  
1. The public should have the freedom to physically witness and hear the 
evidence a court relies on; 
                                                
19 See, eg, Momcilovic v The Queen [2011] HCA, [444] (Heydon J) citing Scott v Scott [1913] 
AC 417, 473-77. 
20 Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417. 
21 R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 (Lord Hewitt).   
22 Daubney v Cooper (1829) 109 ER 438, 440.   
23 Constitution of the United States, Amendment 6. 
24 Harold Shapiro, ‘Right to a Public Trial’ (1951) 41(6) Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 782, 782-83. 
25 See, eg, Joseph Jaconelli, Open Justice: A Critique of the Public Trial (Oxford University 




2. Those who attend proceedings should be free to publish reports of what 
occurred at those proceedings; 
3. The public should have the freedom to identify the parties; 
4. The public should have the freedom to access documents relied upon in 
the decision-making process; and  
5. Reasons for decisions should be explicable and publicly accessible.26  
A decision-making process that implements these procedural arrangements 
means that the process is transparent. In turn, transparency facilitates 
accountability, because it provides public access to information that allows the 
public to analyse the lawfulness of decision-making processes, and ultimately the 
fairness of substantive outcomes. The principle of open justice thus facilitates the 
detection of unlawful uses or abuses of authority.  
5 The Importance of Transparency in Decision-making   
Although there is a consensus across common law legal systems that non-
consensual medical treatment is necessary in some circumstances where persons 
have a mental illness,27 there is also a consensus that the administration of that 
treatment must be sufficiently accountable.28 In part, it is because of the special 
vulnerability of involuntary mental health patients that there is a corresponding 
                                                
26 See Hon James Jacob Spigelman, ‘Reasons for Judgement and the Rule of Law’ (Speech 
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27 See, eg, Terry Carney, David Tait and Fleur Beaupert, ‘Pushing the Boundaries: Realising 
Rights Through Mental Health Tribunal Processes?’ (2008) 30(2) Sydney Law Review 329, 329. 
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special need to implement high levels of accountability.29  Civil commitment 
involves incursions on liberty, autonomy, and potentially the bodily integrity of 
persons whose mental health has been put into question. The potential for clinical 
or political misuses of such power necessitates that the institution of civil 
commitment, including review processes, be underpinned by legal principles that 
strive to safeguard the lawful administration of such unusual power. In Harry v 
Mental Health Review Board, Kirby J remarked that ‘it is not necessary to go to 
the mental health laws of Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia to be reminded of 
the potential for misuse, or excessive use, of compulsory mental health powers. 
The courts must be vigilant against such a misuse or excessive use. 30 
Bell J also, in Kracke v Mental Health Review Board, expressed similar 
sentiments when acknowledging the human rights engaged by involuntary 
patients in mental health systems:  
Because treatment orders authorise giving involuntary medical treatment, they necessarily 
involve serious human rights breaches. The medical authorities and others involved in making 
orders and giving treatment are therefore in an extremely powerful position. The patients are 
in a very vulnerable position. If the medical opinion is wrong, in full or even in part, the 
consequences for the individual can be profound. Sadly, history tells us tragic cases can occur 
in which unwarranted treatment is forced on people for the wrong reasons. To prevent 
departure from the legislative purposes and strict criteria, even if not deliberate, the patients 
need the safeguards in the system to operate effectively as Parliament intended.31   
Transparency in decision-making in this context is important because, as Bell J 
commented in the quote above, those persons with authority to impose civil 
commitment and to henceforth administer involuntary treatment are in a 
powerful position vis a vis a committed person, and there is accordingly an 
individual and public interest in ensuring, as far as possible, that those persons in 
positions of power are accountable for their decisions. The individual interest lies 
in the fact that these decisions affect the liberty and autonomy interests of 
vulnerable persons. The public interest lies in the fact that these decisions 
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potentially affect the safety of the community.32 In other words, the interests 
affected by the decisions made in mental health systems and particularly by 
mental health tribunals is twofold; it is both the protection of the individual and 
the protection of society. The transparency of those decisions facilitates 
accountability in this context because it facilitates individual, public and 
professional scrutiny of their lawfulness and wisdom. The operation of the open 
justice principle, as a manifestation of transparency, is said to guard against 
unlawful and unwise decisions because the procedural arrangements set out in 
the principle are considered to contribute substantially to the provision of a fair 
hearing.33 
6 Conflicting Interests of Transparency and Privacy Require Balancing 
Although it is important that civil commitment review hearings be as transparent 
as possible, it is a general principle of health law that the confidentiality of 
medical and health related information should be maintained for all persons. 
Though, it is the special vulnerability of involuntary mental health patients and 
the potential adverse consequences of publicity, that provides an additional 
reason to favour the maintenance of patient privacy over transparency. There are 
inevitably cases where media outlets will consider a review hearing newsworthy, 
and the dissemination of an involuntary patient’s confidential information may 
contribute to adverse consequences at the individual and systemic level. For 
instance, at the individual level, the dissemination of a patient’s medical and 
personal information may facilitate discrimination against the person in several 
contexts (in relation to employment opportunities for example), or exacerbate 
negative stigmas and stereotypes society attaches to persons with mental illness. 
Stigmatisation and its practical effects is a long-standing concern and remains an 
important issue facing persons with mental illness. Moreover, at the systemic 
level, it may be that adverse media reporting emanating from public hearings 
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could undermine inclusivity-based public mental health initiatives by potentially 
re-enforcing negative stigmas and stereotypes, thereby risking the efficacy of 
those initiatives. 
The two contrasting goals of transparency and privacy encapsulate the tension 
between a patient’s confidentiality of health information, and the spirit of the 
principle of open justice, reflecting the key regulatory issue examined by this 
research. Is it possible to enhance transparency while maintaining privacy and 
confidentiality interests?  Further, can an explicable human rights framework 
inform a resolution to this tension?  
7 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with a Disability (CRPD) 
The most recent human rights instrument relevant to Australian mental health 
civil commitment processes is the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD).34 The CRPD is a thematic convention promulgating both 
civil and political rights and economic, cultural and social rights that engage 
persons with a disability, regardless of whether the disability is physically or 
mentally based. It is a binding human rights agreement positing a social model of 
disability within the ever developing field of international human rights law. 35   
The right to equality at law under art 12 of the CRPD is a major element of the 
human rights normative framework presented in chapter five. Chapter five 
demonstrates how this specific human right alters and then ultimately 
reconfigures the human rights framework of open justice decision-making at 
mental health civil commitment hearings. It does this through an exploration of 
the scope of article 12 and by applying it to the current tension between 
transparency and privacy as briefly described above.   
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III RESEARCH FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES 
This research focuses on the procedural issue of open justice and the extent that 
an international human rights framework may contribute to the development of a 
model framework that effectively mediates the tension between transparency and 
privacy evident within Australia’s mental health legislation. Given the nature of 
Australian federalism, which confers sovereignty on each state and territory, the 
civil commitment process is regulated by each jurisdiction’s unique statute. 
Carney has noted that ‘[in] contrast to jurisdictions such as the United States and 
Canada, where judicial decision-making has played a central role in reform of 
mental health laws, Australia has tended to rely on conventional reform by state 
and territory legislatures’. 36  The creation and amendment of mental health 
legislation is thus the responsibility of each Australian jurisdiction, and just as 
there are significant variations within legislation across international 
jurisdictions,37  there are variations within Australia’s statutory frameworks.38 
The variation is also evident in relation to the balancing of transparent review 
hearings and the privacy of confidential health information. Such inconsistency 
creates complexity and uncertainty regarding civil commitment processes, 
particularly if an involuntary patient’s case has moved between jurisdictions.39 If 
consistency is desirable, then Australia’s federal system is a significant barrier to 
its achievement. The Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs has 
stated: 
                                                
36 Terry Carney et al, Australian Mental Health Tribunals: Space for Fairness, Freedom, 
Protection and Treatment? (Themis Press, 2011), 47. 
37 See, eg, Elizabeth Fistein et al, ‘A Comparison of Mental Health Legislation from Diverse 
Commonwealth Jurisdictions’ (2009) 32(3) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 147. 
This study compared mental health legislation in 32 Commonwealth jurisdictions using a multi-
axial framework derived from international human rights principles. The study identified 
widespread deviation in legislative provisions, suggesting that some legislation may be 
inadequate for the protection of the human rights of people with mental illnesses. The study 
concluded that reasons for the deviation included variations in the value perspectives 
underpinning approaches to balancing conflicting principles, failure to keep pace with changing 
attitudes to mental illness, and variations in the resources available for providing treatment and 
law reform. 
38 See, eg, Terry Carney et al, Australian Mental Health Tribunals: Space for Fairness, Freedom, 
Protection and Treatment? (Themis Press, 2011), 12, 47. 
39 See, eg, Mark Pearson (2011), ‘Mental Illness, Journalism Investigation and the Law in 




Mental health policy in Australia sits within the context of the federated system. While reforms 
such as the National Mental Health Strategy are articulated at a national level and with the 
cooperation of all jurisdictions, the reality remains that implementation has been variable in 
light of each state and territory's own policy context and history.40 
Although consistency in statutory approaches across the Australian federation 
might be a focus of other studies, it is not the focus of this research. Bernadette 
McSherry, for one, has said that it is optimistic to assume that all Australian 
jurisdictions will ever fully agree on one unified statutory mental health 
framework, though she has argued that it is appropriate to develop model 
frameworks that comply with human rights obligations.41 This research provide a 
model framework informed by human rights jurisprudence relevant to the 
statutory balance between transparency and privacy at mental health civil 
commitment review hearings. Australian jurisdictions have made varying 
attempts at finding the most appropriate balance between the public interest (and 
individual interest) in transparent review hearings on one hand, and a patient’s 
right to the confidentiality of health-related information on the other. For 
example, in New South Wales and South Australia, review hearings are 
conducted according to a statutory presumption that each hearing will be open to 
public observation, but with tribunal discretion to close proceedings and make 
confidentiality (non-disclosure) orders to prevent the dissemination of 
information. These procedures are the exception rather than the rule. In all other 
jurisdictions, hearings occur according to a statutory presumption of closed 
review hearings, with tribunal discretion to open those hearings according to 
prescribed statutory criteria in each Australian state and territory.  
This thesis does not directly analyse Australia’s statutory criteria for imposing 
civil commitment and involuntary treatment, which since the introduction of 
article 12 of the CRPD has taken up the focus of investigation in most related 
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academic and professional commentary. In Callaghan and Ryan’s words: ‘The 
terms under which involuntary treatment is given now occupies a place at the 
epicentre of current legal interest in mental health law reform’.42  
A Aims and Methods 
The research aims to identify the limits of a hitherto under expressed 
pronouncement of the ambit of the open justice principle according to 
international human rights law when applied to the mental health civil 
commitment context. By articulating human rights as a normative framework, 
Australia’s international obligations in this area can become clearer, and it may 
be that the human rights framework presented in chapter five will inform future 
approaches to the regulation of transparency and privacy issues at civil 
commitment review hearings and in mental health law generally. 
The research involves the identification, analysis, and reflection of existing 
Australian civil commitment laws and comparing those laws with the 
requirements of the relevant human rights framework presented in chapter five. It 
synthesises data derived from Australian mental health legislation, case law, 
human rights documents and jurisprudence, domestic policy documents and the 
secondary literature in the field of civil commitment, and then critically analyses 
the existing Australian statutory frameworks to determine Australia’s level of 
compliance with the requirements of the human rights framework.   
The primary research question is: 
Do Australia’s mental health statutory frameworks comply with Australia’s 
international human rights obligations in relation to the operation of the open 
justice principle at mental health civil commitment review hearings? 
The primary research question yields four key secondary questions: 
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1. What is the conceptual and legal framework underpinning the operation 
of the open justice principle at common law?  
2. How is the open justice principle at common law recognised in 
Australia’s statutory frameworks, to regulate the conduct of mental health 
civil commitment review proceedings?  
3. What is the conceptual and legal framework underpinning the operation 
of the open justice principle at international human rights law, and what 
impact does the recently enacted CRPD impart in the development of this 
framework?  
4. To what extent does Australia’s mental health legislation recognise the 
international human rights framework in regulating the operation of the 
principle of open justice at mental health civil commitment review 
proceedings?  
IV SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
A Civil Commitment Applies to a Significant Demographic 
Civil commitment review hearings apply to a substantial proportion of 
Australia’s population.43 A report in 2010, by the Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare, reveals that of the 122 132 admissions for mental health care across 
the public and private hospital sectors during a 12-month period in 2007/8, 41 
156 were classified as involuntary admissions.44 According to the AIHW data, 
the archetypal involuntary patient can be loosely characterised as an Australian-
born, non-indigenous male, aged 25-44 years, living in a capital city, and who 
has not married. 45  As involuntary patients, these persons are entitled to an 
independent tribunal review of the decision to impose involuntary status, either 
upon the individual’s request at any time, or at on-going intervals as required by 
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the mental health statutory frameworks.46 According to data from the annual 
reports of each jurisdiction’s relevant reviewing tribunal, there are, at a 
conservative estimate, over 20 000 review hearings conducted throughout 
Australia each year. This heavy caseload demonstrates that review hearings 
constitute a significant component of Australia’s justice system, affecting the 
lives of a substantial number of persons.     
B Transparency is an Important Method of Accountability 
Because of the serious nature of civil commitment and the significant number of 
persons affected, institutional accountability in decision making is essential. The 
principle of open justice is said to facilitate accountability because it functions to 
produce transparency, and thereby the ability to scrutinise decision making.47 An 
issue that has become evident in recent years is that some involuntary patients 
have requested open review hearings to differing degrees but have found it 
difficult to fully achieve this objective.48 Thus, the level of transparency and 
accountability in tribunal decision-making is an issue that some involuntary 
patients consider important.  
Moreover, apart from an involuntary patient’s direct interests, many other 
persons may claim an interest in the transparency and accountability of review 
hearings. At the most general level, the community has an indirect interest 
because, as noted earlier in chapter one, a revocation of involuntary status may 
endanger the community in some cases. The ability to scrutinise review hearings 
is thus important because the community has an interest in security; that persons 
who may be lawfully detained and treated are not released given the harm he or 
she may cause to others. The legal profession, too, has significant interests in 
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open justice, because restrictions in transparency to the level demonstrated by 
chapter four creates difficulties for legal practitioners in understanding the 
application of law by reviewing Tribunals. The private nature of review hearings 
and their apparent lack of transparency effectively hinder legal practitioners’ 
capacity to provide effective advocacy and, in turn, this creates potential barriers 
to involuntary patients’ accessing substantive justice.  
Restrictions on open justice at review hearings also restrict the media from 
reporting the workings of the mental health civil commitment system. Professors 
in journalism, Mark Pearson and Tom Morton have argued that reviewing 
Tribunals in the forensic mental health context should be more open to public 
scrutiny so the public can be informed and educated about lawful processes and 
decisions that can restrict the liberty of citizens within a mental health system 
that the wider community has a legitimate interest in understanding.49  
V ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
This research makes five original and significant contributions to knowledge 
within the broader field of health law and the more specific field of mental health 
law, as listed below.  
1. Review and update, at the time of writing, of the salient elements of the 
latest generation of Australia’s mental health legislation following a 
considerable volume of law reform in recent years.  
2. First comprehensive legal analysis of the recognition of the open justice 
principle at civil commitment review hearings created under Australia’s 
mental health legislation. 
3. The first major human rights analysis of the operation of the open justice 
principle in the context of mental health based civil commitment review 
hearings.  
                                                
49 See, eg, Mark Pearson (2011), ‘Mental illness, journalism investigation and the law in 




4. The first time that article 12 of the CRPD has been applied conceptually 
and doctrinally to develop a human rights framework outlining the 
operation of the open justice principle at civil commitment review 
hearings.  
5. The development of a new normative framework to measure decision-
making relating to the operation of the open justice principle in mental 
health law. 
 
VI THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter two identifies the nature and scope of the open justice principle at 
common law. It articulates the principle’s five essential elements, its exceptions 
and the rationales, noting in particular its derogation under the parens patriae 
jurisdiction, which applies to persons in the mental ill-health context.   
Chapter three identifies the nature of Australia’s statutory frameworks 
underpinning the regulation of Australia’s system of civil commitment. It 
describes the nature of existing civil commitment laws in all Australian 
jurisdictions by focusing on the their most salient elements. Chapter Three 
observes that Australia’s mental health statutory frameworks recognise a right to 
the privacy of an involuntary patient’s health related information by imposing 
duties of confidentiality upon persons involved in the administration of mental 
health statutes. 
Chapter four identifies the nature of the civil commitment review jurisdiction 
including the decision-making processes according to the requirements of the 
statutory frameworks. In particular, chapter four identifies that each of 
Australia’s mental health statutes regulate with respect to the operation of all five 
elements of the open justice principle and observes an extant tension between the 
maintenance of patient privacy, and the operation of open justice principle, 




and confidentiality over transparency, in keeping with the common law 
derogation of open justice under the parens patriae jurisdiction. This becomes a 
problem in the mental health context because by favouring privacy, the beneficial 
rationales for transparency that emanates from the operation of the open justice 
principle become compromised in a jurisdiction in which the liberty, security and 
well-being of involuntary patients must be as safeguarded as possible.  
Chapter five identifies how a human rights framework reconciles the tension 
between the maintenance of patient privacy, and the operation of open justice 
principle at civil commitment review hearings. This involves the identification of 
the relevant sources of human rights to which Australia is a state party and the 
specific rights applicable to open justice in the review context. Chapter five 
identifies three relevant human rights. They include the right to a public hearing, 
the right to privacy, and the right to equality before law under article 12 of the 
CRPD. Chapter five then articulates what the human rights framework requires 
in relation to each of the five elements of the open justice principle.    
Chapter six analyses Australia’s compliance with the normative framework 
provided in chapter five. Chapter six therefore applies the human rights 
framework to Australia’s current statutory frameworks to determine if its 
regulation of open justice at civil commitment review hearings reflects its 
obligations to respect human rights conventions to which it is a state party. 
Chapter six argues that all Australian mental health statutes currently prescribe 
welfare, or best interests tests in relation to decision-making regarding the 
opening and closing of review hearings. Essentially, each statutory framework 
risks inconsistency with article 12 of the CRPD because such tests do not protect 
the legal capacity of an involuntary patient to waive his or her rights to 
confidentiality in requesting an opened civil commitment review hearing; if, for 
example, a reviewing tribunal considers that opening a hearing would have an 
adverse effect on the patient’s health. The CRPD requires a move away from this 




an involuntary patient’s legal capacity to make decisions relating to the 
publication of his or her confidential health related information, and to offer 
appropriate support to enable the patient to do so, should he or she wish to 
receive that support. 
Chapter seven summarises the main research findings and the arguments derived 








The purpose of chapter two is to identify the nature and scope of the open justice 
principle at common law. Chapter two thus provides an introductory description 
of the procedural issue under investigation in this research. It focuses on 
articulating the derivation of the principle’s five recognised elements, the 
exceptions to those elements, and the rationales underpinning why the principle 
exists and why it is capable of derogation in some circumstances. Chapter two 
ultimately observes that at common law, the long-standing presumption of open 
court hearings, which open justice posits, is capable of derogation in cases that 
involve persons with a mental illness and who are considered incapable of 
making personal decisions. This protective exception finds legitimacy because 
the common law has taken the view that the administration of justice requires 
those vulnerable persons, because of mental incapacity, be protected from 
potentially damaging consequences that open hearings might facilitate. Although 
this research is concerned primarily with human rights and Australia’s statutory 
regulation of open justice at civil commitment review hearings chapter two is 
necessary because it describes the nature of this chief procedural issue under 
analysis. Further it establishes a basis for the principle’s manifestation in human 
rights frameworks providing for rights to privacy and a public hearing, and in 
modern domestic mental health legislation that derogates from the principle, in 
providing a pervasive privacy orientation around review hearings.         
II WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF OPEN JUSTICE? 
The principle of open justice is a longstanding procedural component of the 
common law.50 In the broadest sense, it is the idea that the administration of 
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justice should be transparent. Judicial proceedings should generally be open to 
public scrutiny because the community has an important interest in witnessing 
proceedings. That interest derives from the purposes of open justice, which 
include the facilitation of fact-finding, accountability in decision-making, and the 
education of the community about the application of law, to which all persons are 
subject. In Lord Hewitt’s words: ‘…it is not merely of some importance but it is 
of fundamental importance, that justice should not only be done, but should 
manifestly be seen to be done’.51 
The modern development of the open justice principle and its constituent 
elements at common law has derived from the House of Lords decision of Scott v 
Scott (Scott).52 Scott was not the first to consider the authority of superior courts 
to close and open, or re-open proceedings. Such is the entrenched character of 
open justice as a common law principle, that its precise genesis remains unclear. 
Some jurists and scholars have thus considered the principle to exist since time 
immemorial.53  
The legal issue in Scott was a judge’s common law authority to exclude the 
public from attending judicial proceedings. Scott involved an uncontested 
divorce application, conducted on a presumption that the hearing would occur in 
camera,54 because the respondent was impotent.55 The fact that the man was 
impotent was considered by the Court to constitute private information and the 
principal basis for closing the hearing to public access. The man’s wife was 
subsequently held to be in contempt of Court on the finding that she had sent a 
copy of the divorce proceedings to her family, and to a third unrelated person. On 
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appeal, the Court rejected the view that the High Court had an unlimited 
discretion to conduct closed hearings, declaring that a judge's discretion to 
conduct matters in the absence of the public was limited. Earl Loreburn stated 
that the entrenched rule is that justice shall be administered in open court, and 
that a closed hearing may be conducted only where the subject-matter of a 
litigation would be ruined by a public hearing, or otherwise where there already 
existed a well-established exception to that rule. In the words of Lord Atkinson:  
The hearing of a case in public may be, and often is, no doubt, painful, humiliating, or 
deterrent both to parties and witnesses, and in many cases, especially those of a criminal 
nature, the details may be so indecent as to tend to injure public morals, but all this is tolerated 
and endured, because it is felt that in public trials is to be found, on the whole, the best security 
for the pure, impartial and efficient administration of justice, the best means for winning for it 
public confidence and respect.56  
Further, in the early nineteenth century English case of Daubney v Cooper, the 
Court stated:  
...it is one of the essential qualities of a Court of Justice that its proceedings should be public, and 
that all parties who may be desirous of hearing what is going on, if there be room in the place for 
that purpose, (provided they do not interrupt the proceedings, and provided there is no specific 
reason why they should be removed), have a right to be present for the purpose of hearing what is 
going on.57 
In Nagle-Gillman v Christopher,58 another nineteenth century case, the Court 
observed that the English High Court did not have jurisdiction to hear cases 
behind closed doors, even if the parties so wished. The Court held that a closed 
hearing should only occur in cases involving ‘lunatics’, or wards of court, where 
a public trial would defeat the purpose of bringing the action, or in cases where 
the previous ecclesiastical courts had traditionally heard cases in private. 
A The Elements of Open Justice  
There are five specific elements, which constitute a comprehensive principle of 
open justice.59 First, the public must enjoy the freedom to physically witness and 
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hear the evidence the court relies upon.60  Second, those who attend judicial 
proceedings should have the freedom to publish reports of what occurred at those 
proceedings. Third, the public should be able to discover the identity of the 
parties and witnesses to those proceedings. Fourth, the public should have the 
freedom to access the documents relied upon in the decision-making process. 
Fifth, the Court’s decisions and the reasons for those decisions should also be 
publicly available.61 For the sake of brevity, the five elements of the principle of 
open justice shall hereafter be grouped (in this chapter and subsequent chapters) 
into the following three categories:  
1. Attendance at tribunal hearings 
• Freedom of the public to attend judicial proceedings. 
2. Publication of information about judicial proceedings 
• Freedom to report what occurred at proceedings; 
• Freedom to identify persons involved in proceedings; 
• Freedom to access documents relied on in proceedings. 
3. Judicial decisions and reasons 
• Freedom to access decisions and statements of reasoning. 
1 Freedom to Attend Proceedings 
One of the key standards of the administration of justice in common law 
jurisdictions is the principle that judicial proceedings should be conducted in 
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open court.62 An open court is one in which the public, and therefore the media, 
is permitted physical admission. The hearing should be conducted in such a 
fashion, that any interested person would reason that it is obvious that they 
possess the freedom to attend and to witness court proceedings.63 The nature of 
this freedom is reflected in the common law authority declaring that any person, 
who attempts to prevent another from accessing judicial proceedings in the 
absence of lawful justification, may be charged with contempt of court.64 The 
Australian cases referring to the public’s right to observe court proceedings have 
considered the decision of the House of Lords in Scott as authoritative.65  
2  Freedom to Access Information About Proceedings 
Open justice requires that the administration of justice be capable of scrutiny. 
Therefore, those persons who choose to attend proceedings should be free to 
publish reports and to identify the parties involved in proceedings,66 particularly 
those cases in which there is a significant public interest. 67  Lord Scarman 
emphasised the desirability of publicity in this context: 
… the common law by its recognition of the principle of open justice ensures that the public 
administration of justice will be subject to public scrutiny. Such scrutiny serves no purpose 
unless it is accompanied by the rights of free speech, i.e. the right publicly to report, to discuss, 
to comment, to criticise, to impart and to receive ideas and information on the matters 
subjected to scrutiny. Justice is done in public so that it may be discussed and criticised in 
public.68 
Open justice thus goes beyond merely permitting public attendance. It extends to 
a freedom of the public, including the media, to publish fair and accurate reports 
of what transpired at proceedings. Given that those persons in the wider 
community may not always be capable of attending, the media is a useful tool 
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because the public may read reports of proceedings, prepared and disseminated 
by others employed in professional media services.69  The reality of modern 
society is that most people are limited in their ability to avail themselves of the 
freedom to attend proceedings.70 The majority of interested persons therefore 
rely on the media to convey information regarding the workings of courts. The 
freedom of the media to report proceedings is therefore an important corollary of 
the public’s freedom to attend court proceedings.71  
Permitting publicity from proceedings often comes at a price for those persons 
involved in proceedings. One of the inevitable consequences of open processes is 
that the identity of persons involved in court proceedings may have their 
identities publicly accessible. 72  The cost for these persons can include 
embarrassment or humiliation. There may be negative social and vocational 
consequences or even threats to personal security.73 Nevertheless, at common 
law, the protection of private information that may facilitate the prevention of 
these consequences does not generally outweigh the importance of applying open 
procedures, unless there are special circumstances (discussed below). 74  Lord 
Denning has stated, for example that 
It is of the first importance that justice should be done openly in public…[therefore] any 
newspaper should be entitled to publish a fair and accurate report of the proceedings, without 
fear of libel action or proceedings for contempt of court. Even though the report may be most 
damaging to the reputation of individuals, even though it may be embarrassing… nevertheless 
it can be published freely, so long as it is part of a fair and accurate report.75 
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Moreover, the principle of open justice generally requires that documents 
contained on the court file should also be open to public inspection. Generally, 
access to judicial files is available as of presumption, if the document is one that 
is relied on in open court. 76  There is also a common law right to access 
documents on the court record where the person seeking access can establish a 
sufficient interest in the document sought.77  
In all States and Territories in Australia, specific legislation regulates public 
access to information contained on the court record (in documents). The 
following section describes the statutory framework in New South Wales, while 
the applicable statutory frameworks in all Australian jurisdictions relating 
specifically to public access to health related information including information 
contained in documents can be identified in Table 1 of chapter four. 
In New South Wales, the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act,78 
and the Court Information Act,79 were enacted to provide a general framework 
that regulates access to information on the court record. This framework does not 
impact upon such specific regulations contained in other legislation such as the 
Public Health Act,80 and the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act,81  or the 
Mental Health Act, 82  but it does consolidate the common law and similar 
suppression and non-disclosure provisions contained in various other statutes.83  
For instance, the Court Information Act establishes a statutory framework 
regulating the general public access to documents and other information relating 
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to civil and criminal proceedings on the court record. Information is classified as 
‘open access information’ or ‘restricted access information’.84 Open access is 
granted to the public, by presumption,85  to documents in criminal and civil 
jurisdictions relating to originating processes, written submissions to court, 
statements of facts and affidavits, transcripts of proceedings conducted in open 
court, expert reports, and records of judgments.86	‘Restricted access information’, 
on the other hand, is unavailable, by presumption. 87  It includes personal 
identification information, information that the court has not admitted into 
evidence, information relating to proceedings on a voire dire, and information 
contained in a statement of a person’s criminal record or statements containing 
medical, psychiatric, psychological or pre-sentence reports, except where 
summarised in a judgment given, or orders made in proceedings, or information 
the subject of a suppression or non-publication order.88 Suppression orders allow 
a court to close a courtroom to the public; to prohibit any publication of the 
details of the relevant proceedings; and to make use of appropriate de-
identification techniques such as the use of pseudonyms for all parties. Non-
publication orders allow the court to restrict the reporting of particular matters 
and utilising de-identifying techniques for decisions where permission for 
publication is granted.89    
The defined grounds for making a suppression or non-publication order include 
where it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice; 
in the interests of national security, to protect the safety of any person; to avoid 
undue distress or embarrassment to a person involved in criminal proceedings 
relating to sexual or indecent offences, or where the public interest significantly 
outweighs the public interest in open justice.90 Courts may make orders on their 
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own initiative or by application by a party to proceedings, or another person with 
a sufficient interest in such an order. Applications may be made at any stage 
during or after proceedings have concluded.91  
Public access to ‘restricted access information’ is authorised only with the leave 
of the court. In determining whether to grant leave, a court must balance the 
public interest in open justice and the extent to which the principle will be 
adversely affected, against competing factors such as the public interest in the 
protection of privacy and how granting access would impact on the 
administration of justice and any other matters at the court’s discretion. 92 
Importantly though, in determining whether to make a suppression order or a 
non-publication order, a court must consider that ‘…a primary objective of the 
administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice.’93 
Accordingly, the legislation in New South Wales provides a framework for the 
public, including the media and others who have an interest in court proceedings, 
to access documents, subject to any existing suppression or non-publication 
orders issued by a court. For instance, a news media organisation may be entitled 
to access a wide range of ‘restricted access’ documents such as transcripts of 
proceedings and statements and affidavits admitted into evidence where 
proceedings were held in closed court.94  
The legislation also provides specific provision for the media to access particular 
restricted information by presumption unless a court orders otherwise.95 This 
information includes transcripts of proceedings conducted in closed court, 
affidavits admitted into evidence, proceedings on a voire dire, and transcripts and 
statements admitted into evidence, proceedings on applications for orders 
seeking restrictions on publicity of court proceedings; or information where the 
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only restriction placed upon that information is the personal identification of 
certain persons.96 However, a news media organisation must not publish any 
personal identification information without the leave of the court or the consent 
of the person to whom the information relates.97 
The legislation allows those permitted to access open access information by 
inspecting the court record or by considering other means of access as advised by 
the preference of the person or the organisation. However, a court can impose 
reasonable conditions on the provision of access to ensure safe custody and 
preservation of records, and may refuse access if providing that access would 
require an unreasonable diversion of court resources.98   
3 Publication of Reasons for Decisions 
The final element of open justice requires that the decisions of judicial 
proceedings and the reasons for decisions should be publicly accessible.99 Judges 
should not rely on the somewhat comical advice Lord Mansfield gave to a Judge 
in the West Indies:  
Be of good cheer – take my advice, and you will be reckoned a great judge as well as a great 
commander-in-chief. Nothing is more easy; only hear both sides patiently – then consider what 
you think justice requires and decide accordingly. But never give your reasons – for your 
judgment will probably be right, but your reasons will certainly be wrong. 100    
In Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd Kirby J stated: 
…it is clear that it is no longer correct to say that a judge has no duty to give reasons unless 
there is a right of appeal against his decision. If it was, an ultimate court of appeal would have 
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no duty to give reasons. In my opinion, the duty rests on a wider basis: its foundation is the 
principle that justice must not only be done but it must be seen to be done. 101 
B Rationales Underpinning the Principle of Open Justice  
There are three commonly cited rationales for the operation of the open justice 
principle. They are the disciplinary, investigative and educative rationales. Open 
procedures are necessary because the common law considers that transparency 
deters inappropriate behaviour by a court and renders lawful processes and 
decisions more likely (see the disciplinary rationale below). Open procedures can 
also result in evidence becoming available that may remain unknown if 
proceedings were closed. Open procedures also serve an educative function by 
informing the public, and the legal profession about substantive law and legal 
procedure. It may also be said that open procedures, facilitates public confidence 
in the administration of justice because transparency enables the public to 
determine if justice is being administered lawfully.  
1 Disciplinary Rationale 
The core rationale for ensuring open procedures is the disciplinary effect of 
transparency. Transparency impacts all actors involved in decision-making, 
which diminishes the possibility of unlawful processes and decisions.102  The 
disciplinary effect rests on the proposition that open procedures elicit the faithful 
and impartial performance in the conduct of important decision-making.103 Lord 
Shaw in Scott cited Jeremy Bentham’s famous epigram: ‘Publicity is the very 
soul of justice, it is the keenest spur to exertion, and the surest of all guards 
against improbity. It keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial.104 In the 
common law adversarial method, the judge is the central actor in decision-
making. It is the judge who is the adjudicator of legal process, and often a 
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decision’s substantive merit. The knowledge that he or she is under public and 
professional supervision via transparency is said to provide an incentive to avoid 
conduct that would attract suspicion about the lawfulness of procedures, and the 
ultimate fairness of decisions. 
Open procedures exert a similar disciplinary effect on the performance of others 
involved in court proceedings including legal practitioners and witnesses. For 
instance, transparency may prevent the incidence of loose or inept advocacy, or 
at least enhance the quality of advocacy.105 Similarly, open procedures may focus 
a witness’s attention to the seriousness of court proceedings, thereby tending to 
elicit accurate testimony, 106  because transparency allows the public to hold 
witnesses accountable for inaccurate or dishonest observations recounted in 
testimony. 107  Openness thus provides a psychological incentive for all 
participants in legal hearings to execute their functions faithfully and 
conscientiously.108 
2  Investigative Rationale 
Open procedures have the potential to elicit unexpected depositions that may 
otherwise remain untendered, because information that is publicly accessible 
may potentially assemble additional witnesses as members of the public who 
may relevant knowledge become apprised of the existence of a case and its 
factual content. 109  The functioning of courts requires the gathering of all 
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obtainable evidence, and publicity provides an opportunity to ensure that 
evidence is more complete.  
3 Educative Rationale 
Essentially, the principle of open justice allows the community to learn the 
content of laws and the way they are applied. 110  The educative rationale 
functions to inform the public of acceptable values and standards and the 
consequences of breaching those standards. The community can obtain 
knowledge of the state of the law, to modify behaviour, and to measure if a case 
is likely to succeed, should they consider litigation in future disputes. Open 
procedures, whether in the form of physical attendance, access to media reports 
or statements of reasons for decisions, allows the community and the legal 
profession to acquire knowledge by which the outcome of litigation or criminal 
trials can be reasonably predicted.111  Ultimately, the educative rationale allows 
for understanding. The former Chief Justice of the United States, Warren Burger 
stated: 
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult 
for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial is conducted 
in the open, there is at least an opportunity both for understanding the system in general and 
its workings in a particular case.112  
4 Public Confidence in the Administration of Justice 
It is difficult to imagine a legal system that operates secretly and simultaneously 
maintains public confidence in the administration of justice. Lord Atkinson in 
Scott acknowledged that open justice is desirable because ‘…it is felt that in 
public trial is to be found, on the whole, the best security for the pure, impartial, 
and efficient administration of justice, the best means for winning for it public 
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confidence and respect’.113  Public confidence in the administration of justice 
amounts to public confidence that the courts are administered independently and 
according to the values that underpin the doctrine of the rule of law in order to 
ensure institutional legitimacy.114 In the absence of publicity, adherence to the 
rule of law may be significantly diminished given that the community would 
possess no ability to access the courts in order to determine the lawfulness of 
decision-making. Cumulatively, the three rationales for the operation of open 
justice, described above, perform a critical function – to facilitate public 
confidence in the administration of justice and thus facilitate the legitimacy of 
justice systems.115  
C Exceptions to the Principle of Open Justice 
At common law, interference with the public nature of court proceedings is 
generally avoided unless the administration of justice requires the closing of 
proceedings.116 Nevertheless, the ability to admit the public to a hearing may be 
restricted by logistical limitations imposed by the physical space available to a 
Court. The actors required to give appearance at proceedings must logically 
attend,117 but the common law does not preclude courts from denying access to 
the public, or removing persons where there is insufficient space to accommodate 
those persons, unless there is a public interest in a matter. Courts may also 
remove a person from proceedings where his or her behaviour is disruptive to 
proceedings.118 Apart from those logistical restrictions, the exceptions to open 
justice at common law operate generally only in exceptional circumstances but 
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according to judicial discretion. At common law, Superior Courts have implied 
power as part of their inherent jurisdiction to close a court and to make 
suppression orders. Inferior Courts also have similar powers by implied 
jurisdiction.119 The use of such orders is a deeply rooted mechanism in common 
law where required to protect the administration of justice (discussed further 
below in relation parens patriae jurisdiction). For example, McPherson J in Ex 
parte the Queensland Law Society Incorporated stated that the Supreme Court of 
Queensland has the power to prohibit the publication of reports of certain 
proceedings conducted in open court, by the Court's inherent power to regulate 
its proceedings for administering justice, although:  
… that does not mean that it is an unlimited power. The only inherent power that a court 
possesses is power to regulate its own proceedings for the purpose of administering justice; 
and, apart from securing that purpose in proceedings before it, there is no power to prohibit 
publication of an accurate report of those proceedings if they are conducted in open court, as 
in all but exceptional cases they must be.120 
Inferior courts, in contrast to Superior Courts, are created by the legislature, and 
therefore do not hold responsibility for the administration of justice beyond the 
confines of their respective enabling statutes. Although these courts do not 
possess the inherent common law powers of a Supreme Court, it has been 
possible to imply the existence of powers to regulate proceedings according to 
what is necessary to discharge the Court’s duties within its express 
jurisdiction. 121  Inferior courts thus possess an implied jurisdiction to create 
procedural rules and practices that allow each Court to administer justice in an 
efficient and effective manner, that allow Courts to close, open or re-open 
hearings in accordance with the requirements of the administration of justice.122   
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1 The Administration of Justice Exception 
It is accurate to describe the principle of open justice at common law as a 
presumption rather than a right. The public or private nature of proceedings is to 
be decided on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the relevant judicial 
authority. This is so because the strict recognition of one or more of the elements 
of open justice at times produces a tension with the administration of justice. 
Shapiro has noted this potential:   
While it can hardly be doubted that the presence of the public usually has a beneficial effect on 
the judicial process, it would be surprising if, on the other hand, the judge, the jury, and the 
officers of the court were not influenced by a common, strong prejudice of the courtroom 
spectators. Cheers, applause, and other demonstrations of approval or disapproval have often 
prejudiced defendants' rights. Even unexpressed spectator hostility to the defendant has been 
the basis of reversible error when the mob has come into close contact with the jury. It is 
apparent that the public's presence sometimes actually prevents the just administration of the 
law.123 
There are circumstances in which the administration of justice requires certain 
information be kept private and confidential. For example, Mahoney J referred to 
the administration of justice in relation to the treatment of victims in John 
Fairfax v Local Court, remarking that Courts have an obligation wherever 
possib1e to administer justice in a way that avoids unnecessary pain and 
suffering to victims. In some circumstances this requires measures that protect 
some vulnerable persons from potential unacceptable consequences of open 
procedures.124 Open justice, can at times, threaten the administration of justice 
and thereby provide grounds for closing hearings and suppressing the 
dissemination of information derived from those hearings.  
Thus, derogations from the presumption of open hearings may be acceptable 
where it is necessary for the administration of justice.125 In the words of Viscount 
Haldane in Scott:  
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While the broad principle is that the Courts of this country must, as between parties, 
administer justice in public, this principle is subject to apparent exceptions... But the 
exceptions are themselves the outcome of a yet more fundamental principle that the chief 
object of Courts of justice must be to secure that justice is done... it may well be that justice 
could not be done at all if it had to be done in public. As the paramount object must always be 
to do justice, the general rule as to publicity, after all only the means to an end, must 
accordingly yield. 126    
Hearings that involve matters of national security, blackmail or police informants 
have been held to constitute matters whereby a restriction on publicity has been 
adequately justified in the administration of justice. 127  Other circumstances 
where courts have considered it appropriate to restrict the flow of information 
from litigation include, commercial cases that involve the dissemination of 
confidential information such as trade secrets, or, where negative publicity would 
risk a loss of custom sufficient to preclude the viability of business operations.128 
Moreover, as a general principle, it should be noted that potential damage to 
reputations does not, in and of itself, justify closing a Court.129  
Further, the following considerations in isolation from other factor, do not 
automatically justify closing a Court:  
• The unsavoury nature of evidence;130 
• Considerations of public decency and morality;131 or 
• Where a party to a proceeding would suffer embarrassment, distress, 
ridicule or encroachment on privacy.132  
Although the factors above may contribute to a decision to close a Court, or to 
suppress information about a hearing, each of the circumstances will require the 
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satisfaction of the criterion that maintaining an open Court would not serve the 
administration of justice.  
2 Parens Patriae Jurisdiction 
At common law, derogations from the presumption of open hearings are 
commonly invoked by a Superior Court exercising its inherent protective parens 
patriae jurisdiction. A protective jurisdiction is one in which the rights and 
interests of persons considered incapable of making personal decisions is 
considered paramount. 133  Common law has considered it acceptable in 
circumstances involving vulnerable persons, to close courts in the protective 
interests of those persons.134 Cases involving children, the mentally impaired and 
other persons who may lack mental capacity to make personal decisions are 
frequently conducted privately, in order to shield the person from the perceived 
negative effects of publicity.135 In the words of Lord Shaw in Scott, a protective 
order to protect a person from the negative effects of publicity relies on:   
…the familiar principle that the jurisdiction over wards and lunatics is exercised by the judges 
as representing His Majesty as parens patriae. The affairs are truly private affairs; the 
transactions are transactions truly intra familiam; and it has long been recognised that an 
appeal for the protection of the Court in the case of such persons does not involve the 
consequence of placing in the light of publicity their truly domestic affairs.136   
And, Viscount Haldane in Scott stated: 
[i]n the two cases of wards of Court and of lunatics the Court is really sitting primarily to 
guard the interests of the ward or the lunatic. Its jurisdiction is in this respect parental and 
administrative, and the disposal of contraverted questions is an incident only in the 
jurisdiction. It may often be necessary, in order to attain its primary object, that the Court 
should exclude the public.137   
In cases involving vulnerable persons, courts may close proceedings from public 
attendance or they might issue suppression orders in a public hearing that 
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provides anonymity in the reporting of cases as well as other reporting 
restrictions (discussed briefly below). Such measures are considered in the 
interests of justice because a matter involving a vulnerable person may often 
involve his or her personal information such as health related information and the 
interests of justice directs that the vulnerable person’s privacy be protected to 
shield the person from potential negative effects that may ensure from the 
dissemination of that information.  
3 Cases Involving Persons with Reduced Capacity or Mental Illness  
Of direct relevance to this research is the protection of persons with mental 
illness, who represent a class of vulnerable people that Superior Courts, in the 
interests of justice, may afford privacy protections via their inherent parens 
patriae jurisdiction. In these cases, an exception to the presumption of open 
hearings can be grounded in the status of a party.138 This paternalistic exception 
is of long standing at common law, as demonstrated by the early cases cited 
above. The common law has generally taken the view that the interests of justice 
require those persons who, because of mental incapacity, be protected from 
potentially damaging consequences that open hearings might facilitate.   
Common law is, nevertheless, subject to the will of parliaments, and the principle 
of open justice has found recognition and derogation in a vast range of 
legislation. For the purposes of this research it is the mental health statutory 
frameworks in each State and Territory that regulate with respect to the privacy 
and open justice issues of persons with a mental illness, who have become 
involuntary status patients and are entitled to a review of that status by Mental 
Health Tribunals.  
In this context there is an inherent tension between openness and transparency. 
Davis has identified that one of the potentially undesirable consequences of the 
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absolute adherence to open justice can, paradoxically, be a denial of justice, 
citing ‘embarrassment, humiliation, hurt, social and employment consequences’ 
as a too high a price in many circumstances.139 It is on this basis that there may 
be instances where high levels of transparency may lead to such outcomes that an 
exception to open justice operates in favour of the privacy of a person who 
suffers from a mental illness. For example, there may be the potential for 
detriment so far as the patient is concerned; a patient may suffer physical harm 
(security interest); and distress by disclosures of particular information. There 
may thus be concerns for the manifestation of a negative impact of a public 
hearing and publicity in relation to the patient's ongoing treatment and mental 
condition. There may also be concern for the protection of third parties to a 
proceeding, who may be indirectly or directly identified and negatively 
implicated from forthcoming publicity.140   
III CONCLUSION 
Chapter two has demonstrated that the principle of open justice is a longstanding 
principle of common law, which provides a presumption that judicial 
proceedings should be open to public scrutiny through the freedom to attend, 
report and identify persons involved in proceedings, to access records and 
documents contained on the court record and that additionally, courts are 
expected to report and publish their reasons for decisions. Thus, chapter two 
identified that open justice contains five elements (grouped into three categories 
of discussion), which can nevertheless be derogated in several contexts, but most 
pertinently for this research, derogated almost invariably in the context of 
proceedings that involve persons with reduced capacity or mental illness. The 
rationale for making this exception to the open justice principle is that the 
protection of such persons’ privacy (and therefore their welfare) is paramount 
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and thus overrides the public interest in the open administration of justice. It is 
important to note that although general statutory frameworks provide schemes 
for public access to information, and the suppression and non-publication of 
some information on the court record, these schemes do not interfere with access 
to court or tribunal information otherwise regulated by law under other specific 
legislation. The specific regulation of the open justice principle as applied to 
Australia’s civil commitment review hearings is identified in chapter four and 
analysed further in chapter six when measured against the human rights 























CHAPTER THREE: AN OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S 
STATUTORY REGULATION OF CIVIL COMMITMENT IN THE 
MENTAL HEALTH CONTEXT 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of chapter three is to provide an overview of Australia’s statutory 
frameworks regulating the imposition of involuntary mental health treatment in 
the civil context. This is an important descriptive aspect of this thesis because 
each state and territory provides a unique statutory framework that authorises the 
imposition of involuntary medical treatment in circumstances where a person 
may have a mental illness.  Each statute also creates a tribunal framework to 
review the lawfulness of this process, and it is the operation of open justice at 
tribunal review hearings that constitutes the focus of this research.      
This chapter first describes the objectives of the frameworks and the guiding 
principles to be recognised in performing functions under the legislation. An 
understanding of these objectives and principles is important because they 
provide guidance to persons who administer the legislation regarding how to 
relate to persons’ subject to involuntary status, and how to go about statutorily 
prescribed decision-making tasks. These provisions are also important for the 
interpretation of the more substantive statutory provisions such as those, for 
example, that prescribe criteria for the apprehension of persons for the purposes 
of assessment; criteria for the imposition of involuntary status; authority to 
administer regulated medical treatments; and the imposition of privacy and 
confidentiality related obligations, which this chapter describes. 
Chapter three also identifies that the primary method of accountability for the 
imposition of involuntary status is the creation of a procedure (usually conducted 
by a mental health tribunal), which must periodically review the relevant 
statutory criteria to ensure commitment processes remain lawful. Section seven 




because it provides the necessary context for the analysis of open justice’s 
operation at review hearings in chapter four.   
A Method and Terminology 
Australian federalism has produced a variety of statutory language to regulate 
similar aspects of mental health legislation in each jurisdiction. It would be 
impractical, overly complex and burdensome on the reader to provide the full 
ambit of that terminology. This chapter does provide differentiation in 
terminology, and salient distinctions in the legislation where it is considered 
important to the thesis’s purpose, and is within its scope. In all cases, though, 
readers should access the relevant legislation referenced in the tables and 
footnotes, to access precise terminologies employed in each jurisdiction.   
II THE OBJECTIVES OF AUSTRALIA’S MENTAL HEALTH 
LEGISLATION AND THE PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING THEIR 
INTERPRETATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
Each mental health statute includes expressions of their objectives and principles 
that guide the administration of the legislation. The inclusion of these sections is 
significant because they provide interpretative guidance to the staff and decision 
makers undertaking the functions prescribed by the legislation. They also aid 
tribunals and courts in the interpretation of substantive provisions. Generally, 
courts will ascribe to statutory language its ordinary and natural meaning, while 
considering the purpose of the mental health legislation where there is 
ambiguity.141 The purpose of Australia’s mental health legislation is provided in 
each statute’s specific objects and statements of principles sections.142  
Table 1 below demonstrates that each mental health statute combines legal, 
social and therapeutic objectives. For instance, each provides for involuntary 
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assessment and treatment, protection and ultimate recovery of persons with 
mental illness in a way that attempts to balance individual rights and freedoms 
with the rights and freedoms of others, including the wider community. 
Table 2 then identifies the salient guiding principles underpinning the 
administration of the statutory frameworks, many of which converge in their 
language with the objectives sections identified in Table 1. These principles seek 
to facilitate the achievement of each statute’s objectives and should be 
considered by staff and decision makers in the performance of their functions 
under each statutory framework. 
Table 1: Objectives of Australia’s mental health legislation 
 
JURISDICTION STATUTORY OBJECTIVES 
Mental Health Act 2016 
(Qld)  
 
S 3 - Improve and maintain health and wellbeing of persons with 
mental illness who do not have capacity to consent to treatment; 
enable persons to be diverted from criminal justice system if of 
unsound mind, or unfit for trial; protect community if persons 
pose risk of harm to others; safeguard rights of persons; provide 
treatment that is least restrictive of rights and liberties; promote 
recovery and community living without involuntary treatment.   
Mental Health Act 2015 
(ACT) 
 
S 5 - Promote recovery from mental illness; promote capacity to 
determine, and participate in assessment and treatment, care or 
support, taking into account the legal rights of persons; ensure 
people receive assessment; treatment, care or support that is least 
restrictive or intrusive; facilitate access to services that respects 
legal rights, dignity and needs; promote inclusion and 
participation by people in communities of their choice; support 
systemic improvements through mental health promotion, illness 
prevention, and early intervention.  
Mental Health Act 2007 
(NSW) 
 
S 3 - Provide care and treatment and promote recovery for persons 
with mental illness; facilitate treatment through community care 
facilities; provide hospital care on voluntary basis, and, in limited 
situations, on involuntary basis while protecting civil rights; 
provide treatment for protection of person or others; involve 
persons and their carers’ in decision-making. 
Mental Health Act 2014 
(Vic) 
 
S 10 – Provide assessment for persons who appear to have mental 
illness, and treatment for those with mental illness; assess and 
treat persons in least restrictive way with least possible restrictions 
on human rights and dignity; protect legal rights of persons; 
enable and support persons with mental illness to make, or 
participate in decisions about assessment, treatment and recovery 
and to exercise their legal rights; provide oversight and safeguards 
of assessment and treatment; promote recovery; ensure persons 
informed of rights; recognise role of carers in assessment, 
treatment and recovery.  
Mental Health and Related 
Services Act (NT) 
 
S 3 - Provide care, treatment and protection of people with mental 
illness while protecting civil rights consistent with UN Principles 
for Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the 




Mental Health Statement of Rights and Responsibilities; and 
National Mental Health Plan; regulate review of voluntary and 
involuntary admission; regulate obtaining informed consent and 
authorisation of treatment; regulate emergency detention and 
treatment; regulate specific forms of treatment; establish right to 
receive oral and written explanations of legal rights and 
entitlements; establish Mental Health Review Tribunal to conduct 
reviews; establish inquiry, complaints, investigation, visiting, 
inspection, and advocacy procedures; recognise provision of care 
by relatives and others in community settings.  
Mental Health Act 2014 
(WA) 
 
S 10 – Ensure persons with mental illness provided best treatment 
and care, with least restriction on freedom and legal rights; 
recognise role of carers/families in treatment, care and support; 
facilitate involvement of people with mental illness, nominated 
persons, carers/families in treatment and care options; minimise 
effect of illness on families; ensure protection of people with 
mental illness, and community.  
Mental Health Act 2009 
(SA) 
 
S 6 - Ensure persons with serious mental illness receive 
comprehensive range of services of highest standard for treatment, 
care and rehabilitation with goal of recovery; retain person’s 
freedom, rights, dignity and self-respect as far as consistent with 
their protection; protection of public; enable community/inpatient 
status where required.  
Mental Health Act 2013 
(Tas) 
 
S 12 – Provide assessment, treatment and care of persons with 
mental illness; provide oversight and safeguards of assessment, 
treatment and care; give everyone involved with assessment, 
treatment and care clear direction as to rights/responsibilities; 
provide assessment, treatment and care in least restrictive setting 
consistent with clinical need and legal constraints, public safety, 
patient health, safety/welfare; promote voluntary, free and 







Table 2: Principles applying to the administration of Australian mental health legislation 
 
JURISDICTION STATUTORY PRINCIPLES 
Mental Health Act 2016 
(Qld)  
 
SS 5-7 - Recognition of same human rights as others; 
encouragement to participate in decisions about treatment/care and 
have views/wishes/preferences considered; presumption of 
capacity for decision-making; family/carers/supports involvement 
in decision-making subject to right to privacy; provision of 
support to exercise rights; special needs recognised/considered; 
participation in community and existing supportive relationships 
considered; provision of recovery-oriented services; treatment 
provided only if it promotes health/wellbeing; rights to privacy 
and confidentiality of information about the person must be 
recognised and taken into account.  
Mental Health Act 2015 
(ACT) 
 
S 6 - Recognition of same rights and responsibilities as others and 
provision of support to exercise same without discrimination; for 
example, right to consent to, refuse or stop treatment; right to have 
will and preferences considered in decisions about treatment; right 
to be assumed to have decision-making capacity unless established 
otherwise; right to provision of support to make decisions in way 
that respects preferences of person.  
Mental Health Act 2007 
(NSW) 
 
S 68 - Provision of best possible treatment in least restrictive 
environment; provision of high quality treatment in accordance 
with professionally accepted standards; treatment should assist 
participation in community; medication given only for therapeutic 
or diagnostic needs, not punishment/convenience; provision of 
appropriate information about treatment, alternatives and effects; 
provision of support to pursue own recovery; restriction on 
liberty/rights to be minimised; recognition of special needs; 
participation in development of treatment/recovery including 
consideration of patient’s views and wishes; provision of 
information about legal rights/entitlements under Act; carers 
should be involved and considered in decisions.  
Mental Health Act 2014 
(Vic) 
 
S 11 - Provision of assessment/treatment in least restrictive way; 
services aim for best therapeutic outcomes/recovery and full 
participation in community life; persons should be supported in 
making decisions about assessment/treatment/recovery and have 
views/preferences respected; persons should be allowed to make 
decisions that involve a degree of risk; persons should have 
rights/autonomy respected and individual needs recognised; 
distinct cultures/identity recognised; carers should be involved in 
decisions.  
Mental Health and Related 
Services Act 2004 (NT) 
 
S 9 – Provision of professional quality treatment and not without 
consent; provision of treatment in community near ordinary 
residence where possible; provision of comprehensive information 
to patient about illness and proposed/alternative 
treatments/services; patient participation in treatment/discharge 
planning; medication is for therapeutic/diagnostic purposes not 
punishment/convenience; treatment plan reviewed regularly; 
assessment for purposes of admission conducted in least restrictive 
manner; involuntary admission imposed after all efforts to avoid; 
involuntary status reviewed regularly and legal rights including 
privacy/confidentiality respected; person to have access to 
personal records. 
Mental Health Act 2014 
(WA) 
 
Part 4 - Charter of Mental Health Care Principles  
Provision of treatment without discrimination upholding human 
rights; uphold person-centred focus including recovery oriented 
practice in least restrictive manner, involving patients in decision-




including the recognition of capacity for decision-making; 
recognise and respond to special needs; respect and maintain 
privacy/confidentiality; provide information about legal rights in a 
way that helps people to understand, obtain assistance and uphold 
rights; take collaborative approach to decision-making, including 
facilitating involvement of family/carers/others.  
Mental Health Act 2009 
(SA) 
 
S 7 - Services should bring about therapeutic outcomes, recovery 
and participation in community; services be provided on voluntary 
basis, or otherwise in least restrictive way near where patients, or 
their families/carers/supporters reside; patients and 
family/carers/supporters involved in treatment plans and 
accounting for different cultural backgrounds of patients; regular 
medical examination mental and physical health; medication used 
for therapeutic purposes or safety, not punishment/convenience; 
restraints/seclusion used as last resort for safety, not 
punishment/convenience; patients and family/cares/supports 
should be provided comprehensive information about illnesses, 
orders that apply, legal rights, treatments, other services 
provided/offered. 
Mental Health Act 2013 
(Tas) 
 
Schedule 1 - Mental health service delivery principles 
Interfere/restrict rights of persons in least restrictive way; provide 
services responsive to individual needs; enable therapeutic 
outcomes/ recovery/autonomous choices; involve and respect 
patients/ families/supports’ wishes in decision-making if 
consistent with patient wishes’ and consistent with health/safety of 
all persons; enable community participation; be accountable and 




The main objectives of Australia’s mental health legislation can be categorised in 
three main themes: 
1. To provide access and support to persons with a mental illness who do 
not, or cannot, consent to treatment, to public mental health services, to 
facilitate recovery;  
2. To safeguard the rights of persons with a mental illness; and 
3. To protect the public from harm. 
 
1 Accessibility of Mental Health Services to Persons with Mental Illness  
A person may seek voluntary access to mental health services and treatment and 
this will involve the provision of his or her consent to receive those services.  
That said, Australia’s mental health legislation is more concerned with 
permitting civil and forensic commitment and thus regulating the provision of 




who refuse to consent to, or subsequently withdraw his or her consent to 
treatment.143 When a person becomes subject to a civil commitment process, the 
requirement to obtain consent is generally removed by the relevant mental health 
statute, and the person becomes an involuntary patient, upon satisfaction of the 
statutory criteria (discussed below in section IV). Thus, in these circumstances a 
psychiatrist, or another authorised mental health professional, may override a 
patient’s refusal to consent to treatment. Neil Rees has referred to this as ‘clinical 
guardianship’ because a psychiatrist effectively becomes a substitute decision-
maker in relation to decisions about the provision of medical treatment.144  
Some statutes provide limited express regulation of access to public mental 
health services via voluntary admission. For example, the Northern Territory’s 
legislation provides express accessibility to services via assessment, admission 
and the provision of treatment as voluntary patients.145 A person may be admitted 
for treatment at his or her own request, and if a medical practitioner is satisfied 
the person is likely to benefit from treatment.146 A refused patient shall also have 
a right of appeal to that refusal.147 Moreover, the Mental Health Review Tribunal 
reviews the admission of long-term voluntary patients (a patient admitted for a 
period of more than six months).148  In New South Wales, a person may be 
admitted to a mental health facility upon request, but a medical officer may 
refuse treatment if unsatisfied the person is likely to benefit from treatment.149 A 
person also has a right to review of a decision to refuse admission.150 The New 
South Wales legislation provides jurisdiction to the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal to review cases of voluntary admission exceeding 12 months, in order 
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to formally establish that a voluntary patient continues to consent to treatment.151 
South Australia, Tasmania and other jurisdictions refer to the regulation of 
voluntary patients more sparingly, and do not provide for explicit regulation of 
voluntary patients to the same prescription as, for example, in the Northern 
Territory and New South Wales.152 In South Australia, the legislation provides 
for voluntary admission and some limited regulation of treatment and care 
plans.153 In Tasmania, the objects section of the legislation provides an explicit 
objective ‘to promote voluntary over involuntary assessment and treatment and 
the making of free and informed assessment and treatment choices’.154  
It is important to note that if a voluntary patient at any time satisfies the 
involuntary status criteria, the patient may then be re-classified to a type of 
involuntary status order. Mental health services in all jurisdictions can rely on the 
relevant apprehension for assessment provisions (discussed below in section III) 
for this purpose. There has been some concern that there is some potential to 
view and treat voluntary patients as ‘de-facto’ involuntary patients, particularly 
after an initial period of consensual and voluntary admission. Ultimately, at 
present the extent and efficacy of external oversight relating to voluntary patients 
remains unclear, and it may be that some enhanced statutory clarification around 
this issue may help to guard against some potentially negative outcomes of so 
called ‘de-facto’ involuntary status.155  
2 Safeguarding the Rights of Persons with a Mental Illness 
The objectives section in each jurisdiction indicate that the legislation places 
significant emphasis on safeguarding the rights of those who may, and do 
become subject to involuntary status. All jurisdictions refer specifically to the 
need to recognise and respect legal rights, some referring to human rights, and 
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particularly the need to treat persons with humanity, equality and respect for 
dignity.  
The objectives sections do not refer to specific rights, which are placed within 
the substantive sections throughout each mental health statute. For example, each 
statute establishes a scheme of substantive and procedural mechanisms 
endeavouring to protect an individual’s right to freedom from unlawful 
commitment including: 
• Minimum objective criteria to be met before an individual can be subject 
to involuntary treatment;  
• A statutory obligation for health services to notify involuntary patients of 
their legal rights shortly after admission; 
• Regular review of the compulsory treatment of individuals by a tribunal; 
and  
• The ‘least restrictive alternative principle’ as a guiding principle for 
decision-making (discussed below).156  
Moreover, beyond the prescription of specific rights contained in each statute’s 
substantive sections, each patient retains the same legal rights as all other persons 
at common law and under other statutes, unless otherwise clearly stated. 
Involuntary patients, for example, retain the common law right, not to be touched 
without lawful authority, which encompasses the provision of treatment outside 
the ambit of the mental health legislation. Persons who have a mental illness, but 
are not the subject of an involuntary status order may determine his or her health 
care and treatment to the same extent as any other person. For example, he or she 
is entitled to refuse medical treatment, even if doing so may result in the ending 
of his or her life.157 In the absence of consent, no one should provide medical 
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treatment to any person.158 Moreover, it should not be consequential that an 
adult’s decision about treatment is contrary to a clinician’s judgment about good 
medical practice in the particular patient’s circumstances, and, it should not be 
consequential if others believe the patient’s reasons for refusing treatment are 
irrational or unreasonable. A person’s body is his or her own, and he or she may 
refuse treatment or consent to it, according to his or her expressed will and 
preference.159   
(i) Recognition and Respect for Human Rights   
Notwithstanding the objectives and principles, which refer to the need to protect 
legal rights, the nature of Australia’s mental health legislation means that many 
human rights are invariably affected or even removed.160 Noting this reality, the 
Victorian legislation provides that the assessment and treatment of persons 
should occur in in a way that places the least restrictive imposition on human 
rights, 161  while the Northern Territory legislation explicitly provides the 
objective of providing care and treatment while protecting a patient’s civil rights 
consistent with the United Nations Principles for Protection of Persons with 
Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, 162  and the 
Australian Health Ministers' Mental Health Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities.163 A notable omission in the Northern Territory’s legislation 
(and the other jurisdictions when referring generally to human rights) is specific 
reference to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, ratified by Australia in 2008.164 This important Convention is the 
most recent of a series of international human rights instruments that have 
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focussed specifically on the rights of persons with a disability, which includes 
persons with a mental illness. Chapter five discusses the scope and application of 
this important Convention and other human rights instruments in establishing the 
normative framework of the research.  
(ii) Interpretation of Functions Consistent with the Least Restrictive Principle  
Each Australian jurisdiction, either in its objectives or statutory principles 
attempts to ensure that the interpretation of functions and powers are consistent 
with the least restrictive principle. In relation to medical treatment the dominant 
theme is that every patient has a valid claim to be treated in a way that imposes 
the least restrictive imposition of his or her legal rights (for example, on a 
voluntary and consensual basis), and in the least restrictive environment (for 
example, as an outpatient in a community setting). Thus, any reasonable 
alternative to coercing a patient into treatment should be availed, and all efforts 
should be made to ensure that any reasonable alternative to inpatient-based care 
and treatment should be administered.  
(iii) Community-Based (Outpatient) Treatment 
The least restrictive principle commonly manifests in the now widespread use of 
community-based treatment that gives effect to the objective of caring for and 
treating persons, as far as possible, near where he or she usually resides, and 
where a patient’s family, friends, and others are more capable of providing 
sources of support. Thus, the fundamental principle is that a person subject to an 
involuntary treatment order, where appropriate, may receive treatment and 
support toward recovery without subjecting the person to detention as an 
inpatient in a psychiatric institution. Community-based treatment are now an 
entrenched component of the Australian mental health regulatory landscape, and 
are said to perform a therapeutic purpose by providing a method of treatment that 
facilitates the normalisation, and reintegration of persons into civil society.165 In 
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many ways, community-based treatment may enhance patient autonomy and the 
potential for recovery by including persons in a familiar environment, while 
maintaining a method of supervision that is far less invasive than the practice of 
hospitalisation.  
3 Public Protection from Potential Harm 
The objectives and principles also emphasise that the rights and freedoms of 
mental health patients should be balanced with the community’s expectation of 
protection from harm. The legislation also emphasises the community’s interest 
in seeing the administration of justice and being protected from potential danger 
from those persons who may be released unlawfully from involuntary status. 
Given that treating institutions and mental health tribunals have the power to 
order the release into the community of persons who may prove dangerous or 
harmful to others, the public can claim an interest in seeing that institutional 
decision-making has as much regard for public safety as they have for the rights 
of the patient. From this viewpoint, the community has a legitimate interest in 
seeing that the mental health system does not neglectfully discharge detainable 
and treatable persons, lest there be circumstances in which members of the 
community may be harmed in some way. Thus, in all the Australian mental 
health statutory frameworks, a suitable balance must ultimately be found 
between the duty of the state to protect the community, and the legal rights and 
freedoms of persons who may be the subject of involuntary status orders.  
B A Principled Approach to Decision-making  
Tables 1 and 2, and the provisions identified above demonstrate that many 
jurisdictions provide for a particularly principled approach to the regulation of 
decision-making, which holds significance for many decision-making tasks 
under the legislation, but particularly those relating to the involuntary treatment 
criteria, and for decisions relating to open justice issues as identified in chapter 4 




administrators and service providers) provide that patient’s views and 
preferences should carry significant weight in decision-making.  
In Victoria, for example, the statutory principles provide that decision-making 
capacity is presumed;166 and there are several new principles that promote human 
rights and dignity; 167  participation in decision-making; 168  a preference for 
voluntary treatment;169 respect for a patient’s views and preferences;170 tolerance 
for decisions that involve a degree of risk; 171  and respect for patients’ 
autonomy.172 
In the Australian Capital Territory, like Victoria and New South Wales, it 
remains permissible to provide involuntary treatment to a competent patient who 
refuses to consent, but the decision must have considered the objects and 
principles of the legislation. 173 For instance, a key objective is to promote the 
capacity of persons to determine, and participate in assessment and treatment or 
support. 174   Further, the ‘Principles of decision-making capacity’ attempt to 
enhance a patient’s ability to exercise self-determination,175  and a person must 
be considered competent until all practicable steps to support the person to make 
the relevant decision have been taken.176  
These statutory provisions outlining the objects and principles of the statutory 
frameworks attempt to move closer toward implementing a supported decision-
making framework in Australia’s mental health legislation. They have been 
described by Callaghan and Ryan as predominantly aspirational in their 
regulation of a variety of decision-making tasks under the legislation, which 
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includes decisions relating to patients’ privacy, confidentiality and open justice 
related decisions (discussed in detail later in the thesis). For instance, although 
the objects and principles generally promote respect for human rights; 177 assert 
that decision-making capacity is presumed; 178  that voluntary treatment is 
preferred;179 that the dignity of risk should be respected; 180 and that patients 
should be placed at the centre of the decision-making matrix, 181 the statutory 
principles serve merely as ‘soft-law’ provisions lacking clear obligations to 
respect a patient’s will and preferences in decision-making.182 Specifically, as 
Callaghan and Ryan argue, an authentic supported decision-making framework 
requires substantive provisions beyond the principled approach that is evident is 
the current generation of Australia’s mental health legislation.183  
 
III APPREHENSION FOR ASSESSMENT AND THE POTENTIAL 
IMPOSITION OF INVOLUNTARY STATUS 
The first step to involuntary status commonly requires the apprehension of a 
person for the purposes of a psychiatric assessment to determine if the 
involuntary status provisions apply to the person either potentially as an 
inpatient, or outpatient on a community-based order. There are different 
provisions in Australia for the apprehension of persons suspected of satisfying 
the statutory civil commitment criteria for and their transport to hospital for the 
purpose of a mental health assessment. Various professionals, such as clinical 
staff, police and ambulance officers, and lay participants such as relatives, carers 
or friends are generally able to facilitate involuntary admission to a hospital for 
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the purposes of such an assessment. The most recent Annual Report of the New 
South Wales Mental Health Review Tribunal reports that the most common form 
of initial commitment to a mental health facility for these purposes is through the 
certification of a doctor, though there are also significant rates of apprehension 
via apprehension by police officers.184 
The prospect of apprehension for assessment often arises in a domestic or 
personal context, whereby family members or friends become concerned about a 
person’s behaviour. In these circumstances, a family member or friend may seek 
the involvement of police or health practitioners to initiate and authorise the 
assessment process. Apprehension for assessment also often arises in medical 
emergencies by police or ambulance officers, or by police officers involved in 
investigating criminal conduct whereby the interaction between a person and first 
responders leads to a belief or a suspicion that person has a mental illness, and 
may pose a risk of harm to him or herself or to others. There are differing 
statutory provisions in Australia for this purpose and in some statutes, the 
threshold for apprehension differs according to the expertise of the person 
undertaking the initial assessment, such as clinicians, ambulance officers, other 
mental health professionals, or police officers for which examples are provides 
below.    
In Victoria, a police officer may apprehend a person for the purposes of 
involuntary assessment and treatment if satisfied the person appears to have a 
mental illness, and because of that illness, the persons require apprehension to 
prevent serious and imminent harm to the person or any other person. There is 
explicit recognition that police officers need to be required to exercise clinical 
judgment to be satisfied a person has a mental illness.185 
In New South Wales, a police officer may apprehend a person who appears to be 
mentally ill or disturbed and take them to a mental facility if the officer 
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reasonably believes the person has recently committed an offence, or it is 
probable the person has recently attempted to cause serious harm to him or 
herself or another, and believes that it would be beneficial to the person to be 
dealt with under the mental health legislation rather than according to another 
law (such as the criminal law) that may be applicable in the circumstances.186  
In Western Australia, a police officer may apprehend a person if the officer 
reasonably suspects that the person has a mental illness, and because of the 
mental illness, needs to be apprehended to protect the health or safety of the 
person or the safety of another person, or prevent the person causing, or 
continuing to cause, serious damage to property.187 
In Tasmania, a police officer may apprehend a person if the officer reasonably 
believes the person has a mental illness, and the person should be examined to 
see if he or she needs to be assessed against the statutory treatment criteria, and 
the person’s safety, or the safety of others is likely to be at risk if the person is 
not apprehended.188 
As demonstrated above, there is often then a period in which a person becomes a 
candidate for civil commitment and the person may be apprehended for a period 
of time during which an assessment by a clinically trained professional is 
determinative, in most jurisdictions, as to whether civil commitment will be 
imposed. Thus, the initial point of contact with the mental health system is 
through contact with police or other authorised officers who may apprehend and 
detain a person on the basis that they need a mental health assessment under each 
mental health statute. It may be through a phone call from a hospital or a police 
station advising a family member that a relative has been detained for doing 
something odd or unusual. At such a difficult time, one would hope that the 
rights of such family members and the person detained would be fairly well 
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understood not just by the persons concerned but the legal practitioners who 
might be called upon to advise those persons, but in practice it has been observed 
that this is not the case.189 After the mental health assessment process has been 
undertaken by an authorised mental health service, formal involuntary status can 
be imposed where the statutory criteria are satisfied. The next section describes 
these criteria.  
IV CRITERIA FOR IMPOSING INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT 
An understanding of the involuntary treatment criteria in Australia is integral to 
providing the context in which open justice decisions at review hearings are 
regulated. This next section, alone, effectively demonstrates the importance of 
striving to enhance transparency in tribunal decision-making and maintaining the 
confidentiality of patients and the privacy of others, in equal measure. 
After a person, has undertaken a psychiatric assessment, the treating institution 
must determine if the statutory criteria required to impose one of the forms of 
involuntary status orders are satisfied. The decision to impose involuntary status 
is, in most jurisdictions,190  made by the treating team rather than a tribunal 
(although the initial medical decision must be ratified in some jurisdictions).191 
The requirements of each statute’s specific involuntary treatment criteria vary 
between jurisdictions, but generally require the presence of mental illness 
symptomatology, and the existence of significant or imminent risks to the person 
or to others because of that mental illness. Recent developments in law reform 
have also seen the requirement of decision-making capacity to consent to 
treatment assessments become more important as a specific criterion, and these 
are discussed further below. Table 3 provides each jurisdiction’s involuntary 
treatment criteria.  
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Table 3: Criteria for Imposition of Involuntary Treatment  
 
JURISDICTION CRITERIA FOR INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT 




S 12 - Person has mental illness, and lacks capacity to consent to 
treatment for illness; and the absence of involuntary treatment is 
likely to result in imminent serious harm to person or others, or 
person suffering serious mental or physical deterioration.  
Mental Health Act 2015 
(ACT) 
 
S 58(2) - ACAT may make an involuntary treatment order if person 
has mental illness; and either does not have decision-making 
capacity to consent to treatment and refuses treatment; or has 
capacity but refuses to consent; and ACAT believes on reasonable 
grounds that because of mental illness person is likely to do serious 
harm to self or another, or is likely to suffer serious mental or 
physical deterioration; and the likely harm or deterioration is of such 
a serious nature to outweigh person’s right to refuse to consent, and 
ACAT satisfied that treatment is likely to reduce harm or 
deterioration or result in improvement in psychiatric condition; and 
satisfied treatment cannot be provided in a way that is less restrictive 
of freedom of choice and movement.  
Mental Health Act 2007 
(NSW) 
 
SS 12-13 - Authorised medical officer opines that person is mentally 
ill or disordered and less restrictive care is not appropriate or 
available. 
S 14 - If mentally ill, there are reasonable grounds for involuntary 
treatment of the person to protect self or others from serious harm. 
S 15 - Person is mentally disordered if behaviour is so irrational that 
temporary care is necessary for protect self or others from serious 
physical harm. 
Mental Health Act 2014 
(Vic) 
 
S 5 - Person has mental illness, and because of illness, person needs 
immediate treatment to prevent serious deterioration mental or 
physical health; or serious harm to person or another, and there is no 
less restrictive means reasonably available to enable person to 
receive treatment.  
Mental Health and 
Related Services Act 2004 
(NT) 
 
S 14 – Person has mental illness requiring treatment because person 
is likely to cause serious harm to self or others; or likely to suffer 
serious mental or physical deterioration; person not capable of 
giving informed consent to treatment or unreasonably refuses to 
consent; and there is no less restrictive means of providing 
treatment. 
Mental Health Act 2014 
(WA) 
 
S 25 - Person has mental illness needing treatment and 
because of illness, there is significant risk to health or 
safety of person or to safety of another; or significant 
risk of serious harm to person or another; and lacks 
capacity to make treatment decision; and community 
treatment cannot reasonably be provided; and cannot be 
provided treatment in less restrictive way.  
Mental Health Act 2009 
(SA) 
 
S 12 – Person has mental illness requiring treatment for the person's 
protection from harm (including harm involved in continuation or 
deterioration of person's condition) or for protection of others; and 
there is no less restrictive means of appropriate treatment.  
S 13(3) - Treatment may be provided despite refusal to consent.  
Mental Health Act 2013 
(Tas) 
 
S 40 - Person has mental illness, and without treatment, illness is 
likely to seriously harm person's health or safety, or safety of 




status, and person does not have decision-making capacity. 
 
A Discussion 
Table 3 demonstrates variance in the specific criteria and variance at the 
threshold level of common criteria. Some distinctions between jurisdictions are 
noted in the following discussion, but the salient elements of the criteria to 
impose involuntary treatment are:     
• Presence of mental illness; and 
• There is a risk of harm to self or others, or, risk of deterioration of 
person’s illness; and  
• The person lacks decision-making capacity to consent to treatment; or, 
the patient unreasonably refuses treatment whether he or she has capacity 
or not. 
1 Presence of Mental Illness 
As Table 3 demonstrates, involuntary treatment may only be provided if a person 
is considered to have a mental illness. There has been a history of questioning the 
validity of the conceptualisation of mental health and mental illness, and how 
specific conditions can be characterised.192 These concepts are important because 
they provide the initial grounds on which individuals may be treated without 
consent, and it is  a finding of mental illness that is therefore a threshold issue in 
initiating and maintaining  involuntary treatment.  
The Annual Reports of Australia’s Mental Health Tribunals identify that acute 
psychotic illnesses are the primary diagnostic group associated with civil 
commitment.193 The most common illnesses associated with civil commitment 
include schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, manic depression, dementia, 
delusional disorder, depression and drug-induced psychoses. It is, therefore, 
persons with these diagnoses who represent most involuntary status patients, and 
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it these persons who are more likely to become subject to Australia’s mental 
health statutory frameworks regulating the civil commitment process. 
(i) Statutory Definitions of ‘Mental Illness’ 
In New South Wales, a ‘mental illness’ is defined as a condition that seriously 
impairs, either temporarily or permanently, the mental functioning of a person 
and is characterised by the presence of any one or more of the following 
symptoms: delusions; hallucinations; serious disorder of thought form; severe 
disturbance of mood; or sustained or repeated irrational behaviour indicating the 
presence of any one or more of those symptoms.194 
In the ACT and the Northern Territory, a ‘mental illness’ is defined ‘similarly to 
New South Wales.195 In South Australia, ‘mental illness’ is defined as ‘…any 
illness or disorder of the mind…’196 In Queensland, ‘mental illness’ means a 
condition characterised by a clinically significant disturbance of thought, mood, 
perception or memory.197 Victoria defines ‘mental illness’ similarly.198  
In Tasmania, ‘mental illness’ is defined as someone who experiences, 
temporarily, repeatedly or continually a serious impairment of thought (which 
may include delusions); or a serious impairment of mood, volition, perception or 
cognition; and nothing prevents the serious or permanent physiological, 
biochemical or psychological effects of alcohol use or drug-taking from being 
regarded as an indication the person has a mental illness.199 
In Western Australia, mental illness is defined as a condition that is characterised 
by a disturbance of thought, mood, volition, perception, orientation or memory; 
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and significantly impairs (temporarily or permanently) the person’s judgment or 
behaviour.200  
All jurisdictions except South Australia and Tasmania expressly provide that the 
determination of mental illness must be made only in accordance with 
internationally accepted medical standards. Thus, the determination of mental 
illness in Australia must occur through a proper examination and diagnosis 
undertaken and confirmed by qualified practitioners. A qualified medical 
practitioner is generally stated to be a qualified psychiatrist; although, for the 
purposes of assessment, this may include a doctor, clinical psychologist, nurse, 
social worker, or other appropriately trained person holding specific skills 
relevant to mental health care.  
One of the major challenges for the psychiatric profession has been to establish a 
consensus as to an appropriate taxonomy of various mental illnesses.201 There are 
two major (yet similar) diagnostic manuals in which the psychiatric profession 
relies upon not only in Australia, but throughout the world of western medicine - 
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) and the WHO’s International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD).202 Modern psychiatry relies on clinical judgment and the posited 
expertise of those predecessors who are responsible for formulating the criteria 
for specific mental disorders contained in these classification manuals. Medical 
testing such as pathology services and medical imaging techniques are not 
helpful for diagnostic purposes in the field of psychiatry, and this constitutes a 
significant basis of many criticisms of the psychiatric profession. It is the posited 
unscientific nature of the creation of specific mental illnesses, the subsequent 
clinical diagnosis of those illnesses and the actual treatment of them that is so 
often the basis of claims that the practice of psychiatry is overly deferential to the 
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clinical discretion of each individual practitioner’s subjective judgment rather 
than objective and verifiable scientific tests.203  
Although Australian psychiatrists continue to utilise the World Health 
Organization’s Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders (ICD),204 the 
DSM-IV-TR, 205  the diagnostic tool used most commonly by the Australian 
psychiatric profession. 206  But, regardless of which diagnostic tool, it is a 
psychiatrist’s perception of the existence of a recognised mental illness in either 
of these documents that is axiomatic to the lawful operation of Australian mental 
health legislation and the lawful process of civil commitment.    
(ii) Exclusory Factors 
All Australian jurisdictions except South Australia expressly lists stand-alone 
exclusionary factors that must not, in isolation, form the basis of a determination 
of mental illness. For instance, considerations of ethnic, political, religious,207 or 
cultural status are exclusionary factors provided in most jurisdictions. 
Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory provide for 
the following exclusionary factors: political status; economic status; social status; 
membership of a cultural group; membership of a religious group; membership 
of a racial group; moral non-conformity; and sexual orientation. Some 
jurisdictions also exclude conditions such as psychosexual disorder or antisocial 
personality and others have recognised the exclusion of so called ‘untreatable’ 
conditions, such as intellectual disability. Accordingly, there may be behaviours 
that are present, but they must not, of themselves, indicate the presence of a 
mental illness. These factors include:  
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• Political, cultural or religious, philosophical opinions or beliefs; 
• Sexual preference, orientation or promiscuity; 
• Immoral conduct; 
• Illegal conduct or other anti-social behaviour; 
• The presence of a developmental disability of mid; 
• The person has consumed alcohol or another drug; 
• Membership of a cultural or racial group; 
• A social or economic status.  
2 Harm and Risk Assessment 
The criteria to impose involuntary treatment in all cases requires more than the 
presence of a mental illness. Each jurisdiction restricts the imposition of 
involuntary treatment unless an authorised mental health service can demonstrate 
that because of the mental illness, there is a prospect of harm that may come to 
the person or to others. There is some variation as to whether the harm must be 
imminent, and the type and intensity of the potential harm. 
In New South Wales, the requirement is that there are reasonable grounds for 
care of the person to protect the person or others from ‘serious harm’. The 
Mental Health Act Guide Book interprets ‘serious harm’ to include any physical 
and financial harm; and harm to reputation, relationships, neglect to self or others 
including children.208 In South Australia, the threshold is that a person must 
require protection from harm, which includes the deterioration in the person’s 
condition. Tasmania requires a significant risk of harm, and in Victoria, the 
threshold is that a person requires treatment for their health or safety or to 
prevent deterioration in physical or mental condition.  
In Western Australia’s the threshold requirement is satisfaction that there is a 
significant risk of ‘serious harm’ to the person or others, or, to protect the ‘health 
or safety’ of the person or others. Western Australia also expressly states that the 
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risk of harm can include ‘...serious property damage.’ Moreover, in Western 
Australia, self-inflicted harm may include serious financial harm; harm to any 
personal relationship; and serious damage to reputation. This along with the 
statutory criteria in New bSouth Wales, provides, perhaps, Australia’s most 
expressly paternalistic threshold for the imposition of involuntary status, because 
of the broadly stated nature of the potential harm that must be established, such 
as financial, or reputational harm.  
(i) Low risk Thresholds are Prevalent (Based on Welfare Considerations) 
Table 3 demonstrates that Australia’s legislation provides expressly for low risk 
thresholds using terminology that allows the imposition of involuntary status 
where treatment is necessary for the welfare of the patient; which includes 
provisions that include necessity to benefit the health of the patient or to prevent 
the likely deterioration in a person’s condition; or to simply prevent ‘harm’ to 
oneself. Risk in this sense may refer to the risk of deterioration to a person’s 
health, safety, reputation, or personal relationships as defined under Western 
Australia’s legislation.  
Assessing risk in the legal and medical contexts is a controversial issue, with 
many studies that question the accuracy of risk assessment methods, leading 
scholars to question the evidentiary reliability of approaches to assessment.209 
There are some studies that suggest that persons with a mental illness are no 
more dangerous than ordinary members of society.210  Moreover, in the specific 
context of risk of future conduct in sexual offenders, Coyle has claimed that 
given the evidentiary unreliability of current assessment methodologies, 
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miscarriages of justice should not be unexpected; the very subjective nature of 
risk assessment means that judgments are always subject to potential error. 211   
In 2010, the Human Rights Committee heard a complaint in relation to the 
detention of Robert James Fardon, after his 14-year term of imprisonment under 
Queensland’s Dangerous Prisoners legislation,212 which was claimed to violate 
article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.213 The 
Committee commented that:  
The concept of feared or predicted dangerousness to the community applicable in the case of 
past offenders is inherently problematic. It is essentially based on opinion as distinct from 
factual evidence, even if that evidence consists in the opinion of psychiatric experts. But 
psychiatry is not an exact science. The DPSO on the one hand, requires the Court to have 
regard to the opinion of psychiatric experts on future dangerousness but, on the other hand, 
requires the Court to make a finding of fact of dangerousness. While Courts are free to accept 
or reject expert opinion and are required to consider all the other relevant evidence, the reality 
is that the Courts must make a finding of fact on the suspected future behaviour of a past 
offender, which may or may not materialise.214 
The quote above demonstrates that the United Nations has acknowledged the 
problematic nature of risk assessments. It is inherently difficult to predict the 
future behaviour of any person, yet this is precisely what treating teams, courts 
and tribunals are required to do in making findings of risk of future harm or 
dangerousness, which are required by all of Australia’s mental health statutory 
criteria in order to impose civil commitment and involuntary treatment upon 
persons with a mental illness.215  
The literature on risk assessment demonstrates that there is no ideal approach in 
the assessment of risk, 216  and assessments vary according to individual 
characteristics and the number of cumulative risk factors observed in each 
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person. However, a number of risk predictor variables include the incidence of 
past violence, substance abuse, state of mind, situational triggers, personality 
constructs, other interpersonal factors, and mental illness itself.217 Freckelton has 
discussed the employment of risk ‘descriptors’ (common terms contained within 
clinicians’ medical reports) and also within the judgments of the Victorian 
Mental Health Review Board. A person’s perception of their illness (his or her 
‘insight’) is the most widely used variable in the risk assessment process. Other 
widely used descriptors include, ‘non-compliant’, ‘promiscuous’, ‘absconder’, 
‘substance dependent’, ‘disorganised’, ‘poor hygiene’, and ‘impaired judgment’. 
Freckelton claims that such descriptors have the potential to cause discrimination 
and he has therefore questioned the legitimacy and applicability of their use in 
the process of risk assessment.218 Moreover, Coyle has argued that the inherent 
unreliability in risk assessment methodologies risks producing miscarriages of 
justice.219 
3 Capacity (Competence) to Consent to Treatment 
Table 3 demonstrates that in some jurisdictions, involuntary treatment can only 
be provided to a person who cannot consent to treatment.220 And, there is some 
variance in the threshold requirements for establishing the necessary mental 
capacity. In the Tasmanian, Western Australian, and Queensland’s legislation, 
the treatment criteria prescribe a more stringent incapacity-based criterion. 
Involuntary treatment cannot be provided if the person retains mental decision-
making capacity and he or she refuses treatment.221A decision-making capacity 
test typically considers the abilities required of a functional capacity test, such as 
the ability to understand information relevant to the decision, and to use and 
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weigh that information to decide. 222  For example, Queensland’s legislation 
asserts that a patient must not be given involuntary treatment unless he or she 
lacks the capacity to consent to the proposed treatment. A person has capacity to 
consent under the Act, if the person is capable of understanding, in general terms, 
the following: that the person has an illness, or symptoms of an illness that 
affects the person’s mental health and wellbeing; the nature and purpose of the 
proposed treatment for the illness; the benefits and risks of the treatment, and any 
alternatives to the treatment; the consequences of not receiving the treatment; 
and, is capable of making a decision about the treatment and communicating the 
decision in some way.223 Queensland’s provisions further provide that a person 
may be supported by another to understand the requirements to satisfy the 
decision-making capacity test;224  a support-based provision that is lacking in 
other Australian statutory frameworks.225  
In Tasmania, an adult does not have decision-making capacity if established, on 
the balance of probabilities, that: he or she is unable to make the decision 
because of an impairment of, or disturbance in, the functioning of the mind or 
brain; and he or she is unable to understand information relevant to the decision; 
or retain information relevant to the decision; or use or weigh information 
relevant to the decision; or communicate the decision (whether by speech, 
gesture or other means).226 In Western Australia, a person has decision-making 
capacity if the person has the capacity to understand the proposed treatment and 
alternatives (after clear explanation); and understand the matters involved in 
making the treatment decision; and understand the effect of the treatment 
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decision; and weigh up the factors involved in making the decision; and 
communicate the decision in some way.227   
A differing approach operates in the Australian Capital Territory, New South 
Wales and Victoria, which requires decision-making capacity as one factor, 
amongst others, which cumulatively permit the provision of involuntary 
treatment to competent patients in some circumstances. The New South Wales 
legislation, for example, permits involuntary treatment in situations where a 
competent person has a mental illness, and where treatment is necessary to 
protect the person or others from serious harm, and if there is no less restrictive 
appropriate care reasonably available.228 The legislation does not define capacity, 
and courts will likely interpret the term with reference to other mental health 
legislation and the common law.229 Higher court decisions have held that the 
right of a competent individual to refuse treatment is protected even if the 
decision is ‘not sensible, rational or well considered’,230 and even if refusal will 
likely lead to death or serious injury. 231  Thus, while an objectively unwise 
decision may form part of a rationale to begin to question whether a person has 
decision-making capacity, the nature of the decision, on its own, cannot be 
determinative of the issue of competence. The assessment of decision-making 
capacity involves an assessment of the person’s ability to undertake the process 
of coming to the decision, not the quality or worth of the decision itself. For 
example, when a person decides to cease his medication, the objective 
irrationality of this decision is not determinative of whether he or she has the 
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capacity to make this decision, even if the treating team feel that such a cessation 
might ultimately place his or her life in danger.232  
The statutory capacity tests reflect the common law in that decision-making 
capacity is relevant to a person’s ability to make a specific decision, and to a 
person’s ability to decide at the time the assessment is made, and as such, 
capacity assessments may be valid for a limited or intermittent periods. 233 There 
is a common law presumption of capacity and an explicit presumption (yet 
rebuttable) in most jurisdictions’ mental health legislation, 234  which begs a 
question as to what procedures should ensue if a person refuses to cooperate with 
clinicians in assessing mental decision-making capacity, regardless of whether 
the relevant jurisdiction is one in which a capacity assessment is a necessary 
requirement for involuntary treatment or not. 235  Ryan, Callaghan and Peisah 
suggest that: 
…a capacity assessment should be made where a person appears to have a form of mental 
illness that is likely to impair his or her decision-making capacity, and where that person 
appears to be making a decision that may entail serious adverse effects, such as significant 
suffering, loss of property, failure to provide for the necessitates of life, serious illness or 
injury, violent or self-harming behaviour, or choices that seem inconsistent with the person’s 
usual values, wishes and preferences.236  
At this point, it is pertinent to state that this thesis, in chapter five and six, will 
argue, for a more absolutist approach in the specific context of decisions relating 
to privacy, confidentiality and the principle of open justice, based on the 
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interpretation provided by General Comment No 1, published by the UN 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee), which 
clarifies the content and scope of article 12 of the CRPD. That is to say, that 
given the clear and unambiguous language provided by the CRPD Committee, 
even those persons who have impaired capacity (even to the extent severe 
functional incapacity) retain legal capacity, and should not be the subject of 
substituted decision-making;  as a posited universal human right, the right to legal 
capacity applies to all persons, and all persons should be supported to make 
decisions for themselves regardless of the result of his or her mental capacity 
assessment. 237   
(i)  Unreasonable Refusals Override a Competent Patient’s Refusal to Consent 
Under some Australian mental health legislation, such as the Northern Territory, 
the possession of decision-making capacity is not a threshold issue for the 
imposition of involuntary treatment given that the decision of a competent adult 
to withhold consent can be lawfully overridden if a person diagnosed with mental 
illness unreasonably refuses proposed treatment. The term ‘unreasonably 
refused’ is not defined in any of the relevant legislation, but there is an express 
availability of a refusal to consent proxy for mental decision-making capacity as 
a lawful basis for imposing involuntary treatment. There are varying approaches. 
Australian jurisdictions adopt either a combination of a capacity test with a low 
risk assessment, as is the case in Northern Territory, or, a low threshold capacity 
requirement and a stringent risk threshold as now operates in Victoria and the 
Australian Capital Territory.  
V MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENTS 
Once a person has been formally committed for involuntary treatment, the 
process moves to the development and establishment of a treatment plan, which 
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then invariably involves the provision of involuntary treatment. Commonly used 
forms of treatment include psychotherapy, which involves personal interventions 
such as cognitive behavioural therapy focusing on treating the cognitive practices 
underpinning behaviours of specific mental illnesses.238 The use of psychotropic 
medications is also common. For example, antidepressants or anti-anxiety type 
medications may be prescribed for depressive conditions; mood stabilisers for bi-
polar conditions; and antipsychotics for schizophrenia and similar illnesses.239  
A Scoping Treatment at Common Law 
In the mental health law context, treatment at common law has been 
conceptualised broadly for those jurisdictions with a statutory definition. In Re 
Grigor the Court conceptualised treatment as ‘...management in the application 
of remedies; medical or surgical application of service’. 240 In Re Langham & 
Ors, the Supreme Court of Queensland was asked to consider the nature of 
treatment under guardianship and mental health legislation. Chesterman J stated 
that treatment ‘addressed the symptoms of a disease are part of its treatment 
through their function is to reduce the patient’s suffering and distress rather than 
to cure the disease’.241 Moreover, treatment was viewed as anything done with 
the intention of having a therapeutic effect including if it relates to or is 
connected with measures taken the cure the disease such as the alleviation of 
suffering.242 However, Chesterman J also stated that ‘treatment is wider than the 
merely curative.’243 It was regarded as applying to ‘…anything which addressed 
any aspects of the illness’.244 For example, where a patient resides may in some 
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circumstances be regarded as treatment under an involuntary treatment order.245 
Ultimately, Chesterman decided that the provision of artificial nutrition and 
hydration (ANH) was treatment within the scope of mental health legislation for 
the specific treatment of schizophrenia.246  Other cases have held that certain 
procedures can be considered treatment. For example, in Re CJ it was held 
treatment provided for an underlying medical condition may also be considered 
within the scope of mental health treatment.247   For instance, in the United 
Kingdom, it has been held that the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration 
has been considered within the scope of treatment for anorexia,248 borderline 
personality disorder.249 In R (on application of B) v Ashworth Hospital Authority, 
the Court held that it was lawful to treat a person under the mental health 
legislation with treatment that is supplementary to that illness, but excluding 
anything that would be supplementary to a physical illness.250 The case law 
appears to have extended the circumstances in which treatment may be given 
without consent, and it thus appears that the definition of treatment as interpreted 
by the courts gives rise to a broad interpretation of the nature and scope of 
treatment.    
1 Regulated Treatments Under the Mental Health Legislation 
There are forms of treatment that are restricted in relation to being administered 
without a person’s informed consent, or are restricted outright on the basis that 
they have a history of dangerous side effects and questionable efficacy. A 
thorough history and detailed description of the nature of the regulated 
treatments under mental health legislation is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
it is important to identify the treatments and to give a brief account of their 
general nature, which the following sections discuss briefly. 
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(i) Electroconvulsive Therapy  
Electroconvulsive treatment (ECT) as is one of the more controversial forms of 
therapy, although it is generally regarded as a safe procedure when properly 
administered with appropriate safeguards in place. 251  It is defined as ‘the 
application of electric current to specific areas of the head to produce a 
generalised seizure that is modified by general anaesthesia and the administration 
of a muscle relaxing agent’. 252  The treatment ‘…induces complex effects, 
including neurotransmitter release, a transient increase in blood-brain barrier 
permeability, secretion of hypothalamic and pituitary hormones, and a 
modulation of neurotransmitter receptors similar to those induced by anti-
depressant drugs’. 253  Accordingly, the procedure is considered to be most 
effective in the treatment of severe depressive illness, although it may have some 
therapeutic benefit for other categories of mental illness. A typical course of ECT 
involves up to 12 procedures at a rate of two or three per week. 254  
ECT throughout Australia is a regulated treatment and there slightly varying 
approaches to the procedures for justifying its provision to involuntary status 
patients. Most jurisdictions require the approval of a tribunal where informed 
consent cannot be obtained.255 In Queensland, for example, ECT must not be 
performed upon a patient without obtaining their informed consent or with the 
authority of a mental health tribunal.256 If a person is not an involuntary patient, 
ECT cannot be administered against their wishes.257  
Where a patient withholds consent to ECT, or lacks the capacity to give informed 
consent, most states and territories provide alternative means for authorising 
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ECT. For example, the treatment may be provided without consent is urgently 
required for the benefit of the patient and/or alternative treatment has been used 
and not been successful in treating the patient. Some states and territories give 
provisions regarding the number of occasions ECT can be administered to a 
patient.  
(ii) Psychosurgery  
Apart from the ECT perhaps the most controversial of the regulated treatments is 
psychosurgery, which involves an permanent surgical intrusion into a person’s 
brain; it is defined under the Queensland legislation as ’neurosurgical procedure 
to diagnose or treat a mental illness...’258 Psychosurgery may only be performed 
on a person if that person has given informed consent to the treatment and the 
tribunal has given approval to the treatment. 259  In providing its approval, a 
tribunal must be satisfied that the patient has the capacity to give, and has given, 
informed consent, that the psychosurgery has clinical merit and is appropriate, 
that all available alternatives have been given without resulting in a sufficient 
and lasting benefit and that the surgery will be performed at an authorised mental 
health service by a suitably qualified person.260 
(iii) Other Treatments 
Other forms of treatment are prohibited from administration in any circumstances 
under mental health legislation. Specifically, deep sleep therapy and insulin 
induced coma therapy must not be administered to any person under any 
circumstances. 261  Sterilisation as form of treatment for mental illness is 
prohibited under international law but is not expressly dealt with under 
Queensland law.262 
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(iv) Physical Restraint and Seclusion  
Involuntary patients can be physically restrained and secluded in some 
circumstances under the mental health legislation according to prescribed 
statutory criteria. Physical restraint is the use of physical force in order to prevent 
a patient from placing him or herself in a dangerous situation that may harm 
themselves or others.263 Mechanical restraint of an individual involves the use of 
a mechanical appliance to prevent the free movement of a person’s limb or 
body.264 The use of such restraint may be authorised by a doctor in the treatment 
of an involuntary patient in an authorised facility if the doctor is satisfied that it 
is the most clinically appropriate method of preventing injury to the patient or to 
someone else.265 Seclusion on the other hand is the confinement of a patient at 
any time during the day alone in a room or in an area from which free exit is 
prevented.266 Seclusion of an involuntary patient may generally be authorised if 
an authorised practitioner is reasonably satisfied that it is required to protect the 
patient or others from imminent physical harm and that there is no less restrictive 
method of achieving this.267  
One of the concerns expressed about the provision of treatment has been the 
potential for over prescription. It is an inherent risk that clinicians may 
erroneously, or otherwise, prescribe such a dose that side effects may prevent 
that person from adequately conducting normal activities of daily living, and it 
may be that such side effects may produce behaviour that might satisfy 
involuntary status criteria. 268  Some of the common side effects caused by 
psychotropic drugs include, but are not limited to: mania; anxiety; delusions; 
suicidal tendencies; aggression; and depression. A great concern, then, is that the 
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observable characteristics upon which the label of mental illness might be 
clinically diagnosed can also be conceivably produced by a treatment plan itself.  
There is considerable diversity in relation to the statutory criteria for the 
imposition of civil commitment in Australian mental health legislation, which 
places legal obligations on various decision-makers within the overall scheme of 
each statute. The general prerequisites for imposing involuntary status on persons 
in all Australian jurisdictions include:  
1. The person has a 'mental illness' as defined in the relevant statute and 
cannot consent to treatment; and 
2. Compulsory treatment of the person is necessary in order to prevent them 
causing harm to themselves or others; and 
3. No other care of a less restrictive kind is appropriate and reasonably 
available to the person.  
 
The precise legal thresholds between jurisdictions vary, but relate to the presence 
of mental illness symptoms and the existence of significant and imminent risks to 
the person or to others. Ultimately, the criteria include the formulation of mental 
illness, dangerousness or harm, capacity or unreasonable refusal, and treatability, 
all of which are objective criteria.269  
VI PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
This section identifies the general duties of privacy and confidentiality imposed 
in mental health legislation and duties imposed by other statutes of general 
application. It does not contain sections pertaining specifically to the operation of 
open justice at civil commitment review hearings, which are discussed at length 
in chapter four. 
All Australian mental health statutory frameworks contain provisions protecting 
the privacy and confidentiality of information about persons’ subject to civil 
                                                




commitment processes and others who may be involved in performing functions 
or mentioned in institutional documents kept under the statutory frameworks. 
Staff are necessarily capable of accessing personal and health information within 
mental health institutions, which is integral to the holistic care of patients. 
Medical information is frequently disclosed to several persons involved in the 
treatment and care of patients; information, which is capable of dissemination 
within the treating institution and its allied health staff. An involuntary patient’s 
health and personal information, and often by corollary, the personal information 
of others, is thus accessible by a variety of medical, allied health and 
administrative staff. By imposing statutory duties of confidentiality, the mental 
health legislation justifies the maintenance of personal privacy on the basis that 
the information is of an inherently sensitive and personal nature.  
For example, in Tasmania, there are several provisions relating to the privacy and 
confidentiality of patient information and personal information generally. Section 
106 of the Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas), imposes a penalty up to $25 000 if a 
person engaged or formerly engaged in the administration of the Act discloses 
personal information without the consent of person to whom the information 
relates. Moreover, section 133 creates an offence of up to 50 penalty units or 6 
months’ imprisonment for an individual, and up to 250 penalty units for a body 
corporate if a person publishes information that identifies that another person is 
or has been a patient, unless publication is expressly and freely authorised by, 
and with full understanding of the patient and the Chief Psychiatrist.270  The 
legislation defines ‘information’ as information that if disclosed about a patient, 
could reasonably be expected to seriously harm his or her health or safety, or 
seriously compromise treatment, or risk the safety of others.271 Moreover, section 
134 creates an offence of up to 50 penalty units or 6 months’ imprisonment for 
disclosing information of a confidential or personal nature about a patient in the 
discharge of any responsibilities under the Mental Health Act without the 
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patient’s consent, and where the treating medical practitioner considers it 
necessary for the patient's treatment and care, unless for example, disclosure is 
otherwise authorised or required by law, such as in connection with criminal 
investigations.272 In addition, a mental health authority, in giving information to a 
patient or to any private person about a patient may withhold, defer or qualify 
that information, but must place a note with reasons on the patient's clinical 
record.  
In New South Wales, section 189 of the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), 
disclosures of any information obtained in connection with the Mental Health 
Act or the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 are generally prohibited 
unless with the consent of the person from who the information was obtained, or 
for other lawful purposes such as research, or in relation criminal investigations. 
Similarly, in Victoria, section 346 of the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic), prohibits 
disclosure of health information generally (including in documents) about a 
patient. In the Northern Territory, section 91 of the Mental Health and Related 
Services Act (NT), creates an offence for disclosing information contained in a 
record of an approved treatment facility or agency that may identify a person as 
admitted to a facility or receiving treatment from an agency. However, 
information may be disclosed where necessary to perform a function under an 
Act in circumstances such as, with the consent of an involuntary patient, or 
where required, during criminal investigations or proceedings. Similar provisions 
apply in the remaining jurisdictions.273 
A Disclosure May Be Permitted in Some Circumstances 
Despite the default presumption of patient privacy and confidentiality, disclosure 
of information obtained during employment may be permitted in some 
circumstances. As noted above, disclosure may occur without a patient’s consent, 
if required or authorised by law, such as if the information is relevant to criminal 
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proceedings. Disclosure may also be permitted in several other circumstances. 
For example, in South Australia, notwithstanding the requirement that a person 
engaged or formerly engaged in administration of the Mental Health Act must 
not disclose personal information without the consent of person to whom the 
information relates, disclosure is otherwise lawful under section 106, for 
instance, where reasonably required to lessen or prevent a serious threat to life, 
health or safety, or public health or safety. Disclosure is also lawful if made to a 
relative, carer or friend of patient and is reasonably required for treatment, care 
or rehabilitation of the person and there is no reason to believe disclosure is 
contrary to patient’s best interests.274  
In all Australian jurisdictions, a patient’s nominated carer or guardian or lawyer, 
may generally access information, and like the jurisdictions noted above, 
disclosure may occur in some circumstances for the purposes of research or for 
the purposes of assisting police in the investigation of a criminal offence. Recent 
law reform in New South Wales, and other jurisdictions, has also seen the 
introduction of carers’ rights, which provides the right of primary carers to be 
appropriately informed about the treatment of and involuntary patient whom they 
are caring for, which includes notification of matters such as those relating to 
admission to hospital, medication regimes, forthcoming review hearings, and 
discharge plans. 
B Confidentiality Protection Under Other Statutes of General Application 
In each Australian jurisdiction, there are also statutes of general and specific 
application relating to personal and health information rendering it unlawful to 
disclose information about a person’s personal or health information to a third 
party, unless a relevant exception applies. Public sector health legislation 
commonly prohibits employees from divulging patients’ personal information 
obtained during employment. Moreover, Freedom of Information legislation in 
                                                




all jurisdictions prevents the disclosure of health-related information, and several 
information privacy statutes also require health practitioners to comply with data 
protection principles designed to protect the privacy of personal records, 
including health records.275  
VII  THE CIVIL JURISDICTION OF MENTAL HEALTH 
TRIBUNALS ESTABLISHED UNDER MENTAL HEALTH 
LEGISLATION  
This section introduces the processes of the civil commitment review hearing 
under the mental health statutory frameworks, iterating that the primary method 
of accountability for the imposition of involuntary status is the creation of a 
procedure (usually conducted by a mental health tribunal), which must 
periodically review the relevant statutory criteria in each respective jurisdiction 
to ensure that the imposition of involuntary status remains lawfully applied. This 
purpose is to outline the nature of the review process as prescribed throughout 
Australia because this provides the necessary context for the subsequent analysis 
of the open justice principle and its operation at review hearings in chapter four.   
A Establishment of the Reviewing Tribunals  
Each Australian mental health statute establishes a tribunal, or provides original 
jurisdiction to a generalist tribunal, which is responsible for monitoring the 
lawfulness of the civil commitment process. It is the review function of these 
tribunals that underpins this research, it being the principal mechanism of 
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accountability in the civil commitment process.276 It is each reviewing tribunal’s 
responsibility to ensure satisfaction of the prescribed statutory criteria required to 
initiate and maintain the civil commitment process.277 Mental health tribunals 
constitute the initial and on-going statutory review mechanism, each with the 
power to confirm, revoke or vary a patient’s involuntary status.  
Although Australian statutes provide mental health tribunals with wide 
discretions to determine rules, guidelines and procedures, there are nevertheless 
statutory provisions that tribunals must consider in decision-making, and 
prescribed rules, which must apply to their procedures. The specific rules and 
procedures of each reviewing tribunal are therefore prescribed by each state and 
territory’s’ governing statute, which in most cases (other than in South Australia 
and the Australian Capital Territory, discussed below), is the relevant 
jurisdiction’s mental health legislation.  
Two Australian jurisdictions (South Australia and the Australian Capital 
Territory) have subsumed the review of civil commitment responsibility to 
relatively new generalist tribunals (colloquially known as super-tribunals), which 
have a vastly greater jurisdiction across varying areas of law, but have divided 
these tribunals into specialist divisions. For example, in 2009, the Australian 
Capital Territory introduced the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 
(ACAT Act), which established the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(ACAT), and now subsumes several specific tribunals including the Territory’s 
former Mental Health Tribunal. The ACAT Act now provides generic rules, 
regulations and procedures for all applications and hearings. The ACAT is now 
responsible for the review of involuntary status orders and the procedures for the 
review of those orders are informed by a reading of both statutes together. The 
Territory’s Mental Health Act is an enabling law for the ACAT and may 
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therefore ameliorate the specific processes to be undertaken to some extent. For 
example, where provisions of the mental health legislation conflict with those of 
the ACAT Act, the mental health legislation prevails. 278  A similar tribunal 
framework operates in South Australia.279 
B Mental Health Tribunals’ Civil Jurisdiction 
The Australia mental health statutory frameworks provide mental health tribunals 
with a jurisdiction extending beyond the review of involuntary treatment orders. 
Some variation exists between jurisdictions in relation to the specific types of 
decisions a tribunal must determine. For example, some tribunals are required to 
determine the mental condition of persons for the purposes of determining fitness 
for trial; others may determine applications by patients to travel, or to reside in 
another state or territory, and some may determine applications for the 
administration of regulated treatments such as electroconvulsive therapy or 
psychosurgery. Some tribunals may investigate issues raised by official visitors 
regarding inpatients’ living environment, or issues relating to care and treatment 
to a limited extent. Though, generally, a tribunal’s jurisdiction to monitor or 
investigate the actual treatment provided to a patient is very limited.280  
The most significant function of all Australian mental health tribunals (and the 
function that is the primary subject of this research), is their jurisdiction to 
review the relevant statutory criteria authorising the imposition of involuntary 
treatment status in a tribunal’s civil jurisdiction, and, the operation of the open 
justice principle as a procedural aspect of this function. The review of a person’s 
involuntary status is essentially a merits review, though the case law has held that 
                                                
278 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 27.  
279 See Mental Health Act 2009 (SA), Part 11; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA).   
280 See, eg, Ian Freckelton, ‘Mental Health Law’ in Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy 




the reviewing function of mental health tribunals is characterised as a judicial 
function.281  
C Composition of Civil Commitment Tribunals 
Australian mental health tribunals consist of a full-time President and a multi-
disciplinary panel of professional members including lawyers, psychiatrists or 
other medical practitioners, and community representatives with relevant 
professional experience, such as social workers. The President of each tribunal is 
conferred with the authority to manage the operation of the tribunal, as would a 
Chief Executive Officer of another organisation. Each President makes directions 
in relation to tribunal business, including the number of members to constitute 
the tribunal for review hearings, and the scheduling and location of hearings. 
Tribunals generally operate not as a component of the public service but as an 
office independent of the wider State and Territory Health Departments. Tribunal 
members are appointed by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of 
the Minister under the state and territory Departments of Health and are 
responsible to the relevant tribunal’s President. This structure is said to promote 
operational independence by setting tribunal employees apart from all other 
Department of Health employees who are responsible to the Chief Executive of 
those departments.282  
There is considerable variation in relation to how tribunals must be constituted 
for review hearings. Though, in most jurisdictions, the typical composition of a 
civil commitment review hearing includes three members: one experienced 
lawyer; one experienced psychiatrist; and one community member who is neither 
a medical practitioner nor a lawyer.283 In discharging statutory responsibilities, 
                                                
281 See, eg, Kracke v Mental Health Review Board and Ors (General) [2009] VCAT 646 (23 
April 2009). 
282 See, eg, Frank Clair and Shelley Fisher, 'Powering - and Empowering - Through Change: The 
Queensland Tribunal's Experience of Transition from Old Systems to New' (2003) 1 Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law 184-85.  




tribunal members generally enjoy similar protections and immunities against 
liability in tort to the same degree as a state or territory Supreme Court judge.284   
D Review of Involuntary Treatment Orders 
Mental health tribunals in all jurisdictions must decide to confirm, vary or revoke 
involuntary status orders in their civil division, and whether the person should 
continue to receive involuntary treatment either as an inpatient in an authorised 
mental health institution or as an outpatient under a limited community treatment 
category.  The main purpose of a review hearing is to ensure that decisions to 
detain and treat a person only occur when a person meets the threshold treatment 
criteria.285 Although each jurisdiction mandates an initial review and subsequent 
periodical reviews, there is variation within each respective interval and role of 
each tribunal in whether it must authorise the initial decision to impose and 
involuntary treatment order. In Victoria and South Australia, for example, 
reviews must occur at intervals of not more than 12 months. In the Australian 
Capital Territory, Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania, further reviews 
must occur at intervals of not more than six months. In the Northern Territory, 
involuntary treatment orders must be reviewed at intervals not exceeding three 
months. In New South Wales, the tribunal must review the case of involuntary 
patients every 3 months for the first 12 months, and once every 12 months 
thereafter. Within these prescribed intervals, tribunals may also initiate a review 
of involuntary treatment at their discretion and must conduct a review on 
application by and involuntary patient at any time. Involuntary patients and 
persons on their behalf may also appeal the decision of a tribunal to a higher 
tribunal or court.286  
The Australian Capital Territory’s legislation is unique in Australia, in the sense 
that the it is the reviewing tribunal, which is responsible for making the initial 
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involuntary order rather than the clinical treating team. For instance, in 
circumstances where a competent person withholds consent to treatment, the 
ACAT can only issue an involuntary treatment order, if satisfied that the 
potential for harm to self or others, or deterioration in the person’s condition is so 
serious that it effectively overrides the person’s refusal to consent to treatment.287   
E Informal Procedures 
All Australian mental health tribunals (including ACAT and SACAT) have 
discretion to determine procedures and practice directions that govern the 
conduct of review hearings. For example, in the Australian Capital Territory, the 
legislation authorises the Tribunal to determine and apply its own rules and 
procedures to give effect to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under any law.288 In 
New South Wales, the Tribunal may similarly determine the conduct of business 
at any meeting of the Tribunal to give effect to its jurisdiction. The specific 
conduct of business at proceedings is therefore determined by each tribunal at in 
accordance with the practice directions developed and issued by each Tribunal’s 
President.289    
Common to all the mental health statutes is the requirement that hearings be 
conducted in an informal manner. They should be uncomplicated, expeditious, 
economical and free of technical forms common to superior courts. For example, 
the ACAT Act provides that in exercising functions, the ACAT Tribunal must 
ensure that procedures are simple, quick, inexpensive and informal as is 
consistent with achieving justice. 290  Queensland requires the procedure of 
tribunal to be exercised in a way that is fair, just, economical, informal and 
timely. In Western Australia, the Mental Health Tribunal is to act in compliance 
with equity, good conscience, and the substantial merits of the case without 
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regard to technicalities.291 Similarly, in Tasmania the Mental Health Tribunal 
must avoid unnecessary formality, act according to good conscience regarding 
the objects and principles of the legislation but without regard to technicalities or 
legal forms.292  
As is the case with guardianship tribunals, mental health tribunals operate as 
inquisitorial tribunals,293 and are responsible of making their own decisions on 
most issues, ensuring they have a sufficient understanding of the law and facts to 
establish the requisite satisfaction on which to found decisions according to the 
prescribed statutory criteria. Review hearings generally occur in an informal 
conference room, most commonly in an annex of the same hospital in which the 
patient has been receiving treatment. In the Australian Capital Territory and 
South Australia, review hearings occur in Magistrate’s Courts.  
F Standard of Proof 
Not all Australian mental health statutes refer to the standard of proof required to 
establish specific findings of fact in terms of the criteria specified in the 
legislation and it appears that tribunals members need not apply the Briginshaw v 
Briginshaw standard (on the balance of probabilities) in relation to the level of 
evidentiary satisfaction required. 294  Each presiding member takes equal 
responsibility for his or her decision, though tribunal decisions are determined 
according to consensus; the majority position constituting the final decision.295  
G Requirement to Afford Natural Justice (Procedural Fairness) 
There are difficult expectations placed upon tribunals. On the one hand, there is 
the need to conduct proceedings with considerations of efficiency and cost in 
mind. There is, as noted, a statutory requirement to remove procedural 
                                                
291  Mental Health Act 2014 (WA), Sch 2 cl 7. 
292 Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas), s 56; see also Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), s 151(1).   
293 Terry Carney & Fleur Beaupert, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses of Mental Health Review 
Processes’ (Paper presented at the 20th Anniversary Conference ‘Learning from the Past, Looking 
to the Future’, University of Melbourne, 6-7 December 2007), 26. 
294 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1936) 60 CLR 336.  




formalities that may in some ways inhibit parties’ full participation in review 
proceedings. On the other hand, mental health tribunals must afford the subject 
of each review hearing with natural justice (procedural fairness).296 Even in those 
jurisdictions that have no explicitly prescribed the requirement of natural justice 
or procedural fairness, it is possible that a court will imply the requirement into 
the mental health legislation. This is possible given the well-established common 
law position that procedural fairness is required in respect of any administrative 
decision, which affects the rights, interests or legitimate expectations of a person 
in a direct and immediate way. 297 At common law, administrative decision 
makers must afford procedural fairness except to the extent that their 
empowering statute clearly requires otherwise.298 The requirements of procedural 
fairness are:  
• The Hearing Rule: a person is entitled to know the case made against 
them and be given the opportunity of replying;299 and  
• The Bias Rule: the decision maker must decide the matter impartially, 
without actual or apprehended bias.300   
Procedural fairness encompasses flexible obligations to adopt fair procedures 
appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of a matter,301 and much of the 
detail of these obligations may depend on the construction of the provisions of an 
empowering statute. 302  For instance, the overriding object of mental health 
legislation is to provide care and treatment to people with mental illness in the 
least restrictive environment. Some mental health statutes have a requirement 
that all functions under the legislation must be performed so that this object is 
achieved.303 Additionally, most mental health statutes contain express exceptions 
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to disclosure requirements, where revealing information to clients might result in 
harm.304 Thus, the precise requirements of the obligation to afford procedural 
fairness, whether it is expressed as a requirement in the legislation or not, may be 
modified in individual cases to avoid frustrating the overriding objects of the 
legislation. 305  Consequently, there may be a blurred line between hearing 
practices that potentially undermine traditional principles of justice, in pursuit of 
therapeutic objectives.  
1 Patient Access to Information in Documents 
Involuntary patients generally have a statutory right in each mental health statute 
to access information prior to a hearing, including access to the documents to be 
given to the reviewing tribunal to be considered in evidence. This would 
normally include the medical report, the most recent treatment plan, and the 
patient's clinical files. A patient or their representative is entitled to inspect any 
documents to be given to the tribunal about a hearing at least 24 hours before the 
hearing, but these timing requirements vary between jurisdictions.306  
All Australian mental health legislation provides for circumstances in which 
disclosure of all information to involuntary patients may not be appropriate. The 
grounds are generally that patient inspection or access would cause serious harm 
to the patient’s health, or the health or safety of another person; or involve 
unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of another 
person; or breach a confidentiality provision imposed by the supplier of the 
information. Despite making an order for non-disclosure, a tribunal may, where a 
patient is represented, order that the patient’s representative is entitled to access 
the relevant documents. This will almost always be contingent on the 
representative undertaking not to disclose the contents or the source of the 
documents to the patient. 
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2 Provision of Reasons for Decisions to Patient 
There is some variation within Australian jurisdictions as to the statutory 
requirements to provide involuntary patients with oral and written reasons for 
tribunal decisions. Australian mental health tribunals (in the absence of a 
confidentiality order) deliver decisions orally to the patient at the completion of 
the hearing, stating briefly the reasons to the patient and those other persons in 
attendance, if any.307 In addition, Australia’s tribunals, generally provide written 
reasons for review decisions to patients in a limited number of cases. In fact, 
although tribunal’s are required to record and maintain a record of proceedings 
capable of transcription, tribunals do not write reasons as a matter of course, 
unless an appeal had been lodged; where a tribunal determines that a case raises 
what it considers to be a significant issue, or in circumstances where the patient 
(or someone authorised on their behalf), has made a request for written reasons in 
the correct form, and prior to the expiration of the prescribed limitation period. 
For example, in Queensland, the Mental Health Review Tribunal must provide a 
copy of the decision (without reasons) to the patient. If the patient requests 
written reasons for the decision within seven days of receiving the notice of the 
Tribunals decision, the Tribunal must comply with the request within 21 days.308 
Similarly, the Australian Capital Territory’s legislation does not require the 
automatic provision of written reasons for decisions. In that jurisdiction, the 
involuntary patient or someone on their behalf must request written reasons for 
the decision within 28 days in the approved form after the day the decision is 
made. The Tribunal must then provide the applicant a written reasons statement 
for the decision within 28 days after the day the applicant requests the 
statement.309 Other Australian mental health tribunals must provide reasons for 
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decisions like the provisions contained in the two jurisdictions noted above.310 
Thus, involuntary patients do not have a right to receive written reasons for 
decisions automatically. Rather the involuntary patient, or someone authorised 
on their behalf, must request the reasons in the correct form and before the 
expiration of the relevant limitation date under each statute.  
In 2000, a report on Australia’s mental health tribunals commented that the 
provision of reasons statements need not be automatic, though tribunals should 
consider the views of the patient. 311  This seems to account for potential 
therapeutic benefit of recording the views of patients and assisting each patient 
and those who support them to understand the decision and why it was made.312 
However, this approach is problematic where the person may not be adequately 
informed about his or her right to request reasons.313  
3 Confidentiality Orders 
Mental health tribunals have statutory authority to make confidentiality orders to 
restrict the disclosure of certain information to an involuntary patient in certain 
circumstances. Confidentiality orders can direct who may or may not be present 
at a hearing; direct that a hearing, or part of a hearing, be held in private; prohibit 
or restrict publication of information given before the tribunal or matters 
contained in documents before the tribunal; or prohibit or restrict disclosure to an 
active party of information given before the tribunal, matters contained in 
documents before the tribunal, or the tribunal’s decision or reasons.  
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Confidentiality orders may allow a reviewing tribunal to withhold the actual 
reasons for its review decision if it satisfied that disclosure of certain information 
would cause serious harm to the health of the patient or put the safety of other 
persons at serious risk.314 In fact, all Australian mental health legislation provides 
for circumstances in which disclosure of any type of information, to an 
involuntary patient, may be considered inappropriate. The legislation provides a 
process whereby a tribunal or another party may apply for a ‘confidentiality 
order’ (order of ‘non-disclosure’). Confidentiality orders may operate where a 
tribunal is satisfied that patient access to particular information may cause 
serious harm to his or her health or the health or safety of another person. 
Alternatively, a tribunal may withhold information if satisfied that disclosure of 
information relating to the personal affairs of another person would be 
unreasonable, or disclosure would breach a confidentiality obligation imposed by 
the supplier of particular information. Confidentiality orders allow a tribunal to 
withhold sensitive information contained in particular documents to protect the 
privacy of the patient and others. Queensland’s mental health review tribunal’s 
procedure is illustrative. That tribunal may withhold specific documents the 
panel relied upon in its decision-making process. The tribunal may only make 
withhold those documents if it is satisfied that disclosure of certain information 
would cause serious harm to the health of the patient or put the safety of other 
persons at serious risk. 315 Queensland’s mental health legislation provides a 
procedural safeguard by ensuring that if the Tribunal makes a confidentiality 
order, it must subsequently disclose the withheld information to the patient’s 
lawyer or agent and give the written reasons for that order to that 
representative.316  
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The purpose of chapter three was to outline Australia’s statutory frameworks 
regulating the imposition of involuntary mental health treatment in the civil 
context. This was an important because it has demonstrated the common and 
salient themes, and some variations within those themes across Australia’s eight 
state and territory mental health jurisdictions, which make each jurisdiction quite 
similar, yet unique in the subtle differences in which each seeks to regulate the 
imposition of involuntary treatment in the mental health context.  
It can be seen, for example, that the objectives and principles underpinning the 
legislation are similar in that they all aim to provide access to public mental 
health services to persons with a mental illness who do not, or cannot consent to 
treatment; to safeguard the rights of patients, while balancing those rights with 
others to ensure that the wider community remains safe from harm.  
Much of the salient diversity in Australia’s mental health legislation can be 
observed in the criteria for civil commitment and the imposition of involuntary 
treatment, particularly in relation to the use of decision-making capacity tests as 
a criterion for involuntary treatment. This area of statutory regulation remains in 
a state of flux, given that some reforming jurisdictions have now included a 
varying threshold criterion that a patient should have capacity to consent to 
treatment in order to receive involuntary treatment. Nevertheless, where a person 
does not retain capacity to consent, those persons may still be provided with 
involuntary treatment in some circumstances, but there are some nuanced and 
complex variations in relation to these threshold tests, particularly in the 
requirements for establishing if a person has the necessary capacity; and the 
requisite type and intensity of harm that must be satisfied. Moreover, some 
statutes continue to enable a competent patient who unreasonably refuses 
treatment to be provided with involuntary treatment, and it is now the case that 




jurisdictions, since the first wave of modern mental health legislation was 
enacted in the post de-institutionalisation era. The mental health legislation 
across Australia in this critical area is now less uniform that it ever has been.  
Notwithstanding these contrasting aspects of the legislation, there are many 
common themes in relation to regulation of privacy and confidentiality, and the 
regulation of the processes of mental health tribunals. Chapter three 
demonstrated that involuntary patients’ privacy and confidentiality is important. 
Each statute provides a clear framework of provisions designed to protect a 
patient’s privacy through the imposition of obligations on those persons involved 
in the operation of the mental health legislation not to divulge information 
obtained during their involvement with the legislation. Maintaining patient 
privacy and confidentiality is certainly an important component in facilitating 
care, treatment and recovery of persons with a mental illness, and this aspect of 
the statutory frameworks and its relationship with the processes of reviewing 
tribunals becomes the primary focus for the remainder of the thesis.  
Chapter three identified that along with the statutory criteria to impose 
involuntary treatment, and the involuntary patient’s right of appeal from a 
reviewing tribunal’s decision, the primary method of accountability for the 
imposition of involuntary status in each jurisdiction is the establishment of a 
mental health tribunal, which must periodically review the applicability of the 
involuntary treatment criteria to each patient to ensure the authority to treat a 
person remains lawful. Again, notwithstanding some variance in jurisdiction and 
procedures, most tribunal processes are somewhat similar in the way in which 
they conduct review hearings. This is important going forward, because chapter 
four describes the operation of the principle of open justice at these review 
hearings. Thus, the final section of this chapter outlining the general civil 
commitment review process has provided the necessary context for chapter four, 




of the open justice principle, which constitutes the primary focal point of this 





CHAPTER FOUR: THE REGULATION OF THE OPEN JUSTICE 
PRINCIPLE AT AUSTRALIA’S MENTAL HEALTH CIVIL 
COMMITMENT REVIEW HEARINGS 
I INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of chapter four is to identify and to describe the statutory provisions 
directly relevant to the operation of the open justice principle in Australia’s 
mental health statutory frameworks. Chapter three contextualised this purpose by 
first outlining the nature of the mental health statutory frameworks that authorise 
the imposition of civil commitment in Australia. Chapter three also identified 
that the primary method of accountability for the imposition of commitment in 
each jurisdiction is the establishment of a mental health tribunal, which monitors 
the lawfulness of the commitment process by reviewing the applicability of the 
statutory treatment criteria to each patient. 
Chapter four demonstrates that each jurisdiction’s mental health statutory 
framework regulates with respect to the operation of all five elements of the open 
justice principle identified in chapter two. It also identifies that the frameworks 
recognise the importance of maintaining the privacy of an involuntary patient’s 
personal and health related information by prescribing a strong privacy 
orientation around the procedures of civil commitment review hearings and the 
outcomes of those hearings. This provides evidence of a clear pattern of 
protection of the welfare of involuntary patients on a welfare and at times, best 
interests basis. For example, in most jurisdictions the statutory scheme provides a 
presumption that civil commitment review hearings shall be conducted privately, 
and that the information presented at those hearings shall not be disseminated or 
published without leave of the tribunal. Although, each statute permits the 
opening or closing of proceedings by prescribing circumstances in which 
information about a review hearing may be suppressed or disclosed and 




parens patriae exception to the presumption of publicity in the mental health and 
civil commitment context. 
II THE OPERATION OF THE OPEN JUSTICE PRINCIPLE AT 
REVIEW HEARINGS UNDER AUSTRALIA’S MENTAL 
HEALTH LEGISLATION 
Table 4 below identifies the relevant statutory provisions that may have either a 
direct or indirect applicability to the operation of the principle of open justice at 
civil commitment review hearings under Australia’s mental health legislation. It 
demonstrates that Australia’s mental health statutes contemplate each of the five 
elements outlined in chapter two. It also demonstrates those statutes’ reflection of 
the common law parens patriae jurisdiction, in providing for the restriction of 
the flow of information that may emanate from a review hearing in the mental 
health context.   The Australian mental health tribunals generally have a closed 
and private nature, reflecting the generally private nature of the mental health 
statutory frameworks identified in chapter three. Maintaining patient 
confidentiality was  identified in that chapter as an integral aspect in the 
provision of care and treatment of persons with a mental illness. Table one shows 
that in most jurisdictions the statutory schemes provide that review hearings shall 
be presumed private and are closed to public attendance, and that no information 
presented at such hearings may be disseminated or published without leave of the 
respective tribunal. Moreover, each statute permits overriding a patient’s request 
to open (or to close and re-open) a review hearing according to either welfare, 




Table 4: Statutory provisions relating to open justice at Australian civil commitment review 
hearings 
JURISDICTION RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Mental Health Act 2016 
(Qld)  
 
S 741 – Review hearings by MHRT presumed closed to the public 
unless the tribunal directs hearing or part of the hearing open to 
public. Tribunal must not order a hearing be open unless the 
person agrees, and an opened hearing will not result in serious 
harm to the person’s health or risk the safety of another. However, 
an observer may attend if President approves and patient agrees.  
S 758 - Tribunal may publish final decision and reasons for 
decision, including, for example, if satisfied reasons may be used 
as a precedent, however, publication must not identify any person.  
SS 790, 791– Person must not publish report of proceeding or 
information relating to it. However, Tribunal may grant leave to 
publish if satisfied in public interest and not likely to identify a 
person mentioned or involved in proceeding. Offence of 200-
penalty units or two years imprisonment for publishing without 
leave of Tribunal. 
*Access to information contained in documents is additionally 
precluded through general duties of patient confidentiality under 
common law; the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); the 
Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 (Qld), and, the exclusion of 
the right to information of a tribunal’s judicial or quasi-judicial 
functions under the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld). 
Mental Health Act 2015 
(ACT) 
 
S 194 - Review hearings conducted by ACAT presumed private, 
but can open hearing if patient requests public hearing; or ACAT 
orders opening a hearing. A private hearing, however, is taken to 
be a hearing to which ss 39, 40 of the ACT Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) applies:  
S 39 ACT Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) – 
Right to public hearing outweighed by competing interests if 
tribunal satisfied private hearing required to protect morals, public 
order or national security; or because of interest in private lives of 
parties; or publicity would prejudice interests of justice. Tribunal 
may direct hearing occurs in private; decide who may attend; 
restrict publication of filed and/or received evidence whether in 
relation to public or private hearing, including disclosure to some 
or all parties. Offence ascribed up to 200-penalty units or six 
months’ imprisonment, or both, for contravention of such a 
Tribunal order.   
S 40 ACT Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) - 
Offence of 200-penalty units or six months imprisonment, or both, 
for recklessly disclosing information as a function under the Act in 
relation to a hearing held in private.  
*Access to information (including in documents) is additionally 
precluded through general duties of patient privacy and 
confidentiality under common law, and, the Health Records 
(Privacy and Access) Act 1997 (ACT), and, the exclusion of health 
related personal documents under provisions of the Freedom of 
Information Act 1989 (ACT). 
Mental Health Act 2007 
(NSW) 
 
S 151(3-4) – MHRT review hearings presumed open to public. 
However, if Tribunal satisfied it is desirable for welfare of patient 
or for any other reason, it may conduct hearing in private; restrict 
publication of any report of hearing or filed and/or received 
evidence whether in relation to public or private hearing including 
disclosure to some or all parties. 
S 162 - Offence up to 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 12 
months, or both, for publishing or broadcasting material likely to 





S 189 – Disclosure any information obtained in connection with 
MHA or Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 generally 
prohibited unless with consent of person from whom the 
information was obtained, or for other lawful purpose such as 
research under Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 
(NSW). Penalty up to 50 penalty units for contravention. 
*Access to information contained in documents is additionally 
precluded through general duties of patient privacy an 
confidentiality under common law, and, the Health Records and 
Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), and, the restrictions on 
disclosure of health related personal documents under provisions 
of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW). 
Mental Health Act 2014 
(Vic) 
 
S 193 – MHT review hearings presumed closed to public, 
however, Tribunal may order open hearing if satisfied in public 
interest. Provides explicit provision for patient to make written 
request for public, hearing upon which Tribunal must consider if 
an opened hearing would be a serious threat to the health and 
safety of any person; or prejudice the interests of justice. 
S 175 – Offence for contravention of secrecy provision, which 
requires a person who is, or has been, a member of Tribunal or 
other staff for directly or indirectly, disclosing information that 
may identify person involved in hearing, unless otherwise 
provided by law. 
S 346 - Disclosure of health information generally (includes 
documents) about a patient is prohibited.  
*Access to information contained in documents is additionally 
precluded through general duties of patient privacy an 
confidentiality under common law, and, the Health Records Act 
2001 (Vic), and, the restrictions on disclosure of health related 
personal documents under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 
(Vic). 
Mental Health and Related 
Services Act (NT) 
 
S 135 – MHRT hearings presumed closed to public, however, can 
open, either on Tribunal's or patient’s initiative. To open a hearing, 
the Tribunal must be satisfied the patient consents; the privacy of 
parties will not be adversely affected; and public hearing will not 
result in serious harm to patient’s health; or will not risk safety of 
others. 
S 132 – An involuntary patient, his adult guardian, decision-maker 
or representative must have access to medical records and reports 
before Tribunal. However, Tribunal may order involuntary patient 
not be given access if satisfied it may cause serious harm to 
patient’s health or put other’s safety at risk. In such circumstances, 
Tribunal may provide access only to adult guardian, decision 
maker or representative of patient, whom may be required to 
undertake not to disclose specified information, contravention of 
which may attract liability of 40 penalty units.  
S 136 - Tribunal must make audio recording of all proceedings by 
electronic means and retain for 12 months. Tribunal must give 
patient, upon request, copy of record at no cost, however may 
refuse, if satisfied it may cause serious harm to health of patient or 
risk safety of other persons. Tribunal may order only adult 
guardian, decision maker or representative of patient be provided 
copy, and requires those persons to give undertaking not to 
disclose specified information to which the undertaking relates. 
Contravention attracts penalty of 40 penalty units. 
S 138 - A person commits an offence liable to 40 penalty units, if 
person publishes name of involuntary patient; or information that 
results in identification of the involuntary patient. However, a 
publication is permissible of it is an official report made for Act; 




S 139 - Tribunal members, staff members commit an offence 
liable to 40 penalty units if person obtains information in course of 
its statutory functions; and uses, the information to disclose to 
someone else. 
S 141 - Tribunal may publish reasons for decision but must not 
identify patient. Tribunal must consider patient wishes; and be 
satisfied that: 
privacy of parties will not be adversely affected; will not result in 
serious harm to patient’s health or risk other’s safety, and, 
publication must be in public interest. 
S 91- Persons performing any function under MHA liable for 
offence attracting 40 penalty units for disclosing information 
contained in record of approved treatment facility or agency that 
identifies a person as admitted to facility or receiving treatment 
from agency. However, information may be disclosed where 
necessary to perform a function under an Act in circumstances 
such as with the consent of the involuntary patient, or where 
required, for example, during criminal investigations or criminal 
proceedings. 
S 92 – Only involuntary patient; his adult guardian; or patient’s 
decision maker may access records of information under MHA. 
*Access to information contained in documents is additionally 
precluded through general duties of patient privacy and 
confidentiality under common law, and, the Health Services Act 
2014 (NT), and, the restrictions on disclosure of health related 
personal documents under provisions of the Information Act 2016 
(NT). 
Mental Health Act 2014 
(WA) 
 
S 456 – MHT reviews presumed closed to public however 
Tribunal may open hearing. MHA provides no specific criteria.  
S 458 - A person chosen by involuntary patient may be present, 
however, s 456 provides power for Tribunal to exclude that person 
if satisfied it is not in best interests of patient.  
S 467 - Hearings must be recorded and capable of transcription.  
S 468 - A person must not publish information about proceedings 
that identifies a party or a person associated in any way with a 
matter relating to a proceeding. Contravention attracts penalty of 
up to $5 000 and imprisonment for 12 months for an individual, or 
up to $10 000 for a body corporate. Tribunal may, however, 
publish reports for legal educative professional purposes if 
identification of parties or others are not identified.  
S 576 - Person must not directly or indirectly disclose information 
obtained as consequence of their office, position, employment or 
engagement under current or former mental health legislation. 
Contravention attracts fine of $5 000. 
S 249 -  A person is not entitled to access medical 
records/documents relating to patient if psychiatrist reasonably 
believes disclosure poses significant risk to health, safety of 
anyone, or disclosure would reveal personal information about 
persons other than patient. 
*Access to information contained in documents is additionally 
precluded through general duties of patient privacy and 
confidentiality under common law; the Health Services Act 2016 
(WA); and restrictions on disclosure of health related personal 
documents under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 
2002 (WA). 
Mental Health Act 2009 
(SA) 
 
Part 11 – Provides original jurisdiction to the South Australian 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) to conduct reviews of 
involuntary status, which is regulated by the Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) (see below). The MHA is 




the following provisions relevant to elements of the open justice 
principle: 
S 106 – Penalty up to $25 000 if person engaged or formerly 
engaged in administration of MHA discloses personal information 
without consent of person to whom information relates. Disclosure 
is lawful, however, in some circumstances. For example, where 
reasonably required to lessen or prevent a serious threat to life, 
health or safety, or public health or safety. Disclosure is also 
lawful if made to a relative, carer or friend of patient and is 
reasonably required for treatment, care or rehabilitation of the 
person and there is no reason to believe disclosure is contrary to 
patient’s best interests.  
S 107 – Penalty up to $25 000 if person publishes report of any 
proceedings under MHA, however, upon application by person 
with proper interest in matter, Tribunal may, authorise publication 
if it does not tend to identify the person to whom proceedings 
relate.  
S 83A(h)(i) - A decision not to authorise publication of a report of 
proceedings before Tribunal is not appealable to the Supreme 
Court.   
S 60 Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) – 
Presumption that hearings heard in public, however, if satisfied it 
is in interests of justice; or by reason of confidential nature of 
evidence; or to expedite proceedings; or for any sufficient reason, 
Tribunal may conduct hearing in private, restricting publication of 
name and address witnesses; restrict publication of evidence or 
contents of any document produced to Tribunal; restrict disclosure 
to a party of evidence or contents of any document; and exclude 
any person from hearing.  
S 90 Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) - On 
application by any member of public, Tribunal may allow 
applicant to inspect or obtain a copy of any process relating to 
proceedings and forming part of Tribunal's records including 
transcript of evidence and any documentary material admitted into 
evidence.  
*Access to information contained in documents is additionally 
precluded through general duties of patient privacy and 
confidentiality under common law, and, the Health Care Act 2008 
(SA), and, the restrictions on disclosure of health related personal 
documents under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 
1991 (SA). 
Mental Health Act 2013 
(Tas) 
 
Schedule 4(9) – Proceedings of MHT are presumed closed to 
public unless it determines otherwise in particular instance. If 
Tribunal opens a proceeding to public, any party may challenge 
decision, upon which Tribunal may close (or reclose) proceeding; 
exclude any person with no direct interest; or exclude any person 
who has not been authorised to attend. Tribunal is to make and 
keep a record of each proceeding. 
Schedule 4(11) - Tribunal may publish record of any proceeding, 
particularly if it considers it of significance to operation of MHA, 
however, Tribunal is to suppress information that could reasonably 
disclose identity of any patient or any person. In addition, a 
published record is to be provided to every party. 
S 132 - A mental health authority (Chief Psychiatrist, any 
controlling authority or an approved medical practitioner), in 
giving information to a patient or to any private person about a 
patient in respect of any matter may withhold, defer or qualify that 
information, but must place a note about the withholding, deferral 
or qualification, with reasons, on the patient's clinical record; and 




information, with reasons, to MHT Tribunal; Information means 
information that if disclosed to patient could reasonably be 
expected to seriously harm patient's health or safety; or seriously 
compromise patient's treatment; or risk safety of others. 
S 133 - Penalty up to 50 penalty units or 6 months’ imprisonment 
for an individual and up to 250 penalty unit for a body corporate if 
a person publishes information that identifies that another person 
is or has been a patient, unless publication is expressly and freely 
authorised by, and with full understanding of patient and Chief 
Psychiatrist.  
S 134 - Penalty up to 50 penalty units or 6 months’ imprisonment 
for disclosing information of confidential or personal nature about 
patient in discharging any responsibilities under MHA without 
patient’s consent and treating medical practitioner considers it 
necessary for patient's treatment and care, unless for example, 
disclosure authorised or required by law or court; or about 
reporting or lawful investigation of a crime or unlawful act. 
*Access to information contained in documents is additionally 
precluded through general duties of patient privacy and 
confidentiality under common law, and, the Personal Information 
Protection Act 2004 (Tas) and, the restrictions on disclosure of 
health related personal documents under provisions of the Right to 
Information Act 2009 (Tas). 
 
The following sections will extrapolate Table 4, describing Australia’s regulation 
of the open justice principle by reference to the following three categories of 
open justice, as identified in previous chapters:  
1. Attendance at tribunal hearings 
• Freedom of the public to attend judicial proceedings. 
2. Publication of information about judicial proceedings 
• Freedom to report what occurred at proceedings; 
• Freedom to identify persons involved in proceedings; 
• Freedom to access documents relied on in proceedings. 
3. Judicial decisions and reasons 
• Freedom to access decisions and statements of reasoning. 





A Australia Prescribes a Default Presumption of Private Review Hearings in 
Six Jurisdictions 
In all Australian jurisdictions except New South Wales and South Australia 
(discussed below) there is currently a clearly expressed statutory presumption 
that review hearings be conducted privately and therefore those hearings shall be 
closed to public attendance.317  
1 Statutory Framework in New South Wales  
In New South Wales, the Tribunal’s review hearings are presumed open to the 
public.318 Moreover, the published Practice Direction of the New South Wales 
Mental Health Review Tribunal acknowledges that ‘Proceedings are generally 
open to the public…’ 319  Notwithstanding the clear statutory presumption of 
public proceedings, members of the public invariably do not attend review 
hearings for two significant reasons. First, review hearings occur at a hospital 
campus or via a video-link from a hospital campus. Thus, the environment in 
which a review occurs is not conducive to public attendance given, in part, 
because of the inherent spatial limitations and the lack of appropriate facilities to 
accommodate public attendance as understood generally in a curial sense. 
Second, given that there is no publication of scheduled civil commitment review 
hearings, only the parties and other actors who have a direct interest in a matter 
will have access to any knowledge that a review hearing will occur. Thus, the 
public including the media, having no personal/family interest or other direct 
interest in a matter, have no way of ascertaining when a review hearing will 
occur. Moreover, given that the New South Wales Mental Health Review 
Tribunal may close a review hearing (discussed further below), the statutory 
presumption of open hearings is a device that may be employed to merely 
encourage the participation of friends and family in supporting an involuntary 
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patient during the hearing of his or her matter. In practice, therefore, there is 
rarely a circumstance in which the Tribunal is required to order that a hearing be 
closed to the public, because only the interested parties will arrive at a hearing 
location with an intention of witnessing review proceedings.  
2 Statutory Framework in South Australia  
In South Australia, the mental health legislation is largely silent in relation to the 
applicable procedures of civil commitment review hearings, and is also silent as 
to whether review hearings must operate according to a presumption that they be 
conducted in public or privately. However, the legislation provides original 
jurisdiction to the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(SACAT),320 to conduct reviews of involuntary status, which is in turn regulated 
by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act. 321  That statute prescribes a 
presumption that review hearings are conducted in public with criteria to close in 
some circumstances (discussed further below). 322  
In South Australia, the lack of public scheduling of review hearings prevents the 
public from establishing when a review hearing will occur. Thus, in keeping with 
the practical effect of the statutory scheme in New South Wales (despite the 
conduct of hearings occurring in a generalist Tribunal environment rather than on 
a hospital campus), those persons without a direct interest in a matter have no 
way of establishing that a review hearing will occur, given the lack of publication 
relating to the scheduling of reviews in the Tribunal’s mental health list. 
Accordingly, the Tribunal will rarely, if at all, be required to formally direct a 
hearing be closed to public attendance.  
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3 Australian Mental Health Legislation Regulating the Criteria to Open a 
Presumptively Private Review Hearing 
This section analyses Australia’s statutory approaches to regulating the ability of 
a Tribunal to open a presumptively private review hearing. For the moment, the 
criteria apply only to the opening of review hearings to public attendance, and 
are therefore described in isolation from the remaining four open justice 
elements, which are described separately in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
(i) Statutory Framework in Six Jurisdictions with a Presumption of Private 
Hearings  
In Queensland, the Mental Health Review Tribunal may only open a 
presumptively private review hearing to public attendance if an involuntary 
patient agrees, and an opened hearing would not result in serious harm to the 
person’s health or risk the safety of another person.323 In addition, the legislation 
provides power to the Tribunal to allow an observer to attend if the Tribunal’s 
President approves and the patient agrees.324  
Queensland’s statutory scheme prescribes a welfare based test that enables the 
Tribunal to override a patient’s request to open a review hearing. 
Notwithstanding that the test allows a patient to make a request to open 
proceedings, the patient’s request can be overridden if the Tribunal considers that 
opening a hearing may result in serious harm to his or her health.  
Essentially, a patient’s final decision to open a review hearing to public 
attendance is derogable, based upon what the Tribunal may consider to be in the 
interests of a patient’s welfare, even where a patient has clearly expressed a will 
and preference to open a hearing.  
In the Australian Capital Territory, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(ACAT) may only open a presumptively private hearing if the involuntary 
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patient requests a public hearing, or if the ACAT orders one.325  At face value, 
notwithstanding the general and ambiguous terms of these provisions, the 
statutory scheme appears to respect an involuntary patient’s decision-making 
capacity to waive confidentiality rights and to subsequently enforce a right to a 
public hearing. Although, the statutory framework directs that a civil 
commitment review hearing is taken to be a hearing to which the ACT Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal Act applies, and thus the provisions of that statute are 
applicable to decisions relating to the opening and closing of proceedings to 
public attendance. 326 The statute’s language reflects that of article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil Political Rights (ICCPR),327 in its provision that 
competing interests may outweigh the right to a public hearing. The ACAT may 
open a review hearing if satisfied that doing so will not endanger morals, public 
order or national security, or adversely affect the private lives of the parties, or 
where publicity would not prejudice the interests of justice. Additionally, the Act 
provides express power to the Tribunal to direct who may attend a review 
hearing without providing further criteria.328 
The statutory scheme in the Australian Capital Territory while using different 
language that that prescribed in Queensland has similar legal and practical effect 
to Queensland. That is, it prescribes a welfare-enabled test that empowers the 
Tribunal to override a patient’s request to open a review hearing. 
Notwithstanding that the test allows the patient to make a request to open 
proceedings, the patient’s request can essentially be overridden by the Tribunal if 
it considers that opening a hearing would not be in in the interests of justice. That 
is to say, given the privacy orientation underpinning the mental health 
legislation, and the vast number of provisions relating to the importance of 
patient privacy and the enforcement of confidentiality, the Tribunal may make an 
                                                
325 Mental Health Act 2015 (ACT), 194. 
326 ACT Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), ss 39-40. 
327 International Covenant on Civil Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), art 14(1)-(2). 




order that opening a hearing will either adversely affect the privacy and 
confidentiality of the requesting patient, or it may rely on those considerations in 
determining that opening a hearing to public and media attendance may 
negatively affect the patient’s privacy in such a way that it outweighs any 
competing interests in opening the hearing, such as the public interest in the 
operation of open justice.    
In Victoria, the statutory scheme provides express provision for an involuntary 
patient to make a written request to the Mental Health Tribunal to order a public 
hearing,329 and upon receipt of that request, the Tribunal may only open the 
hearing if satisfied that doing so is in the public interest.330 The factors that the 
Tribunal must consider include, but are not limited to, whether opening a hearing 
would be a serious threat to the health and safety of any person, or would 
prejudice the interests of justice.331  
Practice Note 7 of the Victorian Mental Health Tribunal confirms that hearings 
are closed to the public, but provides guidance as to procedures regulating the 
attendance of observers at hearings. 332  The Practice Note emphasises that 
although it applies to observation only, it does not limit the exercise of the 
Tribunal’s power to order a hearing be open to members of the public if satisfied 
it is in the public interest. Ordinarily, one to two persons may be allowed to 
observe hearings, although in ‘special circumstances’, the Tribunal may approve 
more.333  
The Practice Note applies to persons other than the parties to the proceeding and 
who are not a patient’s carer, friend, family member, guardian, nominated 
person, advocate or legal representative attending the hearing at the patient’s 
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request or a person giving evidence at the hearing. It also does not apply to 
security personnel and interpreters who may be required to attend hearings. It 
provides that the Tribunal may allow the attendance of observers at hearings, but 
that even where the requirements of the Practice Note have been met, the 
decision to allow an observer remains at the Tribunal’s discretion, and that the 
Tribunal may request an observer to leave the hearing room at any time for any 
reason it thinks fit.334  
The Tribunal may open hearings to observation if the person has a ‘legitimate 
purpose’. The Tribunal considers the following observers to have a ‘legitimate 
purpose’:  
• Persons employed by or engaged in training at the designated mental health 
service where the hearing is held;  
• Persons undertaking research in mental health;  
• Persons employed by or engaged in training with the body providing legal 
representation or advocacy to the patient at the hearing;  
• Persons employed by or engaged in training at the Tribunal; and  
• Persons whose training in mental health would benefit by observing a 
hearing.335  
The Tribunal Practice Note states that the ‘Tribunal will take into account as a 
key consideration the patient’s views and preferences as to whether a Tribunal 
member or member of staff should be permitted to observe the hearing’.336 In 
addition, the mental health service or relevant body seeking to observe 
proceedings should obtain the patient’s verbal consent before the hearing, and in 
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obtaining that consent, must have discussed the following matters with the 
patient:  
• The name of the observer and why they wish to observe;  
• That the observer has been made aware of the confidentiality provisions 
under the Act;  
• That the patient may refuse to give their consent;  
• That there is no need to give any reason for such refusal; and  
• That refusal will in no way impact on the outcome of their hearing.337  
If the person wishing to observe the hearing is undertaking research, in addition 
to the requirements above, the person must write to the President requesting to 
observe the hearing, describing their area of research, the reason they wish to 
observe the hearing, and provide information regarding ethics approval of the 
research. Further, the person must demonstrate they are aware of the 
confidentiality provisions under the Act. If the President approves, he or she will 
consent in writing, including any directions or restrictions. The researcher should 
then provide a copy of the President’s letter to the Tribunal members at the 
relevant hearing.338  
The Practice Note makes it clear that the attendance of an observer is ultimately 
subject to the patient’s verbal consent at the hearing (assuming the patient him or 
herself attends), and that the Tribunal shall satisfy itself that the patient’s consent 
is voluntary and informed at the hearing.339 On the other hand, if a patient does 
not attend, the observer’s attendance remains at the discretion of the Tribunal 
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members at the hearing but the observer must have previously sought consent 
from the patient prior to the hearing.340  
All observers remain bound by the confidentiality provisions of the Mental 
Health Act.341 Further, an observer should not remain in the hearing room while 
the Tribunal members deliberate their decision, although he or she may be 
present when the Tribunal delivers its oral decision.  
The statutory scheme in Victoria, while using different language to that 
prescribed in Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory, again has a 
similar legal and practical effect because it prescribes a welfare-based test that 
enables the Tribunal to override a patient’s request to open a review hearing if it 
considers that opening a hearing would result in a serious threat to the health and 
safety of the patient or if it would not be in the interests of justice. As in the 
Australian Capital Territory, although the test allows the patient to make a 
request to open proceedings, the Tribunal may override the patient’s request if it 
considers that opening a hearing would constitute a serious threat to the health 
and safety of the patient or if it would not be in the interests of justice. Thus, 
given the privacy orientation underpinning the mental health legislation, and the 
emphasis in the legislation on the enforcement of patient privacy and 
confidentiality, the Tribunal may order that opening a hearing to public 
attendance and the media will result in a serious threat to the health and safety of 
the patient, or it may rely on those considerations in determining that opening a 
hearing in such a way would negatively affect the patient’s privacy in such a way 
that it effectively outweighs any competing interests in opening the hearing, such 
as the public interest in the operation of open justice.    
In the Northern Territory, the Mental Health Review Tribunal may only open a 
presumptively private review hearing upon written request, either on the 
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Tribunal's, or patient’s initiative.342 To open a hearing, the Tribunal must be 
satisfied that the patient consents to opening the hearing, that the privacy of the 
parties will not be adversely affected, and that a public hearing will not result in 
serious harm to the patient’s health, or will not risk the safety of others.343 
The statutory scheme in the Northern Territory operates in a similar way to 
Australia’s other jurisdictions by prescribing a welfare-based test that enables the 
Tribunal to override a patient’s request to open a review hearing if it considers 
that opening a hearing would result in a serious harm to the patient’s health.  
In Western Australia, the statutory scheme does not provide criteria for the 
Mental Health Tribunal to open a presumptively private review hearing to public 
attendance. However, the Tribunal may, on application of any person or on its 
own initiative permit a person to attend, or it may exclude a person (including a 
witness). 344  A person chosen by involuntary patient may attend the hearing, 
however, the Act provides power to the Tribunal to exclude that person if 
satisfied it is not in best interests of the patient.345  
The statutory scheme in the Western Australia differs from Australia’s other 
jurisdictions in that is expressly prescribes power to the Tribunal to deny a 
patient the ability to exercise decision-making capacity on the basis of a clearly 
expressed best-interests test. That is, it may exclude any person if satisfied that 
the person’s attendance would not be in the best interests of the patient. This 
statutory test is discriminatory because it deprives involuntary patients of the 
legal capacity to waive and enforce fundamental human rights. Essentially, the 
patient’s final decision in relation to opening a review hearing remains 
derogable, based upon what the Tribunal considers to be in the best interests of a 
patient, despite the patient’s will and preference of the matter.  
                                                
342 Mental Health and Related Services Act (NT), s 135(3). 
343 Mental Health and Related Services Act (NT), s 135(2). 
344 Mental Health Act 2014 (WA), s 456(2).  




In Tasmania, the Mental Health Tribunal may only open a presumptively private 
review hearing if it determines otherwise. If the Tribunal opens a hearing, any 
party may challenge that decision, upon which the Tribunal may close (or 
reclose) the hearing, exclude any person with no direct interest, or exclude any 
person who has not been authorised to attend.346  
Tasmania’s statutory scheme uses the broadest and widest language in allowing 
the Tribunal to deny an involuntary patient the ability to exercise decision-
making capacity in this context. The test is sufficiently broad in allow the 
Tribunal to override a patient’s request to open a review hearing based on 
welfare and best-interests enabled considerations. The test does not provide 
express power for a patient to request an open hearing and in circumstances 
where a patient may nevertheless request an opened hearing, the Tribunal can 
effectively override the patient’s will and preference on the issue.  
(ii) Statutory Framework in New South Wales 
In New South Wales, the Mental Health Review Tribunal may close, in part or in 
full, a presumptively public hearing if the Tribunal is satisfied it is desirable for 
the welfare of the patient or for any other reason.347 The Practice Direction of 
New South Wales Mental Health Review Tribunal directs that ‘Proceedings are 
generally open to the public, subject to any order the Tribunal may make to the 
contrary pursuant to s.151(4) MHA. Hearing procedures are flexible, and will 
vary depending on the nature of the particular case.’348  
Previous sections of this chapter identified that in New South Wales, the 
statutory scheme prescribes for a presumption of public hearings. Instances in 
which the Tribunal may be required to determine if a presumptively public 
hearing may be closed to public attendance may arise in circumstances where the 
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Tribunal is on notice that members of the public, including the media, wish to 
attend a review hearing for any reason, or, where members of the public have 
become aware of the scheduling of a hearing, either by communication of the 
patient. It may be, for example, that those who wish to attend arrive at the 
scheduled time and location with an intention to enter the hearing chamber. In 
these circumstances, the statutory scheme prescribes a decision-making 
framework that resembles those jurisdictions in which there is a presumption of 
private hearings and accompanying criteria to open them. Essentially, the same 
criteria used to open review hearings in presumptively private jurisdictions is 
applicable in New South Wales if a Tribunal is called upon to decide if a 
presumptively public hearing should be closed.  
In keeping with the legal and practical effect in all jurisdictions, the statutory 
framework prescribes a welfare and best-interests enabling test given that the 
Tribunal may override a patient’s request to maintain an open hearing if the 
Tribunal considers that maintaining an open hearing is not in the welfare interests 
of the patient or for any other reason.  
(iii) Statutory Framework in South Australia 
As previously identified, in South Australia, the mental health legislation is silent 
in relation to the criteria to open or close review hearings but noted that the Act 
directs jurisdiction to the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(SACAT) to conduct reviews of involuntary status, which is regulated by the 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act.349 The Act prescribes that the Tribunal 
may close and conduct privately, in part or in full, a presumptively public 
hearing if satisfied it is in interests of justice, or by reason of the confidential 
nature of the evidence, or to expedite proceedings, or for any sufficient reason.350  
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The legal and practical effect of this statutory scheme is like that in New South 
Wales. That is, it prescribes a decision-making framework that resembles those 
jurisdictions in which there is a presumption of private hearings and 
accompanying criteria to open them. The same criteria used to open review 
hearings in presumptively private jurisdictions is applicable in South Australia if 
a Tribunal is called upon to decide if a presumptively public hearing should be 
closed. Accordingly, the statutory framework potentially denies involuntary 
patients the ability to exercise decision-making capacity by making a final 
decision in relation to how open or closed his or her review hearing shall be, 
because the SACAT may override a patient’s request to maintain an open hearing 
if the Tribunal considers that maintaining an open hearing is not in the interests 
of justice, or by reason of the confidential nature of the evidence, or to expedite 
proceedings, or indeed, for any sufficient reason as prescribed in the relevant 
statutory test.   
IV PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT TRIBUNAL 
HEARINGS 
This section analyses Australia’s statutory approaches to regulating the ability of 
the public to disseminate or publish information about a presumptively private 
civil commitment review hearing. Discussion is therefore confined to the ability 
of the public to report what occurred at a review hearing, the ability to identify 
those involved or mentioned at a hearing, and the ability to access documents, 
which are relevant to the reviewing Tribunal’s decision-making. This section 
analyses the regulation of reporting proceedings and identifying persons involved 
or mentioned in proceedings separately from the regulation of access to 
documents, and in isolation from a Tribunal’s obligations to publish reasons for 




A Statutory Frameworks in Each Jurisdiction Regulating the Ability to Report 
Proceedings and to Identify Persons Mentioned in Proceedings 
In Queensland, the statutory framework provides that a person must not publish a 
report of a review hearing or information relating to one. However, the Tribunal 
may grant leave to publish information if is satisfied that doing so is in the public 
interest and is not likely to identify a person mentioned or involved in a 
proceeding. Moreover, the statute creates an offence for publishing a report about 
review proceedings without obtaining leave from the Tribunal.351  
In the Australian Capital Territory, the statutory framework provided by the ACT 
Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act reflects that provided by article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil Political Rights (ICCPR),352 in providing that 
competing interests may outweigh the right to a public hearing, if the Tribunal is 
satisfied that a private hearing is required to protect morals, public order or 
national security; or because of the interest in private lives of parties; or where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. This framework also expressly 
provides power to the Tribunal to restrict publication of filed or received 
evidence whether in relation to a public or a private hearing, including the 
disclosure to some or all parties. 353  Further, the Act creates an offence for 
contravention of a Tribunal order, and a similar offence for recklessly disclosing 
information in relation to functions performed under the ACT Civil & 
Administrative Tribunal Act or in relation to a hearing held in private.354  
In Victoria, the statutory framework prohibits the publication of the name or 
other identifying details of a person who is the subject of a Tribunal proceeding 
without the Mental Health Tribunal President’s written consent.355 Moreover, the 
Act creates an offence for contravention of a ‘secrecy provision’, which requires 
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a person who is, or has been, a member of Tribunal or other staff from directly or 
indirectly, disclosing information that may identify person involved in hearing. 
356  Thus, although Victoria’s framework does not provide specific criteria in 
relation to the publication of reports, the factors relating to the opening of a 
review hearing may remain relevant factors because of the similar effects that 
may result from opening a hearing to the public and media. Those factors include 
whether opening a hearing would be a serious threat to the health and safety of 
any person, or would prejudice the interests of justice.357 
The former Victorian Mental Health Review Board (applying repealed 
legislation) has demonstrated its approach to potential reporting in 02-104,358 in 
which the Board refused an involuntary patient’s request to record his review 
hearing on videotape.359 In refusing the request, the Board referred to the then 
statutory provisions requiring that reviews be conducted privately, unless the 
Board is satisfied that opening part, or all of a hearing is in the best interests of 
the patient, or in the public interest.360 The public interest test under the repealed 
legislation is reflected in the current mental health legislation, although the best 
interests test has now been omitted. 361  The Board also referred to the then 
confidentiality provision under section 35, which provided a person present at a 
Board hearing from making a recording or communicating information acquired 
by involvement in Tribunal hearings.362 Ultimately, the Board concluded that the 
potential dissemination of a video recording was neither in the patient’s best 
interests nor in the public interest. The Board said that that despite having the 
power to make orders restricting the use of the video, it could not guarantee 
complete control over its distribution and ultimate use, emphasising that it would 
be impossible, in the absence of excessive enforcement processes, that copies of 
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the video could not be produced and then used for any unsupervised purpose. 
Moreover, the Board commented that it could not guarantee the recording would 
not identify a party, and that given the Victorian legislation protects the 
privacy of patients and all other parties, there were no grounds to permit such a 
recording.363 The decision of the Board shows how cautious it will be in making 
decisions with respect to the potential dissemination and publication of 
information that will contain personal and health related material, basing its 
decision on best-interests considerations of the patient, the privacy of others, and 
the public interest in maintaining that privacy.   
In New South Wales, the statutory framework creates an offence if a person 
publishes or broadcasts the name of any person to whom a matter before the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal relates (such as a witness or a person mentioned 
in a proceedings), without the consent of the Tribunal. 364  The Tribunal’s 
published Practice Direction confirms the legislation in prohibiting the 
publication or broadcasting of a name, picture or other information that identifies 
a person involved or mentioned in a hearing, either before or after the hearing’s 
completion, without the Tribunal’s consent.365 The Practice Direction provides 
express provision for a patient to formally request the Tribunal’s consent to 
publish his or her name, however, it also provides that an assessment of a 
patient’s mental capacity to consent to the publication, is an important process 
the Tribunal will undertake in determining whether the Tribunal will provide its 
consent: 
A person cannot consent to the publication of their own name or identifying information under 
s. 162. Only the Tribunal can consent to a publication. However, a person’s attitude towards 
the proposed publication and their capacity to give consent are both important things the 
Tribunal will need to consider. Although an individual’s consent does not automatically lead to 
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consent being granted by the Tribunal under s. 162, it is unlikely that the Tribunal would give 
consent, if a person did not agree to the publication.366  
The New South Wales Supreme Court has confirmed the importance of 
undertaking a mental capacity assessment in applying section 162 of the New 
South Wales Mental Health Act:  
Relevant is the psychiatric health of the plaintiff. Thus, does he have the capacity to determine 
for himself whether he should use his name in the way he envisages? Is there a real (as distinct 
from merely speculative) risk that his mental health will be adversely affected by his doing 
so.367 
The Tribunal must recognise, therefore, that welfare and best interest’s 
considerations are important factors to consider in relation to permitting 
publication of information arising from a Tribunal review hearing, in compliance 
with the requirements of the New South Wales statutory framework. 
Moreover, in New South Wales, the Mental Health Review Tribunal requires 
applicants to set out particulars in support of their application including the 
names of the people to be identified in any publication or broadcast, if known; 
the way in which each person participated in the proceedings (for example, as a 
patient, witness or family member); and an outline of the proposed publication or 
broadcast – including the format (for example, television, radio, print or internet) 
and general content of the proposed publication. The application should also 
include as much detail as possible regarding whether those persons who could be 
identified consent to the publication of their identity. Moreover, the Practice 
direction confirms that if the person to be identified is or was a patient or a 
person the subject of a Tribunal order, the Tribunal may request a recent 
psychiatric or psychological report dealing with the person’s current mental state 
and their capacity to consent to being identified.368  
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In hearing the application, the Mental Health Review Tribunal will conduct a 
hearing and anyone that the application proposes to identify will be invited to 
attend the hearing. Usually as a panel of three members will hear an application 
including the President or a Deputy President and the Tribunal will issue reasons 
for its decision, and those reasons may be published.369  
In the Northern Territory, the statutory framework creates an offence if a person 
publishes the name of involuntary patient, or information that results in the 
identification of an involuntary patient. However, a publication is permissible if 
it is an official report made under the legislation, or otherwise only with the 
approval of the Mental Health Review Tribunal, and the involuntary patient.370 
Moreover, staff members undertaking functions under the legislation commit an 
offence by disclosing such information to another person. 371 
In Western Australia, the statutory framework creates an offence if a person 
publishes information about Mental Health Tribunal proceedings that identifies a 
party or a person associated in any way with a matter relating to those 
proceedings. 372  Moreover, a person must not directly or indirectly disclose 
information obtained because of their office, position, employment or 
engagement under current or former mental health legislation. 373 
In South Australia, the Mental Health Act creates an offence if a person publishes 
a report of any Tribunal (SACAT) proceedings. However, the legislation allows 
the Tribunal to authorise publication, upon application by a person with proper 
interest in matter, if it does not tend to identify the person to whom a proceeding 
relates. 374 Additionally, the legislation creates an offence if a person engaged or 
formerly engaged in the administration of the Mental Health Act discloses 
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acquired personal information without the consent of the person to whom the 
information relates. 375  Disclosure is lawful, however, if for example, it is 
reasonably required to lessen or prevent a serious threat to life, health or safety, 
or public health or safety, or if made to a relative, carer or friend of a patient and 
disclosure is reasonably required for the treatment, care or rehabilitation of the 
person, and there is no reason to believe disclosure is contrary to patient’s best 
interests.376  
Moreover, as noted in section two, the provisions relating to private review 
hearings are also regulated by the Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act, which 
provides that the SACAT may, if satisfied it is in interests of justice, or because 
of the confidential nature of evidence, or to expedite proceedings or any other 
sufficient reason, restrict the publication of a witness’s name and address, restrict 
the publication of evidence or contents of any document provided to the SACAT. 
The SACAT may also restrict the disclosure to a party of any evidence or the 
contents of any document.377  
In Tasmania, the statutory framework does not expressly provide direction to the 
Mental Health Tribunal regarding the publication of information deriving from 
review hearings, notwithstanding that the Mental Health Tribunal may publish a 
record of any proceeding if it is of significance to the operation of the statutory 
framework. However, the Tribunal must suppress information that could 
reasonably disclose the identity of any person, and any subsequent publication 
should be provided to each party to a review hearing.378 In addition, a mental 
health authority (such as a psychiatrist or an approved medical practitioner), in 
giving information to a patient or to any private person in respect of any matter 
may withhold, defer or qualify that information if it could reasonably be 
expected to seriously harm a patient's health or safety, seriously compromise a 
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patient's treatment, or risk the safety of others. 379 The Act creates an offence if a 
person discharging any responsibilities under the Mental Health Act publishes 
information that identifies another person as a current or former patient, unless 
the publication is expressly and freely authorised by, and with full understanding 
of the patient and the Chief Psychiatrist.380 Moreover, the statutory framework 
creates an offence for the disclosure of information of a confidential or personal 
nature, about a patient without the patient’s, and his or her treating medical 
practitioner’s consent. 381  
B Statutory Frameworks in Each Jurisdiction Regulating the Ability to Access 
Documents Relied on in Tribunal Decision-making 
In Queensland, a patient subject to review must be given a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect a document to which the tribunal proposes to have regard 
in reaching a decision unless it would contravene a confidentiality order made by 
the Tribunal. 382  Moreover, if a party to a proceeding intends to rely on a 
document in the hearing, the party must give a copy of the document to each 
other party to the proceeding at least three days before the hearing unless the 
party intends to apply for a confidentiality order in relation to a document.383 
Access to documents in Queensland is additionally precluded through general 
duties of patient confidentiality under common law and other statutory schemes 
designed to protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal health related 
information.384 These provisions demonstrate that public access to documents 
before the Tribunal are not accessible to persons beyond the parties to a 
particular proceeding, and therefore applications made by the public and the 
media to gain access to Tribunal documents are unlikely to be granted.  
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In the Australian Capital Territory, a party to a proceeding must be given a 
reasonable opportunity to inspect a document to which the tribunal proposes to 
have regard in reaching a decision unless it would contravene a confidentiality 
order made by the Tribunal. Moreover, if a party to a proceeding intends to rely 
on a document in the hearing, the party must give a copy of the document to each 
other party to the proceeding at least three days before the hearing unless the 
party intends to apply for a confidentiality order in relation to a document. 
Access to documents is additionally precluded through general duties of patient 
confidentiality under common law and other statutory schemes designed to 
protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal health related information.385 
In keeping with the approach in Queensland, these provisions demonstrate that 
any application made by the public and the media to gain access to Tribunal 
documents are unlikely to be granted. 
In New South Wales, the statutory framework does not expressly regulate with 
respect to public access to documents, however, the Mental Health Act prohibits 
the disclosure of any information obtained in connection with Mental Health Act 
or the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 unless with the consent of 
person from whom the information was obtained, or for other lawful purpose 
such as research under Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 
(NSW).386 Access to documents is additionally precluded through general duties 
of patient confidentiality under common law and other statutory schemes 
designed to protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal health related 
information.387  
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The Mental Health Review Tribunal provides some indication regarding its 
approach to public access to documents in two of its Practice Directions.388 For 
instance, in reflecting the statutory provisions of section 151 of the Mental 
Health Act, the Tribunal may prohibit or restrict the publication of evidence, or 
of matters contained in documents lodged with or received in evidence before the 
Tribunal, and prohibit or restrict the disclosure to some or all of the parties to the 
proceedings, of evidence given before the Tribunal or the contents of documents 
lodged with the Tribunal or received in evidence, if satisfied it is desirable for the 
welfare of the patient or for any other reason.389  
Moreover, the Practice Directions confirm that the Tribunal is required under 
section 159 of the Mental Health Act to record all its proceedings using a 
handheld dicta-phone, but it emphasises that given the issues discussed in 
proceedings are often intensely personal, the Tribunal limits access to audio 
recordings and transcripts of its proceedings. Essentially, this means that the 
distribution of an audio recording or transcript of Tribunal proceedings is done 
cautiously, and with due respect to the prohibition on the publication of the 
persons involved or mentioned in any proceedings, and the disclosure of 
information obtained in the administration or execution of the Mental Health Act 
2007 or the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act.390  
The Practice Direction provides that access to copies of an audio recording will 
be made available where the person requesting the recording can demonstrate a 
legitimate reason for requiring the recording, and, that the Tribunal is likely to 
consider it appropriate to provide access to an audio recording in the following 
circumstances:  
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• Where a person with a right of appeal against a Tribunal’s decision is 
considering an appeal; 
• Where the patient has retained a new legal representative, who wishes to 
understand what was said at a previous Tribunal hearing;  
• Where a patient has a new treating team, who wish to understand what 
was said at a previous Tribunal hearing; and  
• Where the Minister for Health or Attorney General wish to exercise a 
right to appear at a Tribunal review under the Mental Health (Forensic 
Provisions) Act 1990 and wish to understand what was said at a previous 
Tribunal hearing.391  
In other circumstances, the Tribunal will consider an applicant’s reasons for 
requesting access to recordings on a case-by-case basis, and may decide that it is 
appropriate to allow the person to listen to the recording either at the Tribunal’s 
premises or elsewhere provide a copy of the recording to an applicant. 392 
However, where a copy of an audio recording is provided, the Tribunal requires 
an undertaking by the person not to copy or distribute the recording, or to use it 
for any purpose other than for which it was provided, without the Tribunal’s 
consent. 393 The Practice Direction emphasises that it only allows such access in 
these limited circumstances and that, moreover, the Tribunal does not ordinarily 
provide public access to transcripts of its hearings, and where it does so, the 
applicant is responsible for payment of the transcription service. Ultimately, the 
Practice Direction states that:  
Whether a transcript will be provided in these or other circumstances and the arrangements 
that are to be made will be decided by the Registrar of the Tribunal at her/his discretion…. The 
Tribunal will arrange for a transcript of its proceedings to be prepared if it is otherwise 
lawfully required to do so.394  
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The Tribunal thus recognises that welfare and best-interest considerations are 
important factors to consider in relation to allowing access to documents arising 
from a review hearing, in compliance with the requirements of the New South 
Wales statutory framework, notwithstanding that involuntary patients are 
invariably in a powerless position vis a vis the Tribunal, that it is not surprising 
that requests for documents have rarely, if ever, been requested by involuntary 
patients in recent times. The New South Wales Mental Health Review Tribunal 
Annual Report of 2014/15 notes that:  
…applications for access to information from the Tribunal under the Government Information 
(Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA ACT) are made through the Right to Information Officer at 
the NSW Ministry of Health. Information relating to the judicial functions of the Tribunal is 
‘excluded information’ under the GIPA Act and as such is generally not disclosed. The 
administrative and policy functions of the Tribunal are covered by the GIPA Act. There were 
no requests for disclosure of information from the Tribunal’s files during 2014/15.395 
In Victoria, the statutory framework prohibits the disclosure of health 
information generally (including information in documents) about a patient under 
the Mental Health Act.396 The legislation also prohibits the publication of the 
name or other identifying details of a person who is the subject of a Tribunal 
proceeding without the Mental Health Tribunal President’s written consent.397 
Moreover, the Act creates an offence for contravention of a ‘secrecy provision’, 
which requires a person who is, or has been, a member of Tribunal or other staff 
from directly or indirectly, disclosing information that may identify person 
involved in hearing. 398 Thus, factors relating to the opening of a review hearing 
remain relevant to decisions relating to public access to documents, which 
include, but are not limited to, whether opening a hearing would be a serious 
threat to the health and safety of any person, or would prejudice the interests of 
justice. 399 Access to documents in Victoria is additionally precluded through 
general duties of patient confidentiality under common law and other statutory 
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schemes designed to protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal health 
related information. 400 
In the Northern Territory, the statutory framework provides that only an 
involuntary patient or a representative of the patient may access records of 
information about the patient including information contained in documents.401 
Additionally, any person performing any function under the legislation is liable 
for an offence for disclosing information contained in a record of a treating 
facility or agency that identifies a person as receiving treatment, unless 
disclosure is necessary to perform a function under an Act, such as, amongst 
several other exceptions, where disclosure is required for the purposes of 
criminal investigations or proceedings. 402  Moreover, access to information 
contained in documents is precluded through general duties of patient 
confidentiality under common law, and other statutory frameworks designed to 
protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal health related information.403  
However, an involuntary patient or a representative of the patient must have 
access to medical records and reports to be relied upon by the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal in coming to its decision. However, the Tribunal may order an 
involuntary patient not be given access if satisfied it may cause serious harm to 
patient’s health or put others person’s safety at risk. In such circumstances, the 
Tribunal may provide access only to the patient’s representative. In 
circumstances where a representative accesses documents he or she may be 
required to undertake not to disclose specified information, contravention of 
which may attract liability of up to 40 penalty units.404  
In Western Australia, a person is not entitled to access medical records including 
documents that relate to a patient if a psychiatrist reasonably believes that a 
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disclosure poses a significant risk to the health or safety of anyone, or if 
disclosure would reveal personal information about persons other than the 
patient.405 Moreover, a person must not directly or indirectly disclose information 
obtained as a consequence of their office, position, employment or engagement 
under current or former mental health legislation.406 Public access to information 
contained in documents is additionally precluded through general duties of 
patient confidentiality under common law, and other statutory frameworks 
designed to protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal health related 
information.407 
In South Australia, The provisions relating to presumptively private review 
hearings are regulated by the Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act, which 
provides that the SACAT may, on application by any member of public, allow an 
applicant to inspect or obtain a copy of any process relating to proceedings and 
forming part of Tribunal's records including a transcript of evidence and any 
documentary material admitted into evidence.408 However, if satisfied it is in 
interests of justice, or by reason of the confidential nature of evidence, or any 
other sufficient reason, the SACAT may restrict the publication of a witness’s 
name and address, restrict the publication of evidence or the contents of any 
document produced to Tribunal, restrict the disclosure to a party of evidence or 
the contents of any document. 409  Public access to information contained in 
documents is additionally precluded through general duties of patient 
confidentiality under common law, and other statutory frameworks designed to 
protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal health related information.410 
                                                
405 Mental Health Act 2014 (WA), s 249. 
406 Mental Health Act 2014 (WA), s 576. 
407 Health Services Act 2016 (WA); see also the restrictions on disclosure of health related 
personal documents under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2002 (WA). 
408 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 90. 
409 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 60. 
410 Health Care Act 2008 (SA), see also, the restrictions on disclosure of health related personal 




In Tasmania, a mental health authority (such as a psychiatrist or an approved 
medical practitioner), in giving information to a patient or to any private person 
in respect of any matter may withhold, defer or qualify that information if it 
could reasonably be expected to seriously harm a patient's health or safety, 
seriously compromise a patient's treatment, or risk the safety of others. 411 The 
Act creates an offence if a person discharging any responsibilities under the 
Mental Health Act publishes information that identifies another person as a 
current or former patient, unless the publication is expressly and freely 
authorised by, and with full understanding of the patient and the Chief 
Psychiatrist.412  Moreover, the statutory framework creates an offence for the 
disclosure of information of a confidential or personal nature, about a patient 
without the patient’s, and his or her treating medical practitioner’s consent. 
Public access to information contained in documents is additionally precluded 
through general duties of patient confidentiality under common law, and other 
statutory frameworks designed to protect the privacy and confidentiality of 
personal health related information.413 
V TRIBUNAL REASONS FOR DECISIONS  
A Australia’s Statutory Frameworks Regulating the Ability of Tribunals to 
Publish Reasons for Decisions  
In Queensland, the statutory framework provides that the Tribunal may publish 
its final decision and reasons for decision. The statutory examples of the 
circumstances in which the Tribunal may publish reasons statements are 
inferentially non-exhaustive but include whether the Tribunal is satisfied that 
reasons statements may be used as a precedent. However, the statute provides 
that any publication must not identify any person involved or mentioned in the 
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review hearing. The legislation allows the Tribunal to publish the statement in 
‘…a way it considers appropriate’.414 
In the Northern Territory, the Mental Health Review Tribunal may publish 
reasons for its decisions, but such publications must not identify persons 
involved in hearings. The statutory framework provides that in determining 
whether to publish reasons statements, the Tribunal must consider the patient’s 
wishes, and be satisfied that the privacy of the parties will not be adversely 
affected, or publication result in serious harm to patient’s health, or risk others’ 
safety. Additionally, such publications must be in the public interest. 415 
In New South Wales, the statutory framework allows the Tribunal to publish an 
official report of Tribunal proceedings. 416  The Act does not define ‘official 
report’, however the Tribunal’s relevant Practice Directions provide some 
clarification by describing an official report and the circumstances in which the 
Tribunal’s President may authorise publication.417 First, the Practice Direction 
provides that an official report will usually contain the Tribunal’s reasons for a 
decision, but those reasons may be limited to a discussion of those parts of a 
proceeding, which have a broader public interest.418 It also provides that the 
reasons should de-identify the patient, witnesses and other persons involved in a 
hearing.419 Moreover, the Practice Direction outlines circumstances in which the 
President is most likely to authorise publication. Those circumstances include:  
• Where the Tribunal has decided questions of legal significance with 
application beyond a case; 
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• Where the proceedings have considered systemic issues relating to the 
care and treatment, which have application beyond a case; 
• Where proceedings have considered matters of concern relating to care 
and treatment; or  
• Other circumstances the President thinks fit. 420   
The Tribunal commenced publishing ‘Official Reports’ in 2013, of what it 
describes as ‘…important and illustrative decisions of the Tribunal’s Forensic 
Division as part of our drive to enhance the transparency of our processes, and 
the opportunities of others to better understand these [processes].’ As of May 
2015, the Tribunal has begun to publish ‘selected decisions’ of its Civil 
Division. 421  These reports are publicly available on-line on the AUSTLII 
website,422 and the Tribunal’s website.423  
In Victoria, the Victorian Mental Health Tribunal publishes ‘selected’ decisions 
in redacted and de-identified form.424 The Victorian Mental Health Tribunal most 
recent Annual Report reports that  
…the vast majority of the Tribunal’s statements of reasons for 2014/15 have been de-identified 
and published on the AustLII website…. The Tribunal has chosen not to publish certain 
statements of reasons as the facts of those cases may lead to the identification of persons 
involved in the proceedings and/or their publication would not be appropriate in the 
circumstances.425  
The Tribunal also publishes ‘selected statements’ of reasons on its website. It 
selects these publications on the basis that they contain ‘…particular issues and 
questions addressed provide examples of the way the Tribunal has interpreted 
key parts of the Act, which may provide guidance in other matters.’426  
In Western Australia, the statutory framework merely provides that the Tribunal 
may publish reports for legal educative professional purposes if identification of 
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parties or others are not identified.427 In Tasmania, the Mental Health Tribunal 
may publish a record of any proceeding if it considers it to be of significance to 
the operation of the statutory framework. However, the Tribunal must suppress 
information that could reasonably disclose the identity of any person, and any 
subsequent publication should be provided to each party to a review hearing.428   
B Analysis of General Tribunal Decision-making and the Relevant Appellate 
Decision 
Mental health tribunals in Australia have invariably refused an involuntary 
patient’s request to open a presumptively closed and private review hearing, each 
time referring to statutory provisions that require reviews be conducted privately, 
unless satisfied that opening part, or all of a hearing is in the best interests of the 
patient, or in the public interest. Tribunals refer to confidentiality provisions 
under statute which imposes a duty to protect the personal and health related 
information of involuntary patients and third parties, on either a welfare or best 
interests criterion. These decisions demonstrate how cautious reviewing tribunals 
are in interpreting the relevant mental health legislation with respect to the 
potential dissemination and publication of information that will contain personal 
and health related material.  The New South Wales Supreme Court has confirmed 
the importance of these provisions asserting that each mental health statute 
includes expressions of statutory objectives and principles that guide the 
administration and interpretation of the relevant legislation.  
Generally, courts will ascribe to statutory language, its ordinary and natural 
meaning, while considering the purpose of the mental health legislation where 
there is ambiguity.429 The Tribunal must recognise, therefore, that welfare and 
best interest’s considerations are important factors to consider in relation to 
permitting publication of information arising from a Tribunal review hearing, 
and this the approach that tribunals have hitherto taken.  A clear pattern of 
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protection based on a patient’s welfare or best interests is evident in such 
decisions. The legislation places considerable emphasis on obliging those 
persons involved in the administration of mental health legislation to maintain 
and to protect patient confidentiality, including the work of the various mental 
health tribunals. This is largely because maintaining confidentiality is considered 
to favour a patient’s welfare and recovery.430 It is therefore not surprising that 
Australian mental health legislation prescribes that civil commitment review 
hearings shall be subject to a privacy orientation that is difficult to overcome 
notwithstanding a patient’s desire to waive his or her privacy and confidentiality 
rights. 
VI CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of chapter four was to identify and to describe the statutory 
provisions directly relevant to the operation of the open justice principle in 
Australia’s mental health statutory frameworks. This enables an analysis of 
Australia’s statutory approaches when measured against the human rights 
normative framework presented in chapter five.  
Chapter four identified that mental health legislation regulates with respect to 
each of the elements of the open justice principle at civil commitment review 
hearings. The legislation reflects the common law parens patriae jurisdiction, 
and thus the ethical principle of non-maleficence (and to a lesser extent, 
beneficence) because the relevant statutory provisions, for the most part, are 
intended to protect patients from harm and to moreover  facilitate of recovery 
from mental illness. An exception to the presumption of public hearings is 
pervasive in this context; it is essentially personal health information that is 
discussed at review hearings. Accordingly, Australia’s mental health statutory 
frameworks and the associated administrative practices of mental health tribunals 
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indicate that civil commitment review hearings generally have a closed and 
private nature.  
A clear pattern of protection based on a patient’s welfare or best interests 
emerges. As chapter three demonstrated in relation to the mental health 
legislation generally, chapter four has demonstrated that the relevant provisions 
regulating the open justice principle at review hearings, places considerable 
emphasis on obliging those persons involved in the administration of mental 
health legislation to maintain and to protect patient confidentiality, including the 
mental health tribunals. This is largely because (apart from being a fundamental 
doctrine in health law) maintaining confidentiality is considered to favour a 
patient’s welfare and recovery, given that keeping personal health information 
private and confidential facilitates the avoidance of negative consequences for 
patients, such as potential stigmatisation, discrimination, loss of reputation, 
social exclusion and so on.431 It is therefore not surprising that Australian mental 
health legislation similarly prescribes that civil commitment review hearings 
shall be subject to a privacy orientation, so to facilitate the prevention of those 
negative consequences. The principles of non-maleficence and beneficence are 
significant drivers in the manifestation of exceptions to the principle of open 
justice principles as summarised below. These ethical principles are at odds with 
the emerging emphasis on the alternative ethical principles of autonomy and 
justice reflected substantially by the normative human rights framework 
presented in chapter five.   
A Conclusion in Relation to Australia’s Regulation of Attendance at Review 
Hearings 
In all but two of Australia’s mental health statutory frameworks, the statutory 
scheme provides that civil commitment hearings shall be presumptively private 
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(closed to public attendance). 432  In the two jurisdictions that prescribe a 
presumptively open hearing, the tests to close a hearing are different, although 
the practical affect is similar. In New South Wales, for instance, if the Tribunal is 
satisfied it is desirable for the welfare of patient or for any other reason, it may 
conduct a review hearing in private. In South Australia, the SACAT may 
override a patient’s request to maintain an open hearing if satisfied that an open 
hearing is not in the interests of justice, or because of the confidential nature of 
the evidence, or to expedite proceedings, or for any sufficient reason. In the 
remaining six jurisdictions that provide a presumptively closed and private 
review hearing, the practical effect of the existing provisions permitting closed 
hearings to be opened, remain like those in New South Wales and South 
Australia. Each jurisdiction, regardless of whether there is a presumption of 
privacy or openness, permits the overriding of a patient’s wishes to make 
personal decisions relating to who may attend his or her review hearing. 
Specifically, each jurisdiction provides a decision-making framework that allows 
a tribunal to override a patient’s will and preferences, because each statute 
provides criteria sufficiently broad to encompass either a welfare or best 
interests’ consideration that enables each tribunal to override a patient’s specific 
request.  
B Conclusion in Relation to Australia’s Regulation of the Publication of 
Information About Review Hearings 
In all jurisdictions, what occurs at review hearings may not be reported, 
disseminated or publicised in any way that might identify either a patient or 
others involved in proceedings. These statutory provisions effectively provide a 
substantial level of privacy protection to all involuntary patients on a welfare or 
best interest basis. In all Australian jurisdictions, though, there are statutory 
criteria to allow publication and public access to information that are similar to 
the criteria described above in relation to the ability to open or close hearings in 
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New South Wales and South Australia pertaining to public attendance. 
Regardless of whether a review hearing shall be presumptively open or closed, 
the statutory frameworks permit the overriding of a patient’s decision-making 
capacity to make personal decisions relating to the dissemination and publication 
of what occurred at a review hearing based on tests that allows a tribunal to 
override a patient’s will and preferences, because each statute provides criteria 
sufficiently broad to encompass either a patient’s welfare or best interests 
consideration in the decision-making matrix. Specifically, each Australian 
jurisdiction provides a statutory framework that allows a Tribunal to override a 
patient’s decision-making (mental) capacity and thus his or her will and 
preference pertaining to the ability of the public to access information about his 
or her review hearing.  
C Conclusion in Relation to Australia’s Regulation of the Publication of 
Tribunal Reasoning  
Most Australian jurisdictions provide explicit authority for each respective 
tribunal to publish reports of their reasons for decisions. Although, reasons 
statements must not identify the name of the person who is the subject of a 
decision, and a tribunal must be satisfied that the publication of reasons is in the 
public interest, such as for example, for educational and professional purposes. 
Because only two Australian jurisdictions (Victoria and New South Wales), 
publish a limited number of reasons statements, and the fact that very few review 
decisions are appealed, there is very little tribunal reasoning publicly available 
for public scrutiny, or for educative and investigatory purposes. The publications 
of Victoria and New South Wales thus constitute the only significant body of 
mental health law relevant to civil commitment review hearings in Australia, and 
the current general lack of accessibility  to reasons statements may warrant 
further research to understand why most Australian tribunals do not currently 
publish their reasons for decisions. This is a concern because the failure to 




profession from learning each tribunals’ interpretation of important statutory 










CHAPTER FIVE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS NORMATIVE 
FRAMEWORK UNDERPINNING THE OPERATION OF OPEN 
JUSTICE AT AUSTRALIAN CIVIL COMMITMENT REVIEW 
HEARINGS 
I INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of chapter five is twofold. First, it demonstrates the influence of 
human rights law in providing an appropriate normative framework to underpin 
the operation of the open justice principle at mental health civil commitment 
review hearings. Australia’s mental health legislation is historically grounded in 
human rights jurisprudence and substantial compliance remains an objective of 
the federal government and each of the states and territories. Because Australia is 
an active state party to several multilateral human rights conventions, human 
rights law will remain relevant as a normative and analytical framework to guide 
the development of Australian mental health policies and laws. Second, chapter 
five demonstrates that human rights jurisprudence provides an explicable and 
coherent regulatory framework underpinning the operation of the open justice 
principle in the mental health civil commitment review context. The chapter 
presents the human rights framework, thus providing the analytical framework to 
evaluate Australia’s level of statutory compliance in chapter six.  
This chapter presents the normative framework, first by giving an overview of 
the salient human rights sources relevant to the regulation of civil commitment 
review hearings. This includes the seminal human rights sources Australia has 
ratified, such as the United Nations Bill of Rights. It then outlines the specific 
human rights sources relevant to the regulation of open justice at review hearings 
and identifies the relevant human rights deriving from those sources. Those 
human rights are: the human right to a public hearing, and the human right to 
privacy, both derived from several sources. As flagged in chapter one, a tension 
arises between these two rights given their close relationship and their potential 




principle. The chapter then analyses how human rights jurisprudence resolves 
this tension, prior to, and after the application of the CRPD.  
Prior to the introduction of the CRPD, human rights law favoured the protection 
of confidentiality and privacy at review hearings in a way that approximates the 
current position in Australia’s mental health statutory frameworks (demonstrated 
succinctly in diagram 1). Human rights law was, for example, prepared to permit 
substitute decision-making, by allowing others to override a patient’s request to 
open a presumptively private review hearing on welfare and protective 
considerations. It can be argued that this has resulted in involuntary mental 
health patients being denied legal capacity to make important decisions in 
relation to the determination of their privacy interests at civil commitment review 
hearings.  
Chapter five then considers the influence of the introduction of the CRPD, and 
how its interpretation can alter the human rights framework relating to the 
operation of the open justice principle at civil commitment review hearings 
(demonstrated succinctly in diagram 2). The CRPD’s key provision is article 12, 
which requires states parties to acknowledge that those persons with a mental 
illness have a human right to the protection of their legal capacity on an equal 
basis with all other persons. Article 12 requires a shift from paternalistic 
substituted decision-making laws, toward a supported decision-making 
framework that supports civilly committed persons to make personal decisions, 
and to then respect those persons’ specific will and preferences, as 
communicated in the detail of those decisions. 
The chapter concludes that article 12 resolves the tension between the right to a 
public hearing and the right to privacy in the civil commitment review hearing 
context. The application of article 12 provides equal legal capacity to involuntary 
patients, which permits those persons to determine how open or closed his or her 




with or without support. A model of supported decision-making should be 
offered to involuntary patients to assist them to first consider the consequences of 
decision-making relevant to the operation of the open justice principle, and to 
then assist those persons to express their will and preferences. Ultimately, 
chapter five argues that the extent to which a civil commitment review hearing 
may be open or closed depends on each patient’s will and preference in relation 
to each element of the open justice principle. However, the will and preference is 
subject to whether the privacy of others can be managed, and whether a patient’s 
preferences would result in a disproportionate burden on a reviewing tribunal. 
Moreover, notwithstanding a patient’s will and preference, reviewing tribunals 
are obliged to publish reasons of significant decisions with redaction to protect 
the privacy of patients and third parties.    
Chapter five draws heavily on the United Nations Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities’ General Comment No 1, published in 2014, and the 
secondary literature’s commentary in response to that General Comment. It 
becomes clear that the CRPD and article 12 provide an opportunity to further 
develop the existing human rights framework of the operation of the open justice 
principle at mental health civil commitment review hearings. The resulting 
normative framework provides a basis for evaluating whether Australia’s mental 
health statutory frameworks comply with the requirements of this continually 
developing human rights jurisprudence. Chapter six will then undertake that 
analytical exercise.  
II AN OVERVIEW OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCES 
RELEVANT TO THE REGULATION OF CIVIL COMMITMENT 
REVIEW HEARINGS 
Human rights are the product of public international law, and derive their 
authority from the express or implied consent of nation states to be bound by 
those laws. The requirement of consent is underscored by the fact that public 




the product of any distinct legal system. Rather, it is the ever-evolving result of 
the collective will and consent of international governments.433  
Public international law derives from primary and secondary sources outlined in 
article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 434  Primary 
sources include treaties (conventions); custom (where states adopt practices 
consistently and acknowledge them as binding); and general principles, based on 
broader legal principles common to international justice systems. The latter may 
be invoked, exceptionally, to fill gaps in conventions or in customary 
international laws.435 However, the principal source of human rights law relevant 
to the field of mental health and civil commitment derives from multilateral 
treaties. As alluded to above, governments become bound by the terms of a treaty 
through a communication to consent to the terms of a treaty, culminating in 
formal ratification.436  
In addition, secondary sources of international law are important in providing a 
means of applying rules provided in the terms of treaties. Secondary sources 
include judicial decisions; opinions from international and domestic tribunals; 
and the writings of the most highly qualified and respected academic scholars 
and jurists in the field of international law. The principles of interpretation are 
articulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna 
Convention). 437  Article 31(1) prioritises the ‘golden rule’ approach, which 
requires a Convention’s text be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with its 
ordinary meaning and in the context of its object and purposes.438 Article 32 
allows reference to secondary materials in circumstances where this approach 
leaves a Convention’s ordinary meaning ambiguous or obscure.439  Given that the 
language and wording of international conventions are characterised by their 
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generality, secondary sources are integral to establishing the scope of the specific 
terms of particular treaties, and these are indispensable to the presentation of the 
human rights model of open justice provided in this chapter.  
For example, Part IV of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) establishes the Human Rights Committee that periodically publishes 
General Comments, which have come to be regarded as authoritative aids in 
interpreting specific provisions under the ICCPR and Australian domestic human 
rights legislation. 440  The Committee is quasi-judicial in character and its 
decisions and General Comments do not create formally binding precedents. 
However, they do (like similar Committees established by human rights 
conventions) constitute a body of jurisprudence that Australian courts have relied 
upon when interpreting the scope of human rights, particularly as they relate to 
vulnerable persons.441  
A Seminal Human Rights Sources  
This section introduces the seminal human rights instruments and jurisprudential 
sources to which Australia has acknowledged and provided formal consent, 
effectively indicating its willingness to abide by international laws from which a 
model of open justice is ultimately derived from.  
The United Nations (UN) is the principal international institution involved in the 
creation and development of human rights jurisprudence.442 It has performed this 
role since the culmination of World War Two exerting substantial influence upon 
the creation of policy and law in a multitude of contexts. The UN Charter is the 
seminal human rights convention of modern international significance. It sets out 
the institutional structure of the UN and calls for the peaceful resolution of 
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international conflict and the universal recognition of human rights. 443  In 
addition, the International Bill of Rights comprises a body of three distinct UN 
human rights conventions. They are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR);444 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);445 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).446  
The UDHR sets out 30 fundamental human rights. Article 1 provides its overall 
tone stating that ‘…all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights’.447 It provides other fundamental rights and freedoms including the right 
to life, liberty and security;448 the right to equality before the law;449 and the 
freedom from torture; 450  and several other rights and freedoms, which it 
guarantees to all persons.  
The ICCPR establishes a body of civil and political rights generally characterised 
as ‘negative’ because they prohibit conduct that breaches those rights. For 
instance, the ICCPR prohibits conduct that would violate the right to equality and 
non-discrimination;451 the right to life;452 the freedom from cruel or inhumane 
treatment, and medical or scientific experimentation;453 the freedom from slavery 
and involuntary servitude;454  the right to recognition as a person before the 
law;455 and importantly for chapter five: the right to a fair and public hearing;456 
and the right to privacy.457  
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999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
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In contrast to the ICCPR, the ICESCR establishes a body of economic, social and 
cultural rights. These rights are generally characterised as ‘positive’, because, in 
addition to prohibiting certain conduct, they impose obligations on governments 
to take active steps that facilitates their realisation.458 They include the right to 
work and employment;459 the right to the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health;460 and importantly for chapter five: the right to equality and 
non-discrimination.461 
There are UN institutions that monitor compliance with the terms of these 
treaties, each responsible for promoting human rights generally, and for 
addressing potential violations of specific rights and freedoms. Those institutions 
include the UN ‘General Assembly’, the ‘Economic and Social Council, the 
Human Rights Council’, and the ‘Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights’. There are also several UN committees that monitor compliance with 
specific human rights instruments. For example, the Human Rights Committee 
comprises a body of 18 independent experts that monitor the recognition of 
ICCPR rights by state parties to the Convention. The Committee may consider 
allegations of human rights violations submitted by individuals, or by state 
parties that have ratified the First Optional Protocol to the Convention.462 Other 
similar committees monitor compliance with other UN Conventions, such as the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which monitors 
compliance with the ICESCR.  
In addition to the UN institutions above, the European Court of Human Rights, 
despite not being a UN institution, has proven to be a relevant source of 
jurisprudence, particularly in the field of mental health.463 The Court has the 
primary responsibility for deciding the meaning and application of the European 
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.464 
And notwithstanding its European focus, Australian courts and tribunals 
commonly have had jurisprudential recourse to the Courts’ decisions, and this 
dependence is likely to increase given the evolution and expansion of domestic 
human rights frameworks, as discussed further below.465 The Court has often 
delivered judgments in the specific fields of mental health and civil commitment. 
In a general sense Court has remarked that special scrutiny of involuntary 
patients’ conditions of confinement is warranted because of the unusual 
vulnerability of persons who are the subject of civil commitment processes.466 
Further, the Court has affirmed the existence of several rights and freedoms in 
this context, such as a government’s duty to conform to its domestic laws and to 
avoid arbitrary confinement;467  that determinations of mental illness must be 
based on objective medical evidence;468 and that patients have the right to a 
timely review of his or her detention by an independent authority.469 Moreover, 
the Court has identified violations of human rights such as the denial of an 
involuntary patient’s right to control property;470 and the denial of a patient’s 
right to access his or her child.471 And, of direct pertinence to the subject of this 
research, the Court has found that persons subject to civil confinement have the 
right to a fair and public hearing in the determination of his or her civil rights and 
freedoms.472 
B Domestic Human Rights Frameworks 
This section acknowledges the recent evolution of domestic human rights 
charters, which although at the time of writing, remain enacted in only two 
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Australian jurisdictions, nevertheless further indicates Australia’s on-going 
willingness to acknowledge by international laws in the form of domestic 
statutory recognition.  
Two Australian jurisdictions have given statutory recognition to human rights 
principles in the form of human rights charters. This occurred first in the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) in 2004,473 and subsequently in Victoria in 
2006.474 The human rights provided in both statutes reflect the rights set out in 
the ICCPR.475  The main purpose of these charters is to set out the human rights 
that those enacting parliaments intends to protect; to ensure that all other 
statutory provisions are interpreted so far as is possible in a way that is 
compatible with those human rights; and to oblige public authorities to act 
compatibly with those rights.476 For example, Victoria’s legislation requires that 
courts and tribunals (which includes Victoria’s Mental Health Review Board) to 
interpret all statutory provisions consistently with the charter and other human 
rights, so far as it is possible.477 Moreover, it provides that it is unlawful for a 
public authority to act incompatibly with Charter rights or fail to properly 
consider those rights in making a decision.478 The ACT statute articulates these 
provisions in similar terms.479 
Part II of the Victorian Charter sets out the specific human rights the legislation 
intends to promote and protect. Notable rights include the right to equality and 
non-discrimination before the law;480 the right to life;481 the right to protection 
from medical treatment without full, free and informed consent;482 the right to 
privacy;483 the right to liberty and security;484 and the right to a fair and public 
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hearing.485 The ACT statute provides for the protection of similar rights and 
freedoms under Part III of its legislation.486   
A party to a proceeding before a court or tribunal in either of these two 
jurisdictions may refer a matter of law to the Supreme Court requesting a 
‘Declaration of Inconsistency’ between a posited human right and another 
legislative provision.487 The Victorian Charter provides that ‘…if in a proceeding 
the Supreme Court is of the opinion that a statutory provision cannot be 
interpreted consistently with a human right, the Court may make a declaration to 
that effect…’. 488  Where the Supreme Court makes such a declaration, the 
relevant Minister must table the declaration in Parliament and prepare a response 
to the declaration within six months.489 Declarations of inconsistent interpretation 
under the Charter play an important role in informing parliament as to particular 
laws that may be inconsistent with human rights, and are a prompt to parliament 
to consider whether a particular law should be amended to better protect human 
rights.490  
In Momcilovic v The Queen, 491  the High Court considered and upheld the 
constitutional validity of some of the key provisions of the Victorian Charter.  
Much of the discussion revolved around the functions of the judiciary and its role 
within constitutional limits, including the proper relationship between the 
Parliament and the Courts in determining the content of human rights in the 
Victorian Charter. In considering the constitutional validity of the Supreme 
Court’s legislative discretion to declare inconsistency between a Charter right 
and another legislative provision under section 36 of the Charter, a majority of 
the Court (4:3 with several judges deciding the issue in differing ways), held 
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section 36 valid.492  Section 36 ensures that ultimately, it is the sole responsibility 
of Parliament to determine whether law it enacts is consistent or otherwise with 
human rights.493 The power of the Supreme Court is limited to the interpretation 
of a statutory provision in light of the Charter and to the discretionary declaration 
of a statement of inconsistent interpretation where a provision cannot be 
construed consistently with a Charter right. Ultimately, though, the Court 
confirmed that a declaratory statement is merely discretionary and advisory in 
character – it is not legally binding.494 A declaration of inconsistency does not 
require the Supreme Court to engage in any function that is the preserve of the 
legislature or executive. 495 Such a declaration merely draws the attention of the 
legislature, and any substantive changes to law can only be implemented by the 
legislature. 496   Thus, the overriding focus of the domestic human rights 
legislation is to facilitate the creation of policies and laws that are human rights 
compliant.497 
C Relevance of Human Rights for Mental Health Law and Open Justice at Civil 
Commitment Review Hearings 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the importance that human rights 
law exerts in providing a normative framework to underpin not only the 
operation of domestic law generally, but the specific operation of open justice at 
civil commitment review hearings established under Australian mental health 
legislation. It will show that as a consenting member of the international 
community, Australia has a longstanding and continuing obligation to 
acknowledge and to comply with public international law, and specifically the 
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human rights conventions that these international laws have created, and those to 
which Australia has ratified.  
In 1991, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (the 
Commission) conducted an inquiry into the human rights of people with a mental 
illness. The ensuing report is referred to as the ‘Burdekin Report’.498 In drawing 
attention to human rights law in the context of mental illness, the Report asserted 
that mentally ill persons were among the most disadvantaged groups in the 
community and that institutions were in many ways violating many of these 
persons’ rights. 499  Underlying these issues was an apparent culture of 
discriminatory attitudes and institutional practices against mentally ill persons.500 
The report identified a lack of guiding principles underpinning the existing 
regulatory framework.501 It also cited several other perceived substantive and 
procedural shortcomings including:  
• The lack of a definition of mental illness; 
• Ambiguity in the criteria for involuntary detention and admission; 
• Excessive discretion for police and medical practitioners in the decision 
to detain and admit persons;  
• Inadequate and potentially unfair review processes; 
• Excessive time periods for initial and subsequent involuntary status 
reviews;  
• Inadequate provision for involuntary treatment in community settings; 
and 
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• Inadequate protection of patient confidentiality.502     
The report’s recommended responses to these problems were framed, 
unsurprisingly, from within a human rights framework. The report recommended 
greater legislative compliance with the United Nations Principles for the 
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health 
Care (MI Principles), 503  a non-legally binding UN General Assembly 
Resolution.504  
The federal government at the time then made the task of implementing the 
Report’s recommendations a high priority, establishing the National Mental 
Health Task Force, chaired by the then Attorney General. 505  It was the 
publication of the Burdekin Report and the subsequent public debates it spurred 
that provided the catalyst for the initiation of Australia’s national mental health 
strategy, which would put human rights front and centre as the yardstick for 
future law reform in the field of mental health policy and law reform.506 In 1992, 
the federal government released its National Mental Health Strategy, 507 which 
proffered a model of co-operative federalism that should produce policy 
guidelines to underpin the reform of mental health services, and the legislation 
underpinning of those services.508 This agenda gave rise to the National Mental 
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Health Legislation Project, established to assist Australian jurisdictions to work 
co-operatively to identify how inter-jurisdictional consistency and compliance 
with the MI Principles could be achieved.509 Thus, the MI Principles became the 
centrepiece of a human rights based approach to the regulation of mental health 
care and treatment, providing a human rights benchmark of quality improvement 
and performance accountability against which mental health legislation was to be 
measured.510  
This human rights approach resulted in the development of a Rights Analysis 
Instrument designed to measure legislative compliance with the existing human 
rights framework. It provided thirteen ‘Indicators’ representative of standards 
expressed in the MI Principles, grouped under headings such as ‘Criteria for 
Admission to a Mental Health Facility’; ‘Involuntary Admission Review/Appeals 
Body’ and ‘Involuntary Admission Review/Appeals Process’. The Instrument 
created four classifications of compliance: ‘substantial’, ‘significant’, ‘partial’ 
and ‘minimal’.511  
In the year 2000, all state and territory mental health legislation, except in 
Queensland, were reported to have improved in their regulatory compliance with 
this human rights framework. 512  Although no Australian jurisdiction had 
achieved ‘total’ compliance, the majority recorded ‘significant’ or ‘substantial’ 
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classifications for the majority of Indicators.513 The National Assessment Panel’s 
report remarked that ‘...there is still a need to be vigilant in order to maintain and 
further improve compliance - not only in the letter of the legislation measured by 
the Rights Analysis Instrument, but also its actual enforcement in practice’.514 No 
further official analysis of compliance has been undertaken at the time of writing.  
However, there has been some criticism of the emphasis on the MI Principles as 
a measure of human rights compliance.515 Rees, for example, described the MI 
Principles as a ‘compromised solution’ claiming that it provides minimal 
protection for mentally ill persons in comparison with other human rights 
instruments.516 In consequence, Rees remarked that the use of the MI Principles 
as a measure of compliance is flawed when interpreted in isolation from other 
human rights instruments.517 Further, a notable omission of the MI Principles 
framework is that the instrument does not establish a monitoring body or 
mechanism with the responsibility of monitoring its implementation at the 
national level, nor does it provide for a procedure by which individual 
complaints can be received.518 
What is clear, is that human rights frameworks have become a significant 
benchmark by which mental health legislation is measured in Australia. 519 The 
next section introduces other human rights instruments that should be considered 
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alongside the MI Principles and the other seminal human rights conventions 
contained in the United Nations Bill of Rights. It shall also expand on the 
introductory discussion of the MI Principles presented in this section.  
D Focused Instruments Protecting the Rights of Persons with a Mental Illness  
The purpose of this section is to introduce the specific human rights sources that 
are directly relevant to the regulation of mental health in Australia and that 
contribute to important aspects of the open justice framework that should apply 
to Australian civil commitment review hearings. This section will also emphasise 
the recent introduction of the Convention of the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD), which has now effectively revolutionised the way in which 
human rights law frames the regulation of mental health law in Australia and 
elsewhere.  
The UN has now developed a wide range of thematic human rights instruments 
that deal with a specific issue, or a group of persons vulnerable to human rights 
violations. In the context of mental health, the UN has developed several human 
rights instruments directed toward promoting and protecting the rights and 
freedoms of persons with a mental illness, emphasising that such persons remain 
rights holders on an equitable basis with all other persons.520 These instruments 
provide more specific human rights protections for involuntary patients 
appearing at civil commitment review hearings, in addition to the broader human 
rights frameworks outlined above.  
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons was the first 
UN instrument directed toward protecting human rights in the mental health 
context.521 The Declaration asserts that so-called mentally ‘retarded’522 persons 
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should enjoy the same rights as other persons.523 Its protections include the right 
to proper medical care; 524  the right to work; 525  the right to participate in 
community life; 526  and the right to protection from exploitation, abuse and 
degrading treatment.527 It also provides that there should be appropriate legal 
safeguards in place where a person is unable to exercise his or her rights because 
of the presence of a mental handicap. However, the Declaration does not provide 
a definition of ‘mental retardation’. This omission was rectified, to some extent, 
in 1975 by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons,528 which 
posited protections for ‘disabled’ persons. 529  This subsequent Declaration 
defined a ‘disabled person’ as:  
...any person unable to ensure by himself or herself, wholly or partly, the 
necessities of a normal individual and/or social life, as a result of deficiency, 
either congenital or not, in his or her physical or mental capabilities.530  
The Declaration asserted the right to non-discrimination, 531  and the right to 
receive assistance to achieve self-reliance, which includes the right to receive 
medical, psychological, and functional treatments. 532  The Declaration also 
provided for the right to the same legal safeguards as provided in the Declaration 
on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons.533  
Subsequently, the UN declared the years 1983 to 1992, the ‘Decade of Disabled 
Persons’.534 This resulted in the creation of the Tallinn Guidelines for Action on 
Human Resources Development in the Field of Disability (Tallinn Guidelines),535 
and the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with 
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Disabilities (Standard Rules). 536  The overarching intention of the Tallinn 
Guidelines was to develop human resource strategies that would further 
recognise and promote the full capabilities of persons with a disability, 537 
emphasising that persons with a disability have the potential, with appropriate 
assistance, to exercise rights on the same basis as all other persons. This requires 
governments to implement policies and programs that recognise persons with a 
disability as capable of participating as equal partners in decision-making that 
affects them as citizens in mainstream society. 538  The UN subsequently 
implemented the Standard Rules to provide practical mechanisms that would 
facilitate the achievement of these objectives. The Standard Rules emphasise 
principles of equality, respect for dignity, and the provision of assistance to 
persons with a disability to achieve self-reliance in all facets of his or her life. 
They also asserted that such participation in society requires governments to 
implement legal safeguards that support persons with a disability to exercise his 
or her rights.539 
As introduced earlier in this chapter, a significant outcome of the ‘Decade of 
Disabled Persons’ was the publication of the MI Principles in 1991.540  This 
human rights instrument sets out 25 principles focused toward the specific 
regulation of civil commitment processes. The UN derived the principles from 
the rights set out in the International Bill of Rights and the other relevant mental 
health oriented human rights instruments that preceded the instrument.541 The MI 
Principles are the product of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
and the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities.542 The instrument provides that the treatment of persons subject to 
civil commitment processes should be administered according to principles of 
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non-discrimination, respect, dignity, self-determination and respect for 
autonomy.543 There is also an emphasis on protecting committed persons from 
harm, such as harm that may arise from the administration of medication;544 the 
use of restraints or seclusion;545 or the administration of medical procedures such 
as sterilisation; 546  psychosurgery; 547  or other experimental treatments. 548  In 
addition, the instrument provides several principles that function as procedural 
safeguards against the abuse of civil commitment processes, which includes 
specific guidelines for the operation of open justice, which the chapter discusses 
and applies in the human rights model provided later in this chapter.  
The most recent human rights instrument (and by far the most important) 
relevant to Australian civil commitment processes is the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 549  Prior to the adoption of the 
CRPD, existing legally binding human rights treaties did not direct terms to 
specific issues of mental health.550  Although the International Bill of Rights 
guaranteed particular rights and freedoms to all persons, such as equality and 
non-discrimination,551 the instruments did not specifically define mental illness 
as a human rights issue. The CRPD is thus a recent thematic addition to the vast 
array of broader international instruments dealing with human rights issues. 
Because of its importance, the next section of chapter five provides a more 
detailed coverage of the background to the Convention’s introduction, its nature, 
purpose, specific provisions, and its direct application to Australian mental health 
law. Subsequent sections of this chapter shall draw upon the specific elements of 
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the CRPD that contribute to the human rights model of open justice that apples to 
civil commitment review hearings.    
1 Relevance of Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for 
Australia 
As a part of the ‘Decade for Disabled Persons’, the Human Rights Commission 
appointed two Special Rapporteurs, Erica-Irene Daes and Leandro Despouy, who 
prepared a report on the worldwide conditions of people with disabilities. The 
authors claimed there were widespread human rights abuses relating to persons 
with a mentally illness, and proposed a binding treaty that would deal with 
specific issues human rights pertinent to disability.552 
2 A Hybrid Thematic Convention 
Rather than establishing a raft of new rights, the CRPD extrapolates existing 
human rights and freedoms;553 it is essentially a hybrid thematic Convention 
because it deals with civil and political rights together with economic, cultural 
and social rights.554 The CRPD thus breaks with the dichotomy of negative and 
positive rights by recognising rights contained in the International Bill of Rights, 
but furnishes them with terms that directly engage persons with a disability, both 
physical and mental. The CRPD is thus an authoritative legally binding 
international human rights agreement reflecting a social model of disability by 
clarifying what disability means in the context of an already established human 
rights framework.  
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Notably, the World Health Organization (WHO), recently set a global target in 
its Mental Health Action Plan 2013/2020 that requires at least fifty percent of 
state parties to have reformed their mental health laws to improve compliance 
with international human rights instruments, emphasising compliance with the 
CRPD.555  
3 The Drafting Processes 
The drafting processes involved extensive discussions relating to previous non-
legally binding human rights instruments relevant to disability and mental 
health,556  including the consideration of submissions from inter-governmental 
and non-governmental organisations and regional commissions.557 And persons 
with a disability made contributions to the negotiation process and the 
development of the final draft.558 This is essentially an acknowledgment that 
persons with disabilities have lacked equal opportunities, and have faced 
obstacles that emanate from deep-rooted discriminatory attitudes in society.559 
After a long negotiation process, the UN General Assembly adopted a final draft 
outlining the final terms in December 2006, and opening for state signatures in 
March 2007.560 The CRPD came into force on 3 May 2008. Australia, a nation 
that had actively participated in the consultation, negotiation and drafting 
processes, signed the Convention in March 2007 and ratified it in July 2008. The 
influence that the secondary literature has had in informing the CRPD’s 
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provisions and, its emphasis on supported decision-making is included in the 
relevant sections in part 5 of this chapter below. 
(i) CRPD Objectives  
The stated purpose of the CRPD is to promote equality and respect for the 
dignity of persons who have ‘…long-term physical, mental, intellectual or 
sensory impairments which in interaction with barriers may hinder their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.’561 This definition 
of disability effectively breaks the distinction between physical and mental 
disabilities and brings both groups under the Convention’s purview.  
Article 3 identifies the general principles underpinning the purpose of the 
Convention, which include: respect for dignity; individual autonomy including 
the freedom to make one’s own choices; independence of persons; non-
discrimination; participation and inclusion in society; respect for and acceptance 
of difference; equality of opportunity and gender; accessibility; and respect for 
the evolving capacities and the identity of children.562 
(ii)  Substantive Rights and Freedoms  
Articles 10 to 30 outline specific rights and freedoms. Many of these provisions 
re-assert established rights and freedoms under the International Bill of Rights, 
but clarify them in the context of persons with disabilities.  
Article 10 provides that ‘State Parties [shall] reaffirm that every human being has 
the inherent right to life and shall take all necessary measures to ensure its 
effective enjoyment by persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others.’563  
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Article 11 obliges state parties to ensure the safety of persons with disabilities in 
situations of risk, including in cases of armed conflict and natural disasters.564 
Articles 12 to 14 are important in the context of the operation of open justice 
principles at civil commitment review hearings. First, Article 12 re-asserts the 
obligation under Article 5 to provide persons with a disability to equal protection 
before the law.565 Further, it obliges state parties to ‘…recognize that persons 
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects 
of life’.566 Article 12 also obliges state parties to ‘…take appropriate measures to 
provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity.’567 Article 12 then obliges States Parties to: 
…ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity provide for appropriate 
and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with international human rights law. 
Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect 
the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue 
influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest 
time possible and are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial 
authority or judicial body. The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such 
measures affect the person’s rights and interests.568 
Article 13 requires state parties to provide appropriate training for staff working 
in the field of administration of justice to:  
...ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, 
including through the provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodations, in order 
to facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all 
legal proceedings, including at investigative and other preliminary stages.569 
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Article 14 further imposes an obligation to ensure the ‘…right to liberty and 
security of the person’;570 and that any deprivation of liberty is not undertaken 
‘…unlawfully or arbitrarily…and that…the existence of a disability shall in no 
case justify a deprivation of liberty.’571 Article 14 also obliges States Parties to:  
…ensure that if persons with disabilities are deprived of their liberty through any process, they 
are, on an equal basis with others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with international 
human rights law and shall be treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of this 
Convention…572 
Article 15 reasserts the freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment and medical or scientific experimentation without the 
person’s consent. Article 17 protects the right to respect for physical and mental 
integrity and Article 18 recognises the equal rights of persons with disabilities to 
liberty of movement, freedom of choice in relation to residence and to acquire 
and change their nationality.573 Article 19 recognises the equal right of persons 
with a disability to live in the community independently with full participation 
and inclusion. Article 21 obliges States Parties to ensure the right to freedom of 
expression and opinion, emphasising the importance of access to communicative 
technologies.574  
Article 22 guarantees the freedom from unlawful or arbitrary interference with 
privacy, including interference with the person’s family, home, correspondence 
or unlawful attacks on the person’s honour and reputation. Article 22 is also 
especially important in the context of the operation of open justice principles at 
civil commitment review hearings (discussed in detail below). It obliges state 
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parties to protect the privacy and thus confidentiality of a patient’s personal, 
health and rehabilitation information on an equal basis with others.575  
Article 24 recognises the person’s right to education and obliges state parties to 
take measures that enable the realisation of a person’s full potential, sense of 
dignity and self-worth, and to promote effective participation in society.576  
Article 25 re-affirms the right to health under the ICESCR by requiring state 
parties to ‘…recognize that persons with disabilities have the right to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health without discrimination on 
the basis of disability.’577 Article 26 expands on Article 25 by obliging States 
Parties to 
… take effective and appropriate measures, including through peer support, to enable persons 
with disabilities to attain and maintain maximum independence, full physical, mental, social 
and vocational ability, and full inclusion and participation in all aspects of life…[to provide] 
comprehensive habilitation and rehabilitation services …based on the multidisciplinary 
assessment of individual needs and strengths [and to support] participation and inclusion in 
the community and all aspects of society, are voluntary, and are available to persons with 
disabilities as close as possible to their own communities… 578 
The CRPD also obliges state parties to recognise the right of persons with 
disabilities to work and employment on an equal basis with others;579 the right to 
an adequate standard of living;580 the right to participation in political and public 
life,581 and the right to participate in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport.582  
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(iii)  Compliance mechanisms for CRPD terms 
Articles 31 to 50 set out provisions relating to the monitoring, accountability and 
operational provisions. Importantly, Article 34 establishes the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, consisting of a body of international experts 
that review periodical reports that are to be submitted by states parties.583 State 
parties must submit reports to the Committee outlining how CRPD rights are 
being implemented within two years of the Convention entering into force, and 
thereafter at intervals of no more than four years.584 The Committee will then 
consider the reports and make observations and recommendations to each state 
party.585 The Committee may also consider complaints alleging violations of the 
Convention’s rights and freedoms from individuals, or from states parties that 
have ratified the Optional Protocol to the CRPD.586 Important too, is the function 
of the Committee to publish general comments that seek to clarify ambiguities in 
the scope of CRPD terms, and particularly so when the specific human rights 
framework underpinning the operation of open justice at civil commitment 
review hearings presented in the final sections of this chapter refers substantially 
to the Committee’s’ first general comment in relation to the scope of Article 12 
of the Convention dealing with equality before the law.587   
(iv) Australia’s General Obligations as a State Party to the CRPD 
Article 4 states that ‘the provisions of the present Convention shall extend to all 
parts of federal states without any limitations or exceptions.’588 Article 4 also 
outlines obligations of state parties to ensure compliance. They include 
obligations to make undertakings to adopt appropriate legislative and 
administrative measures for the implementation of CRPD rights; to modify or 
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abolish laws and practices that constitute discrimination; to ensure public 
authorities and institutions act in conformity with the CRPD; to promote research 
and development of new technologies; to provide accessible information to 
persons through assistive technologies, to provide support services and facilities; 
and to provide training to staff working with persons with disabilities in relation 
to the rights contained in the CRPD.589  
State parties are obliged to utilise its available resources to maximise progressive 
compliance with the terms of the Convention,590 and should consult disabled 
persons in developing future legislation, policies and programs designed to 
comply with the CRPD. Article 4 states 
In the development and implementation of legislation and policies to implement the present 
Convention, and in other decision-making processes concerning issues relating to persons with 
disabilities, States Parties shall closely consult with and actively involve persons with 
disabilities, including children with disabilities, through their representative organizations.591 
Articles 5 to 7 further recognises the equality of persons with a disability,592 
through the principle of non-discrimination.593 Articles 8 and 9 then oblige state 
parties to adopt measures that raise societal awareness in relation to disability 
issues and facilitate independence and participation in the community. The 
CRPD thus establishes obligations upon Australia as a state party to the 
Convention to facilitate the inclusion of persons with a disability into mainstream 
society. This effectively recognises that persons with a disability remain rights 
holders, rather than simply objects of paternalistic policies and practices.594 
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E Australia’s Obligations to Comply with Human Rights Generally 
The High Court of Australia has commented that Courts should exercise great 
caution in applying principles of international law into the common law where 
Parliament has not formally incorporated those principles into legislation.595 In 
the absence of statutory recognition the High Court has observed that 
international law posits aspirational goals rather than fully justiciable rights.596 
Accordingly, international human rights obligations become legally binding in 
Australia only if legislation gives express recognition to those rights.597 Such 
recognition depends first, on Australia’s willingness to formally consent to the 
terms of a Convention, and second, to incorporate those terms into legislation. 
Thus, Australia’s State and Territory Parliaments must expressly incorporate the 
terms of an international Convention into its domestic legislation to enable direct 
enforceability of its terms.598 Where this occurs, as it has for example within 
statutes relating to discrimination,599 the relevant Convention then operates as a 
judiciable source of human rights, because the terms of the Convention have 
entered into force via the operation of parliamentary sovereignty.  
The Australian Commonwealth has obligations to incorporate the terms of 
international conventions into domestic legislation, by virtue of its status as a 
member of the United Nations and as a state party to many of its conventions.600 
The Human Rights Committee has emphasised the contractual nature of 
conventions and the obligations imposed specifically by the Vienna 
Convention.601 Pursuant to Article 26 of the latter, a state party to a convention 
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UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980). 





must recognise and implement its terms in good faith.602 Such obligations extend 
to all branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial), at national and 
regional levels without limitation or exception. 603  Accordingly, the Vienna 
Convention precludes a state party from relying on the federal nature of 
government as a justification for failing to implement contractual obligations 
under a Convention.604 Further, Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) imposes obligations on state parties to implement 
laws that give effect to the Convention’s terms, and to provide effective remedies 
to those persons whose rights and freedoms may be violated. 605  Article 2 
obligations require recognition through statutory, judicial, administrative and 
educative measures. 606  Moreover, the Committee has asserted that non-
compliance should not be justified by reference to political, social, cultural or 
economic considerations.607 
F Conclusions to the Relevance of Human Rights Law as a Normative 
Framework for the Content of Australian Mental Health Legislation and the 
Operation of the Open Justice Principle 
Human rights law remains central to the development of Australia’s mental 
health statutory frameworks, which supports its use as an appropriate normative 
framework as a source of critical analysis for the operation of the open justice 
principle in Australia’s mental health statutory frameworks, particularly in 
relation to the operation of review hearings. A human rights framework is 
appropriate given that mental health regulation is historically informed by human 
rights developments in mental health, and the current policy position in Australia 
that emphasises that statutory compliance with human rights law is essential. 
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Thus, human rights law remains a key driver of mental health policy and law, 
and there is an ever-increasing recognition that relevant international instruments 
remain a key benchmark of good practice in relation to the continual 
development and reform of Australia’s mental health legislation.   
 
III SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS RELEVANT TO THE REGULATION 
OF OPEN JUSTICE AT CIVIL COMMITMENT REVIEW 
HEARINGS  
The purpose of this section is to identify each of the relevant human rights, 
derived from the instruments described above, which underpin the basis of the 
normative framework presented in the final sections of chapter five. This section 
explores the scope of these human rights and their interlinking relationships, and 
identifies that there is a fundamental tension specifically between two 
simultaneously applicable rights: the right to a public hearing, and the right to 
privacy. Each is relevant because, in its own way, it contributes to the regulation 
of involuntary patient’s confidential medical information at a civil commitment 
review hearing. As chapter four identified, Australia’s mental health legislation 
effectively restricts public attendance at review hearings and the flow of 
information deriving from them. This is a problem because although it is 
important that confidential information remains private, it is also important that 
processes and decisions that encroach upon a person’s liberty and autonomy be 
highly accountable. This section effectively highlights this tension and provides a 
foundation for its resolution through the subsequent application of article 12 of 
the CRPD in the remainder of the chapter. 
A Human Rights to a Public Hearing 
The right to a public hearing reflects each of the five elements of open justice 
described in chapter two, explicitly and implicitly, in the relevant human rights 
instruments tabled below. To iterate chapter two, the elements of open justice 
reflected by human rights law are: first, the public should have freedom to 
physically witness and hear evidence a court or tribunal relies upon. Second, 




occurred at those proceedings. Third, the public should have an ability to 
discover the identity of parties who are the subject of those proceedings. Fourth, 
the public should have freedom to access documents relied upon in the decision-
making process. And fifth, reasons for decisions made by civil commitment 
review bodies should be publicly accessible. 





Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 
Art 10 - Everyone is entitled to a fair & public hearing by an 
independent & impartial tribunal, in the determination of rights & 
obligations. 
International Covenant on 
Civil & Political Rights 
Art 14(1) - In determining rights & obligations in a suit at law, 
everyone is entitled to a fair & public hearing by a competent, 
independent & impartial tribunal, but press & public may be 
excluded from all or part of hearing for reasons of morals, public 
order or national security, or to protect parties’ private lives, or 
where strictly necessary in special circumstances if publicity would 
prejudice interests of justice. However, all judgements shall be 
made public except in relation to matrimonial disputes or cases 
concerning children. 
Charter of Human Rights 
& Responsibilities (Vic) 
S 24(1)-(3) - All parties to civil proceedings have right to a fair & 
public hearing, but persons may be excluded from all or part of 
hearing if permitted by law other than the Charter. However, all 
judgments or decisions by courts or tribunals in civil proceedings 
must be made public unless the child’s best interests or other law 
requires otherwise. 
Human Rights Act (ACT) S 21(1)-(3) - Everyone has right to have determination of rights & 
obligations decided by competent, independent & impartial 
tribunal after fair & public hearing, but press & public may be 
excluded to protect morals, public order, national security, or 
parties’ private lives; or if strictly necessary, in special 
circumstances, because publicity would prejudice interests of 
justice. However, all judgments must be made public unless child’s 
interests require otherwise.  
United Nations Principles 
for the Protection of 
Persons with a Mental 
Illness & the Improvement 
of Mental Health Care (MI 
Principles)   
Prin 18(6) - Patient has right to have anyone present at review 
hearing unless the person could cause serious harm to patients’ 
health or risk others’ safety. 
Prin 18(7) - Any decision on whether hearing or part of it shall be 
in public or private & publicly reported shall fully consider 
patient's wishes; need to respect patients’ & other’s privacy; need 
to prevent serious harm to patient's health; or avoid risking others’ 
safety. 
Prin 18(8) - A decision on whether the review outcome is 
published wholly or in part, shall fully consider patients’ wishes; 
the need to respect patients’ & other’s privacy; & to the public 
interest in the open administration of justice & the prevention of 
serious harm to patients’ health & others’ safety. 
 
B Discussion 
Table 5 demonstrates that the human right to a public hearing is provided for 




Principles. Most notably it is provided for in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’),608 to which Australia is a party.609 Article 14 
provides that every person shall be equal before the courts and tribunals and that 
every person has the right to a fair and public hearing in any suit at law.610 This 
covers determinations made by mental health tribunals.611 Although reviews of 
civil involuntary status may be considered decisions of an administrative 
character, they are nevertheless civil proceedings for the purpose of the phrase 
‘any suit at law’.612 Civil commitment hearings fall within the scope of article 14 
and any decision arising as a result of a tribunal’s judicial or administrative 
function must comply with its requirements.  
Human rights conventions and domestic statutes express the right to a public 
hearing in the same sentence, yet as a discrete and separate right from the right to 
a fair hearing.613 Article 14 of the ICCPR provides that everyone is entitled to a 
fair and public hearing in a suit at law, and both of Australia’s human rights 
statutes provide recognition in similar terms.614 The right to a public hearing is, 
accordingly, a stand-alone right, designed to safeguard the provision of a fair 
hearing.615 This independent recognition of a right to a hearing that is public is 
supported by the MI Principles, which deals with the fairness and publicity of 
hearings in separate principles. Under MI principle 1(6), any decision that 
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determines a person lacks legal capacity should only be made at a fair hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal.616 The MI Principles then refers explicitly 
to elements of the right to a public hearing in principle 18, which provides that 
where a patient requests a particular person be present at a review hearing, that 
person shall be allowed to attend unless his or her attendance could cause serious 
harm to the patient's health or risk others’ safety. 617  In addition, decisions 
relating to whether a hearing will be in public or private, and may be publicly 
disseminated shall fully consider each patient's wishes on the matter, while 
consideration should be given to the patient’s privacy and health interests, and 
the privacy and safety interests of others. 618  These considerations are also 
relevant in determining whether or not the written decision shall be published in 
whole or in part. However, Principle 18 additionally provides that consideration 
should also be given to the public interest in the open administration of justice 
when deciding in relation to publication.619 
The Human Rights Committee confirms the centrality of article 14 ICCPR rights 
as an important procedural safeguard, noting that any publicity that may ensue 
from a hearing is an important check against the abuse of other fundamental 
human rights, such as the right to liberty.620 The Committee noted that public 
attendance must be reasonably accessible, and not limited to specific categories 
of person. 621  To facilitate public accessibility, the Committee asserted that 
sufficient information regarding the date, time and venue should be reasonably 
available, and that reasonable facilities should be available to accommodate 
those interested persons who wish to attend.622 Although article 14(1) provides 
that the press and public may be excluded in some circumstances, 623  the 
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Committee has emphasised that exclusion should only occur in exceptional 
(although unstated) circumstances.624 
1 The Interests of Justice Qualification Permit a Statutory Presumption of 
Closed (Private) Review Hearings in the Mental Health Review Context 
In B. P. v The United Kingdom,625 (a case in which the applicants sought a public 
hearing in relation to the determination of their child’s residential rights 
following a separation), the European Court commented that despite the general 
rule that civil proceedings should be publicly accessible, it is acceptable to 
designate a class of persons, (in this case children) as an exception to this 
principle where the interests of justice are served.626 The Court held that it is not 
inconsistent with article 6(1) of the European Convention to designate cases 
involving children as an example of a class of cases that fall within the 
exceptions because such cases involve the best interests of minors. The Court 
noted that English tribunals have discretion to conduct public proceedings 
involving children if one of the parties requests a public hearing, and if a public 
hearing would be in the relevant child’s interests.627 Given these safeguards, the 
Court was of the view that a statutory presumption of private proceedings 
involving children is permissible, but fell short of stating that it is required by the 
human rights framework in that context.628      
In the context of mental health civil commitment review hearings, two cases 
have considered whether a statutory presumption of in-camera proceedings 
interferes with the human right to a public hearing under article 6(1) of the 
European Convention. 629  Both cases involved review hearings in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and both judgments held that a presumption of in-camera 
hearings in this context is compliant with article 6(1) of the European 
Convention. In the United Kingdom, the First-Tier Tribunal (a generalist so-
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called ‘super tribunal’ with a mental health division) operates according to a 
presumption of closed review hearings, but with discretion to open if satisfied the 
statutory threshold criteria are satisfied.630  
In R (on the application of Mersey Care NHS Trust) v Mental Health Tribunal,631 
a treating hospital applied for the judicial review of a Mental Health Review 
Tribunal decision to conduct a public review hearing.632 The patient had initially 
requested a public review hearing arguing that a proper construction of article 
6(1) of the European Convention favours a statutory presumption that review 
hearings should be conducted publicly. On appeal, the High Court of England 
rejected this argument reasoning that a statutory presumption of in-camera 
proceedings represents a proportionate departure from the presumption of public 
hearings, because article 6(1) provides expressly that proceedings may be closed 
in the interests of private lives.633 Later, in AH v West London MHT and SSJ,634 
(discussed further below), the UK Upper Tribunal set aside a First-Tier 
Tribunal’s decision to reject an involuntary patient’s request for a public review 
hearing. 635  Although, the Upper Tribunal ultimately ordered the First-Tier 
Tribunal to conduct a public hearing,636 the Tribunal followed the High Court’s 
reasoning that a statutory presumption in favour of in-camera proceedings 
represents an appropriate construction of Article 6(1) in the civil commitment 
review context.637  
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C AH v West London 
There is no extant jurisprudence deriving from the ICCPR or Australia’s 
domestic human rights legislation that considers the right to a public hearing in 
the mental health context. Though, there is an on-point case deriving from the 
United Kingdom in relation to the scope of Article 6 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention),638 which expresses the right to a public hearing in almost identical 
terms to the ICCPR. Article 6 states:  
In the determination of civil rights and obligations…everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or 
part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so 
require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances 
where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 639 
In AH v West London MHT and SSJ,640 an involuntary patient pursued a public 
review hearing by relying on the human right to a public hearing under article 
6(1) of the European Convention, which as noted, provides for the right to a 
public hearing in similar terms to the ICCPR. On appeal, the Upper Tribunal 
overturned the First-Tier Tribunal’s decision to refuse the patient’s request for a 
public hearing. In the UK, the relevant statutory provisions require that review 
hearings must be conducted privately unless an involuntary patient requests a 
public hearing and the Tribunal considers that a public hearing is in the interests 
of justice.641  
At the eventual public review hearing, for which statements of reasons were 
published and reported widely in the media, the First Tier Tribunal determined 
that Mr Haines should remain detained given the statutory criteria were satisfied; 
that Mr Haines continued to be a risk to others, and that he required continued 
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639 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature 11 April 1950,213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953), art 6. 
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treatment in hospital for his own health and safety. Mr Haines disagreed that he 
suffered from an emotionally unstable personality disorder; an antisocial 
personality disorder and a psychotic illness; and he disagreed that he presented a 
risk to others.642 
1 Background 
In 1986, Mr Haines was apprehended and held at the Broadmoor hospital in 
England after he attacked a nurse and a doctor with a knife and a machete. He 
then spent sixteen years at Three Bridges Medium Secure Unit culminating in an 
incident where he gained access to the roof and threatened others with a fire 
extinguisher, upon which he returned to Broadmoor hospital. Mr Haines applied 
in April 2009 for a review hearing to consider a revocation of his involuntary 
status order, and requested his hearing be open to public attendance. In October, 
the Tribunal decided that the hearing should be held privately, which was upheld 
again at a further review by Wright J. Mr Haine’s reasons for requesting a public 
hearing relied on the following points:  
• he had remained in detention for 23 years; 
• he was frustrated at the lack of treatment progress; 
• he believed his diagnosis and incarceration as unlawful; 
• he wanted others to be aware of life as a detained patient.643  
In 2010, Mr Haines received leave to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, which 
allowed Mr Haines’s appeal to consider whether his review hearing should be 
held in public. The public review hearing occurred in September 2011 at Upper 
Tribunal chambers outside the Broadmoor hospital.644 
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The Upper Tribunal heard evidence that there had been ten requests for public 
hearings over the previous seven years, and only one had been granted (but then 
withdrawn by the patient) out of 100,000 review hearings,645 and that the basis 
for refusing the patients’ requests rested on the overriding consideration of 
protecting the patients’ confidentiality of their clinical records and personal 
information, which although shared between Tribunal members, remains 
clinically confidential and the consideration of maintaining the privacy of 
potentially sensitive third-party information relevant to Tribunal discussions. 
Importantly, the Upper Tribunal asserted that the issue of a patient’s right to 
privacy ‘does not arise’ in circumstances where a competent patient requests a 
public hearing, as is his or her right; this is essentially, the valid exercise of a 
patient’s right to waive his or her right to privacy and confidentiality. 646 
Moreover, the Tribunal said that once the statutory threshold test for establishing 
a right to a public hearing has been satisfied, article 6 of the European 
Convention read with article 13 of the CRPD (article 13 provides the human 
right to access to justice), 647  requires that an involuntary patient have the 
equivalent right of access to a public hearing as any other person. The Tribunal 
said that the UK threshold criteria to grant a public hearing compatible with 
article 6(1) of the European Convention are as follows:   
1. Is an open hearing consistent with the patient’s subjective wishes and is 
the patient competent to make an informed choice?  
The Tribunal emphasised that the views of the involuntary patient, supported by 
his own experts, should carry considerable weight in the Tribunal’s ultimate 
decision.648 The Tribunal heard evidence from two medical consultants that the 
applicant had sufficient capacity to make decisions regarding the use of 
information relating to his private life; that he understood that he would be 
                                                
645 AH v West London MHT and SoS (J) (Final) [2011] UKUT 74 (AAC). 
646 AH v West London MHT and SSJ [2010] UKUT 264 (AAC), [45].  
647 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 
189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 3 May 2008), art 13(1). 




waiving his right to confidentiality; and that any publicity that may ensue might 
show him in a negative light.649 The Tribunal decided that a public hearing was 
consistent with the patient’s subjective wishes and that he was competent to 
make an informed choice about the matter. 
2. Will an open hearing have an adverse effect on the patient’s mental health 
or are there other special factors militating against an open hearing?  
 
In relation to determining what effect a public hearing may have on the 
applicant’s mental health, a medical consultant opined that there is no certainty 
that a publicly accessible hearing would in fact attract significant publicity. 
However, if it did, it was likely that any derived benefit would be short-lived, 
because he was likely to be sensitive and react negatively to what was presented 
about him, particularly given his imputed tendency for impulsivity and 
inhibition. The consultant thus concluded that the loss of confidentiality would 
have a negative impact on his mental health in the long term.650 In contrast, a 
second consultant opined that the weight of convenience favoured a public 
hearing on therapeutic considerations, because a public hearing would satisfy the 
patient’s wish to communicate his concerns to a wider audience. The consultant 
said that this fact alone would positively influence his engagement with any 
future treatment and rehabilitation programs. Moreover, he opined that if the 
Tribunal denied the applicant a public hearing, this would likely have anti-
therapeutic consequences because the patient may perceive the tribunal system as 
biased in favour of the treating hospital rather than as an independent 
organisation designed to safeguard his rights.651 The Tribunal ultimately decided 
that a public hearing would not have a sufficiently adverse effect on the patient’s 
mental health that would outweigh the patient’s right to a public hearing and 
found no other special factors militating against conducting a public hearing.  
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3. Whether practical arrangements can accommodate an open hearing 
without placing a disproportionate burden on the relevant authority? 
 
Where the previous threshold elements of the test had been resolved in favour of 
the involuntary patient’s request, the Upper Tribunal held that a public hearing 
should be denied only where such hearings would impose a disproportionate 
burden on the state.652 The Tribunal commented that how the right to a public 
hearing can be practically and proportionately achieved depends on the facts of 
each individual case. However, given the serious nature of civil commitment 
review hearings, considerations of cost must reach a high threshold to be 
considered disproportionate.653 The Tribunal held that the additional cost to the 
state in conducting public hearings was insufficient to refuse a patient’s request 
for a public hearing, particularly given that such a request would likely be a 
relatively infrequent occurrence.654 The Tribunal ultimately ordered the First-
Tier Tribunal to permit the public and the media to attend a further review 
hearing in person in the same hearing room in appropriately secured facilities 
outside of the treating hospital.655    
2 Conclusions to the Human Right to a Public Hearing in the Mental Health 
Civil Commitment Review Context Prior to the Consideration of Relevant 
CRPD Rights 
The Tribunal’s reasoning in AH v West London MHT and SSJ is important for 
several reasons. First, it confirms the that a presumption of private review 
hearings is an appropriate statutory construction compliant with the right to a 
public hearing. Second, it is important because it confirms that welfare 
considerations are a relevant factor in the determination of whether to grant an 
involuntary patient a public hearing. For example, although the Tribunal 
considered the patient’s mental capacity as an important factor, it also 
acknowledged there are circumstances in which the interests of justice (based on 
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welfare and protective considerations) may outweigh the decisions of competent 
patients. This effectively leaves it open for reviewing tribunals to determine that 
any adverse effects that may arise from publicity, beyond mere speculation, 
provides a lawful basis to displace a competent involuntary patient’s right to a 
public hearing. Here, the judgment of AH v West London MHT and SSJ clearly 
demonstrates the importance of patient confidentiality as a relevant consideration 
in the interests of justice, and that ultimately, it remains open to deny a 
competent patient’s request for a public review hearing based on protective and 
paternalistic considerations.  
However, critically, the Tribunal said that the European Convention requires that 
an involuntary patient have the equivalent right of access to a public hearing as 
any other person. The judgment makes it clear that by requesting a public 
hearing, an involuntary mental health patient has two key rights at issue: The 
right to a public hearing and the right to the confidentiality of personal and 
medical information. The co-existence of these rights is not in conflict for the 
Upper Tribunal. The Tribunal determined that if the patient has sufficient mental 
capacity to make decisions regarding the control of information about his or her 
private life, then the patient understands that he or she is waiving the right to 
confidentiality as a necessary component of the request to open a review hearing 
to potential public scrutiny.  
AH v West London reveals the some discrimination (as chapter five and six will 
demonstrate) against persons with psychosocial illness in exercising their legal 
capacity to make decisions relating to their rights to a public hearing, privacy and 
confidentiality. It also reflects the way in which substitute decisions can be easily 
manufactured under current statutory criteria. The Tribunal’s reasoning in AH v 
West London MHT and SSJ is thus important for several reasons. First it 
confirms the justifiability of the right to public hearing at human rights law, in 
the mental health civil commitment review context. It is also important because it 




of whether or not to grant a requesting patient a public hearing upon request. For 
example, although the Tribunal considered the patient’s mental capacity highly 
in the context of decisions relating to whether or not to grant a public hearing, the 
Tribunal also acknowledges that there may be circumstances in which the 
interests of justice outweigh the autonomy of persons who have the mental 
capacity to make decisions in relation to waiving a patient’s human right to 
privacy. This effectively leaves it available to Mental Health Tribunals to decide 
that the potential adverse effects of publicity may at times override a competent 
or incompetent involuntary patient’s right to a public hearing. Moreover, it 
demonstrates the paramount nature of the privacy exception on welfare 
considerations.  
(i) Human Rights Obligations to Publish Statements of Reasoning 
As Table 1 demonstrates, the human rights framework regarding the publication 
of reasons for decisions at civil commitment review hearings derives from 
several human rights instruments, and requires that all judgments deriving from 
civil proceedings should be published. For example, article 14(1) of the ICCPR 
requires that judgements of civil proceedings shall be made public except in 
matters concerning children or matrimonial disputes. The Human Rights 
Committee has emphasised that each judgment deriving from courts and 
tribunals should be published regardless of whether a civil proceeding is 
conducted openly or in-camera.656 In addition, the Committee emphasised that 
judgments should include the essential findings of the hearing, the evidence 
relied upon, and the legal reasoning underpinning the decision.657  
In Campbell and Fell v UK,658 the European Court considered the requirement of 
publishing reasons for decisions under article 6(1) of the European Convention, 
which is set out in similar terms to article 14 of the ICCPR. In this case, the 
                                                
656 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 13: Equality before the courts and the right 
to a fair and public hearing by an independent court established by law (Art 14) 21st session, 
UNDOC CCPR/C/GC13 (13th April 1984) [6]; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 
32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, 90th sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/32 (23 August 2007) 9 [29].  
657 Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, General Comment 32, 23 August 2007, [29]. 




Court declared that the practices of the UK ‘Prison Board of Visitors’ violated 
article 6(1) because it took no steps to publish the Board’s judgments.659 The 
Court held that article 6(1) is not subject to an implied limitation by virtue of the 
exceptions to the right to a public hearing provided in article 6(1).660 The Court 
observed that the requirement to publish judgments is expressed in almost 
unqualified terms, which provides no discretion to keep proceedings entirely 
confidential. 661  However, the Court noted that the content of the actual 
publication must be determined with consideration of the nature of each case’s 
subject matter, its special features, and in acknowledgment of a government’s 
margin of appreciation in relation to its preferred publication methods.662 
(ii) Mental Health Tribunals Should Publish ‘Significant’ Reasons 
It may be a concern that publishing reasons for decisions would impose an 
unacceptable burden on mental health tribunals given the additional costs that 
might be incurred. In AH v West London, the Upper Tribunal stated that a public 
hearing might be denied to an involuntary patient if providing such a hearing 
would impose a disproportionate burden on the state.663 However, the Tribunal 
indicated that costs would have to reach a high threshold to be considered 
disproportionate, given the unusual and serious nature of civil commitment 
review hearings.664 The Tribunal held that the additional cost was not sufficient 
to refuse an involuntary patient’s request for a public hearing, particularly given 
that such a request would likely be an infrequent occurrence.665  Moreover, the 
First Tier Tribunal proceeded in that case to publish reasons statements at the 
conclusion of the hearing. 666  
                                                
659 Campbell and Fell v UK [1985] 7 EHRR 165, [91]. 
660 Campbell and Fell v UK [1985] 7 EHRR 165, [91]. 
661 Campbell and Fell v UK [1985] 7 EHRR 165, [91]. 
662 See Campbell and Fell v UK [1985] 7 EHRR 165, [87] citing Pretto and Others judgment of 8 
December 1983, Series A no 71, [21], [26]-[7]; Sutter judgment of 22 February 1984, Series A no 
74, [26], [33]. 
663 AH v West London Mental Health Trust [2011] UKUT 74 (AAC) (17 February 2011) [8], 
[21]. 
664 Ibid [21]. 
665 Ibid [23]. 




Drawing on the reasoning in relation to different elements of open justice, it 
follows that it would be difficult for a state to establish that the publication of 
reasons statements would be too burdensome, particularly given that such 
requests by patients should prove to be relatively infrequent, and that a test of 
significance means that only selected review hearings need be published for 
educative purposes. For example, a test of significance means that a decision is 
one that involves a new matter of interpretation, or one that has involved 
complex factual circumstances. These criteria strike a balance between the 
limited resources available to tribunals and the need to ensure that mental health 
tribunals are educative as to the application of the law, transparent and that 
individuals may exercise their right to a public hearing. 
Diagram 1 on the following page provides a model of the human rights 
framework reflective of human rights law prior to the application of the CRPD.  
The application of CRPD rights and how they alter this model follows diagram 1 






























































Interests of justice exception 
on basis of right to privacy 
including confidentiality of 
health-related information 
 
But: state discretion (margin of appreciation) permits a statutory presumption of closed 
(private) or open (public) review hearings, but further and necessary criteria to open or close a 
hearing notwithstanding the adopted presumption  
 
1. Does patient request open or closed hearing; 
and have mental capacity to understand he or 
she is waiving confidentiality? 
2. Will an open hearing adversely affect 
patient’s mental health? 
3. Any special factors? (e.g. public hearing is 
impractical because of limited space; privacy 
of third parties cannot be managed; or open 
hearing constitutes an abuse of process).  
4. Is opening a review hearing or closing it a 
disproportionately burdensome to 
implement?  
Thus, the extent a hearing may be opened or closed depends on each patient’s 
mental capacity to decide; whether opening or closing a hearing will have an 
adverse effect on patient’s mental health regarding each open justice element, and 
limited to whether the privacy of others can be managed; and whether patient’s 
preferences results in a disproportionate burden on reviewing tribunal, such as 
imposing disproportionate costs on overcoming the physical limitations on hearing 
rooms 
 
In relation to element five of open justice, notwithstanding patient’s wishes, reviewing 
tribunals are obliged to at least publish reasons of ‘significant’ decisions if tribunal can 
protect privacy through redaction, in the interests of the public administration of 
justice.  
 
Criteria to open or 
close review 
hearing based on 
elements 1 – 4 of 
open justice (four 
factors) 
 
Human right to a public hearing 
(comprises OJ Elements): 
1. Public free to attend hearing 
2. Public free to report hearing 
3. Public free to identify parties  
4. Public free to inspect 
documents 




IV THE RELEVANCE OF A HUMAN RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The following section explores the scope of the human right to privacy in human 
rights jurisprudence including article 22 of the CRPD. Following this, the chapter 
will explore how the application of the human right to equality at law under 
article 12 of the CRPD provides an alternative approach to that taken in the cases 
cited in the previous section. The purpose of this section is to explore the scope 
of the human right to privacy and how it might affect the human right to a public 
hearing in the civil commitment review context considered in the previous 
section.  
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has articulated the diverse 
conceptual nature of privacy by noting that an all-encompassing 
conceptualisation would need to incorporate protections relating to bodily 
privacy, territorial privacy, communications privacy and information privacy.667 
Bodily privacy refers to the protection of the physical self against invasive 
procedures such as bodily searches. Territorial privacy relates to the sanctity of 
one’s personal space, such as protecting intrusions into one’s domestic and work 
environments. 668  Communications privacy refers to the security of mail, 
telephone correspondence, e-mail and other forms of communication. 669 
Information privacy refers to the control of one’s personal information including 
the maintenance of confidential medical records – it has been defined as a 
personal right to control information about oneself. 670  Hughes defines 
information privacy as ‘…data which relates to and identifies an individual and 
which, it can be assumed, the individual would prefer not to be made available to 
unauthorised persons or for unauthorised purposes’.671 Through the lens of open 
                                                
667 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, Report No108 (2008) [1.31]. 
668 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, Report No108 (2008) [1.31].  
669 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, Report No108 (2008) [1.31]. 
670 See, eg, Allan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum, New York, 1967), 25. 




justice, and its recognition at review hearings, the concept of information privacy 
is most relevant, as is quite evident from the reasoning in AH v West London 
MHT and SSJ. This is because civil commitment review hearings involve the 
presentation of an involuntary patient’s personal and sensitive information, 
which includes the circumstances in which commitment was initially imposed, 
and medical records contained on a patient’s file. The centrality of information 
privacy as a major theme within the broader conception of privacy can be clearly 
distilled from the articulation of privacy rights as expressed in the human rights 
instruments provided in Table 2 below.  Ultimately, it the conception of privacy 
as information privacy that is directly relevant to this research, and information 
privacy may be conceptualized largely within the ambit of the right to the 
protection of confidential health and medical records, amongst other forms of 










Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 
Art 12 - No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, or to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
Art 17(1)(2) - No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor 
to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation, and everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks. 
Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with a 
Disability 
Art 22(1)(2) - No person with a disability shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy…state 
parties shall protect the privacy of personal, health and 
rehabilitation information on an equal basis with others. 
Charter of Human Rights 
and Responsibilities (Vic) 
S 13(a)(b) - A person has the right to be free from unlawful or 
arbitrary interference with his or her privacy, family home or 
correspondence, and right not to have reputation unlawfully 
attacked.  
Human Rights Act (ACT) S 12(a)(b) - Everyone has the right to be free from unlawful or 
arbitrary interference with his or her privacy, family home or 
correspondence, and right not to have reputation unlawfully 
attacked. 
United Nations Principles 
for the Protection of 
Persons with a Mental 
Illness and the 
Improvement of Mental 
Health Care (MI 
Principles)  
Prin 13(1) - Every patient in a mental health facility has right to 
full respect for privacy and freedom of communication including 
freedom to send & receive uncensored private communications; & 
freedom to receive visits from personal representatives in private.  
Prin 14(1) - A mental health facility shall have adequate space to 
provide patients with privacy and appropriate and active therapy. 
Prin 6 - Confidentiality of information concerning all persons to 
whom the Principles apply shall be respected. 
 
 
A Scoping the Human Right to Privacy and its Relationship with the Right to a 
Public Hearing 
Table 6 demonstrates that the human right to privacy derives from several 
sources. Article 17 of ICCPR672 and article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 673  provide that everyone has a right to privacy. Table 6 
demonstrates the wide conceptual range of potential privacy protections. For 
instance, article 17 of the ICCPR provides that no one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor shall he or she be subjected to unlawful attacks on his or her 
honour and reputation. The provision refers to privacy, in and of itself, and then 
                                                
672 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), art 17. 
673 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953), as amended 




subsequently refers to the more specific concepts of family, home, 
correspondence, honour and reputation. Australia’s two human rights statutes 
provide protection in similar terms and there is judicial acknowledgment that 
those provisions represent re-expressions of the ICCPR requirements. 674  In 
addition, the MI Principles attempt to impose duties on service providers and 
administrators to protect the confidentiality of information relating to those 
person’s subject to commitment processes.675  
Such is the ambit of privacy as a concept that there has been no exhaustive 
attempt to precisely define an overarching right to privacy in human rights 
jurisprudence; the extent of its scope and its associated protections thus remains 
unsettled and contentious.676 For example, the approach of the European Court of 
Human Rights has been to interpret the concept of ‘private life’ widely in 
inquiring as to whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, to determine 
if the right to privacy is engaged under article 8(1) of the European 
Convention.677 Article 8(1) provides similar privacy protections as the ICCPR: 
 …everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. Although, the European Convention omits reference to ‘reputation’ as 
provided by the ICCPR, though the European Court has held that actions that are likely to 
injure reputation fall within the scope of ‘private life’.678 
Bell J in the VCAT case of Kracke endorsed the European Convention as having 
direct bearing on the interpretation of privacy protections posited by the ICCPR 
and the Victorian Charter, 679  and considering that the European Court’s 
construction is such that privacy rights ensure freedom from unjustified external 
interference with the social individuality and identity of a person, and his or her 
relations with others; encapsulating the maintenance of a person’s physical and 
                                                
674 See, eg, Kracke v Mental Health Review Board and Ors (General) [2009] VCAT 646 (23 
April 2009), [591]. 
675 United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care, GA Res 46/119, UN Doc A/46/119 (1991), prin 13(1).  
676 See Jeremy Gans et al, Criminal Process and Human Rights (Federation Press, 2011) 301. 
677 See, eg, PG v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 51, 57; Rotaru v Romania [2000] ECHR 192, 
[44]. 
678 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature 11 April 1950,213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953), art 
8(1). 





psychological integrity, social identity and personal autonomy.680 Moreover, in a 
later case, Bell J further commented that the purpose of privacy as a human right 
is to enhance a person’s liberty interests and his or her participatory opportunities 
in a democratic society.681  
1 Confidentiality as Information Privacy  
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the confidentiality of an 
involuntary patient’s personal information including his or her health care 
records, constitute an element of the right to privacy. In M.S. v. Sweden,682 the 
European Court considered the applicant’s claim that her right to private life 
under article 8 of the European Convention was violated after her treating clinic 
disclosed aspects of her medical records to the Swedish Social Insurance Office 
(the Office) without her consent.683 The Office had requested her records from 
the clinic to assist its assessment of her eligibility to receive a worker’s disability 
pension because of a slip and fall accident during her pregnancy. The records 
revealed a prior diagnosis relating to a significant spinal condition, and that she 
had undergone an abortion because her pregnancy had exacerbated what was 
described as severe back pain. The Office rescinded the applicant’s 
compensation claim, concluding that her injury was not an industrial injury. The 
European Court observed that the applicant's medical records were protected by 
confidentiality under Swedish law, and that those records contained highly 
personal data that was disclosed by one public authority to another, and thus to a 
wider circle of public servants.684  Essentially, the applicant's complaint was that 
the clinic violated her right to privacy because the disclosure of information 
pertaining to her abortion was an irrelevant consideration to her compensation 
claim. Although the Court disagreed, holding that the disclosure of her records 
was justified in the circumstances,685 the Court commented that the European 
                                                
680 Kracke v Mental Health Review Board and Ors (General) [2009] VCAT 646 (23 April 2009), 
[620]; see also P J B v Melbourne Health & Anor (Patrick’s case) [2011] VSC 327 (19 July 
2011), [54]. 
681 Director of Housing v Sudi [2010] VCAT 328, [29]. 
682 M.S. v. Sweden, Application No. 20837/92, judgment 27 August 1997, (1999) 28 EHRR 313. 
683 The Court said that no inference could be made that the applicant had consented to the 
disclosure of this information to another public organisation by seeking treatment at the clinic, 
and, that the Office’s disclosure entailed an interference with her right to privacy, [35].  
684 M.S. v. Sweden, Application No. 20837/92, judgment 27 August 1997, (1999) 28 EHRR 313 
[35].  




Convention requires state parties to implement appropriate safeguards to prevent 
unlawful disclosures, emphasising that the confidentiality of medical records is a 
fundamental aspect of a patient’s right to privacy. However, M.S. v. Sweden is 
also relevant to the principle of proportionality in determining whether 
interferences with the human right to privacy may be justified.686 The Court 
considered article 8(2) of the European Convention, which provides:  
‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.’687  
The Court noted that the medical information was disclosed in accordance with 
Swedish law, and served a legitimate purpose, that being to enable the Office to 
determine whether the legal criteria for industrial injury compensation were 
satisfied, of which the medical information was decisive. The Court held that this 
purpose could be said to be protecting the economic well-being of the country 
and was thus legitimate. In addition, the Court held that the disclosure was 
necessary in a democratic society commenting that the Office had a legitimate 
need to check information received from her against data in the possession of the 
clinic. In the absence of objective information from an independent source, it 
would have been difficult for the Office to determine whether the applicant’s 
compensation claim was well-founded. The information provided by the clinic 
contained information relevant to her back pain, but it also included information 
in relation to her abortion. Accordingly, the Court held that the breach of the 
applicant’s privacy was justified because there were relevant and sufficient 
reasons for the disclosure of information, which was not disproportionate to the 
legitimate purpose pursued in a democratic society. The issue of proportionality 
                                                                                                                               
313, [37] - [44]. 
686 M.S. v. Sweden, Application No. 20837/92, judgment 27 August 1997, (1999) 28 EHRR 313, 
[41]. 
687 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 





in the interference with the right to privacy is discussed further below in the 
specific context of the open justice principle.  
In Z v Finland,688 the European Court considered an applicant’s claim that the 
Republic of Finland violated her right to privacy under article 8 of the European 
Convention.689 In a prior criminal proceeding, the applicant’s husband (X) was 
convicted of the rape of another person and sentenced to a suspended term of 
imprisonment. Further sexual offences were charged including manslaughter (on 
the basis that X knew he was HIV positive at the time of the rape). During these 
proceedings, the Court ordered a Doctor at X’s treating hospital, and other 
witnesses, to adduce evidence from X’s medical records to determine whether X 
had knowledge of his diagnosis. The prosecution had obtained and admitted into 
evidence all the applicant’s medical records, which included information 
pertaining to matters unrelated to her HIV diagnosis. X was ultimately convicted 
and the Court ordered that the evidence and reasoning be kept confidential for 
ten years despite the applicant’s request for a lengthier period. After exhausting 
the Finnish appeal process, the applicant filed several complaints to the European 
Court on the basis that the criminal proceedings violated her right to privacy. 
Although the European Court held that the seizure and presentation of her 
medical records for the purposes of a criminal proceeding was justified the Court 
upheld her complaint in relation to the Court’s orders pertaining to the 
publication of its reasons for decisions. The European Court held that the Court 
of Appeal’s order for a confidentiality period of ten years was inadequate, 
because the disclosure of the applicant’s medical information and her identity in 
its judgement would ultimately allow the public and media to access and 
disseminate that information. The Court emphasised that a ten-year suppression 
                                                
688 Z v Finland, Application No. 22009/93, judgment 25 February 1997, (1998) 25 EHRR 371. 
689 Considering the sensitive nature of the case the Court decided to hear it case in-camera, being 
satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances warranting derogation from the principle of 
open justice under rule 18 of its Rules of Court. Rule 18 has now been superseded by rules 33 
and 63. Each of provide for the same derogations from the public character of proceedings in the 
same way as the European Convention provides for derogations from the right to a public hearing 




period did not correspond with the applicant’s wishes, and such disclosure in the 
absence of consent was unjustified.690  
The cases above demonstrate the importance that human rights jurisprudence 
places on the confidentiality of medical records as an integral component of the 
right to privacy. They also demonstrate that human rights jurisprudence imposes 
duties upon courts and tribunals to maintain the confidentiality of such 
information as it pertains to persons other than a defendant or litigant, such as 
witnesses, at criminal and civil proceedings without his or her consent.   
2 The Right to Respect for Privacy Under the CRPD 
Table 6 demonstrates that the CRPD and the MI Principles provide expressly for 
the right to privacy and the protection of confidential health related information 
pertaining to involuntary patients in the civil commitment context. Pertaining to 
the relationship between the human right to equality at law under article 12 
(discussed further below), and the human right to respect for privacy, the CRPD 
Committee provides:  
Substitute decision-making regimes, in addition to being incompatible with article 12 of the 
Convention, also potentially violate the right to privacy of persons with disabilities, as 
substitute decision-makers usually gain access to a wide range of personal and other 
information regarding the person. In establishing supported decision-making systems, States 
parties must ensure that those providing support in the exercise of legal capacity fully respect 
the right to privacy of persons with disabilities.691  
Article 22 of the CRPD provides for the right to respect for privacy as follows: 
1. No person with disabilities, regardless of place of residence or living arrangements, shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, or 
correspondence or other types of communication or to unlawful attacks on his or her honour 
and reputation. Persons with disabilities have the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks. 
2. States Parties shall protect the privacy of personal, health and rehabilitation information of 
persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others.692 
                                                
690 Z v Finland, Application No. 22009/93, judgment 25 February 1997, (1998) 25 EHRR 371, 
[111] - [113]. 
691 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 
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Thus, the CRPD provides explicit privacy protection for persons in the mental 
health civil commitment review context, referring clearly to the protection of 
personal, health and rehabilitation information equally with others in paragraph 
2. The explicit and implicit referrals to privacy and confidentiality impose 
positive obligations in the sense that reviewing tribunals shall have a statutory 
duty to protect the confidentiality of an involuntary patient’s personal and health 
related information. But the respect for privacy is also negative, given it is a 
human right to which a person with a mental illness may legitimately seek 
redress though CRPD complaints systems, inquiries, communications, and the 
like. Moreover, paragraph 2 is the operative aspect of article 22, given that it 
protects the ‘…privacy of personal, health and rehabilitation information of 
persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others.’ The protection of 
confidential health records is the clear intention of this clause, and if it is to be 
applied equally to all others, it should respect the freedom of involuntary patients 
to control the use of his or her personal information, which includes the freedom 
to waive the right to the protection of one’s confidential information via consent, 
as all persons are entitled to do. Thus, while the treating health services and the 
reviewing tribunal, and all allied staff have a duty to maintain the confidentiality 
of their patient’s personal information, the involuntary patient retains the right to 
waive confidentiality to the extent that any voluntary patient can within all 
aspects of wider health services. The issue then becomes whether any 
interference with an patient’s right to waive confidentiality via consent can be 
justifiably encroached by invoking countervailing claims, such as a claimed duty 
to protect a patient from harm for their own welfare or best interests.  
(i) Protection from Unlawful and Arbitrary Interference with Privacy 
Table 6 identifies that interferences with the right to privacy may be permitted if 
such interferences are neither unlawful nor arbitrary. The Human Rights 




interference should occur except in cases provided for legitimately by law.693 
Moreover, such interferences should be identified in detail, be reasonable in the 
circumstances, and sufficiently flexible to be considered on a case-by-case 
basis. 694  In addition, the HRC asserted that lawful interferences should be 
provided in a manner that precludes decision-makers from the authority to 
exercise excessive discretion to interfere with a person’s privacy.695 That is to 
say, lawful interferences should not be tolerated where imposed arbitrarily.  
In Toonen v Australia, the HRC said that for a lawful interference to be 
reasonable, it must be proportional to the purpose of the interference and 
necessary in the circumstances on a case by case basis.696 The Supreme Court of 
Victoria has conceptualised arbitrary interference with the right to privacy under 
the Victorian Charter as follows:   
The human right in s 13(a) not to have your privacy, family, home or 
correspondence ‘arbitrarily’ interfered with extends to interferences which, in 
the particular circumstances applying to the individual, are capricious, 
unpredictable or unjust and also to interferences which, in those circumstances, 
are unreasonable in the sense of not being proportionate to a legitimate aim 
sought. Interference can be arbitrary although it is lawful.697 
The following two cases from the European Court of Human Rights provide 
examples of what may constitute arbitrary interference with a person’s right to 
privacy. In Herczegfalvy v Austria, 698  a psychiatric facility had sent an in-
patient’s outgoing correspondence (except those addressed to his lawyer or to the 
guardianship court) to his legal guardian rather than to the intended recipients. 
The imputed intention of this policy was that the legal guardian would then 
decide what to do with the patient’s correspondence. The Court held that this 
                                                
693 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16, (Twenty-third session, 1988), Compilation 
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 
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policy did not provide adequate protection against arbitrary interference with the 
patient’s right to privacy.699  
In J.T. v United Kingdom,700 an involuntary inpatient complained that she could 
not remove her mother as her appointed nearest relative (a nearest relative acts as 
an official support person for an involuntary patient in relation to his or he 
treatment), because there was no statutory mechanism under the mental health 
legislation available to that effect.701 The statutory omission effectively rendered 
involuntary patients vulnerable to unwise substitute appointments that could pose 
a risk to the health or well-being of the patient.702 In this case, the patient wished 
to remove her mother as her nearest relative claiming that there existed a 
troubled relationship between herself, her mother and stepfather, and that the 
latter had sexually abused her on previous occasions. The patient was concerned 
that such an arrangement was not in her best interests, particularly given that her 
mother and stepfather would have access to her confidential medical information. 
The Court held that such an omission in the statutory framework violated her 
right to privacy. The mental health legislation was subsequently amended to 
provide involuntary patients with the power to apply to court to remove and 
replace a nearest relative in circumstances where the patient reasonably objects 
to an appointed person acting in that capacity.703 
(ii) State Party Discretion  
All persons have a human right to a public hearing, and a human right to privacy. 
The existence of these rights is not in issue. Though state parties have a degree of 
flexibility in implementing human rights, given that they are not generally 
posited absolutely and thus all terms are subject to potential limitation. The issue 
now is the permissible limits of interference with these rights; whether 
interference or infringement of a right to a public hearing or the right to privacy 
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is sufficiently justified by a countervailing claim based in an identified public or 
other interest. This is in line with the UN and European approach to human rights 
which recognises the ability of states to make choices about these balancing 
exercises and permits flexibility in how they implement or limit rights. The UN 
and the European regional approach to human rights law, recognises the ability 
of states to make choices about these balancing exercises and permits state 
discretion to adopt flexibility in how they ultimately implement or limit human 
rights.  
New human rights, such as articles 22 and 12 of the CRPD (article 12 is 
discussed in the following section), and the development of their content and 
application continues to evolve, and thus the posited universalism of human 
rights presents a problem; how to reconcile the beliefs, practices and cultures into 
a common standard acceptable to all state parties, or at least a minimum standard 
of acceptance relating to a right, that does not diminish it to the extent it becomes 
meaningless. Setting the standard of state obligations is thus problematic, 
particularly when rights are to be progressively achieved, and a lack of 
specificity has been enunciated in relation to the scope of a specific right. The 
written text expresses general agreement  at the ratifying stage, but it does not  
necessarily capture the scope of the ideas, values and beliefs underpinning it. 704   
The European Court of Human Rights has created the concept of the ‘margin of 
appreciation’, partly to address the problems of universalism inferred above, and 
it has since been invoked and developed by that Court, 705  and moreover is 
evident in the practice of the UN’s Humans Rights Committee (HRC).706 Legg, 
has claimed that although little has been written about the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ in the HRC, this is because most cases before the Commission have 
                                                
704 See Rhona K. M. Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (7th ed), (Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 179.  
705 See Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: 
Deference and Proportionality (Oxford University Press, 2012), 3.  
706 Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference 




merely required factual determination. Moreover, he suggests that the regular 
turnover of Committee members; its high workload in assessing Country 
Reports; and a growing backlog of individual communications may negatively 
affect the Commission’s capacity to develop a consistent judicial doctrine.707 
Legg claims that after analysing the substance of what the HRC decides, it can be 
concluded that the Committee is using the language of a margin of appreciation 
there being ‘…ample evidence supporting the proposition that it forms part of the 
Commission’s practice’.708  
European human rights law generally provides state parties some latitude in 
complying with certain human rights and this is illustrated in the implementation 
of article 6(1) of the European Convention, in the extradition case of Judicial 
Authority in Sweden v Assange.709 Assange appealed an order to extradite him 
from the United Kingdom to Sweden where he would be tried on sexual assault 
charges. Assange made several arguments based on claimed breaches of his 
human rights under the European Convention in relation to the extradition. The 
relevant argument for the purposes of this chapter was that he would be denied 
the right to a fair and public trial under article 6(1) of the European Convention, 
based on the claim that trials involving rape charges in Sweden are closed to the 
public and constitute secret trials. Assange claimed that ‘Any sense of fair play – 
that justice must be seen to be done – revolts at this Swedish practice’.710 In 
rejecting Assange’s argument (which has not been appealed), the Magistrates 
Court said: 
There can be no doubt that Sweden incorporates article 6 principles into its judicial system. 
Because that country has reached a different conclusion on the appropriate balance between 
privacy and open justice does not mean that their practice offends against article 6. I am 
satisfied that the appropriate test is applied in Sweden and that if a decision is taken to hold a 
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trial in private then that will be after the necessary balancing has been undertaken, and will 
not breach article 6 or any other fundamental human right.711 
The conclusion reproduced from the judgment above effectively rejects 
Assange’s claim that rape trials in Sweden constitute secret trials. Although the 
Court conceded that in almost all rape trials in Sweden the evidence is at least 
heard privately, other important elements of the trial process remain accessible to 
public attendance and the final judgment is pronounced publicly. Moreover, a 
defendant to a rape charge in Sweden may apply to a court to request a public 
trial. The judgment demonstrates that given the complexity of determining an 
appropriate balance between privacy and open justice, state parties should have a 
degree of state discretion or a margin of appreciation, if you will, in determining 
the necessary balancing applicable to the context of each specific type of trial or 
hearing. 712  The Court in Assange refers to the appropriate balancing 
(proportionality) of competing interests at issue referring to the balancing of the 
competing interests of the decedent, the complainant and the public interest in 
seeing that justice is done. Without going into reasoning based on an explicit 
invocation of the doctrine of a margin of appreciation, the Magistrate effectively 
provided state deference to the Swedish Authority to use its discretion to 
appropriately balance those competing interests proportionately. 
(iii) Proportional and Necessary Given the Circumstances 
As noted above, states should respond proportionately to a situation to minimise 
the risk of violating human rights laws and obligations. 713 For example, the right 
to a public hearing and the right privacy may only be exercisable to the extent 
that such exercise does not impinge on the rights of others. There will, in these 
circumstances need to be a balancing of the right to a public hearing and the right 
to privacy, and this will tend to be decided on a case by case basis, in 
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consideration of the facts and circumstances relevant to each matter. The test as 
to which right to favour or prioritise in any given circumstance is one of 
proportionality involving and analysis of competing interests.714  
(iv) Supported Decision-Making: Resolving Competing Interests 
According to Callaghan and Ryan, in relation to the provision of involuntary 
treatment, those persons’ subject to involuntary orders must receive support, first 
to make their own decisions, and second to express and give effect to their will 
and preferences.  A person may only make decisions on behalf of another 
(substituted decision-making) if he or she lacks decision-making capacity 
(including with support). This allowance for substitute decision-making must be 
subject to the following safeguards:  
• A person must have an opportunity to appoint a representative decision-
maker; 
• All decisions must respect the ‘rights, will and preferences of the person’ 
and must give effect to them as far as possible; and   
• Any mechanisms which permit a person’s current will and preferences to 
be overridden may only be to the extent necessary to protect the person’s 
other rights (such as rights to life and health); and be proportional and 
tailored to the risk to other rights.715   
The model preferred by this thesis in the context of open justice decisions takes 
this model a step further. First it is important to note that Callaghan and Ryan’s 
model is based upon a focus on the primary interest in mental health legislation: 
the involuntary treatment criteria and how those criteria may comply with the 
requirements of the CRPD and particularly article 12. This involves the 
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balancing of a different set of human rights as noted by Callaghan’s reference to 
rights to liberty and health amongst others, such as privacy and confidentiality.  
The competing interests in this thesis are wholly different because they involve a 
balancing of rights that are arguably less serious than those contemplated within 
the current focus of academic inquiry that purely involves the validity of 
treatment criteria and not the procedural issues of open justice examined in this 
thesis.   
Apart from those commentators advocating for a continuing, if diminished, role 
for substitute decision-making, there is also significant support for its 
abolishment: 
When restrictions are placed on the right to exercise legal capacity and the right to refuse 
medical treatment on an equal basis with others, the basis for supported decision-making as a 
remedy for disability-based discrimination is compromised. Hence, even if provisions for 
‘supported decision-making’ and other measures to support the exercise of legal capacity were 
installed into current mental health and guardianship laws, the violation of core obligations of 
the CRPD would remain. 716 
B State Practice as an External Factor in Providing State Deference, if 
Proportional, to the Appropriate Statutory Presumption 
The principles articulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Vienna Convention), includes current state practice as a relevant factor in the 
interpretation of conventions. 717  Moreover, Legg has argued that the current 
practices of states is a relevant external factor in determining whether not to 
recognise a margin of appreciation that may apply to states in some 
circumstances:  
‘Where there is a common trend among states on the meaning of a human right in a particular 
context, the reasons for deference to alternative definitions are weakened, but where there is a 
lack of consensus, reasons in favour of deference are strengthened…Where there is ambiguity 
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about the meaning of human rights treaty obligations and a diversity of practice amongst 
states, the Tribunals should be cautious in finding a violation of the treaty…’.718  
The relevance of the margin of appreciation for the interpretation of treaties by 
the Australian federation by reference to its current practice should have a 
bearing in determining the latitude of deference that may be afforded to 
Australian states and territories in general terms, and in relation to the operation 
of the principle of open justice at civil commitment review hearings, as discussed 
further below. 719 Where the scope of a human right is unclear, the intention of 
the state party as evidenced by its current practice, an external interpretative 
factor, is relevant to defining the current human rights standard.  Where there 
exists diverse legal approaches amongst state parties on specific questions, this 
can indicate that there is no explicably precise international standard.720 And this 
may provide state deference to state parties on a lack of consensus in relation to 
the presumption of open or closed hearings, given there are diverse legal 
approaches amongst state parties.721 In relation to the current practice of state 
parties pertaining to the statutory presumption of open and closed hearings, 
diversity and thus a lack of consensus is evident. For example, in the United 
States, it most common to find civil commitment hearings (usually conducted in 
courts not tribunals) operating on a presumption that proceedings shall be open 
and  thus accessible to public attendance.722 Conversely, many European nations 
provide for a presumption of closed hearings with an ability to open a hearing to 
public access, according to prescribed criteria, as identified in AH v West 
London.723 In Australia, as discussed in chapter four, there is also a lack of 
consensus, whereby two Australian jurisdictions provide a presumption of open 
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hearings, and six jurisdictions provide a presumption of closed hearings, 724 
indicating that cumulatively, the diversity in international and domestic state 
practices, cannot determine a specific international standard that prescribes the 
most appropriate statutory presumption. 
V THE HUMAN RIGHT TO RECOGNITION OF EQUALITY 
UNDER LAW INFLUENCES THE SCOPE OF THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the new human right to 
equality before law under the CRPD, influences the human rights normative 
framework underpinning the operation of the open justice principle at civil 
commitment review hearings. It does this through a consideration of the content 
and scope of article 12, and then applies this to the tension between the human 
rights to a public hearing and to privacy. This chapter ultimately presents an 
alternative and more nuanced approach to that taken in AH v West London MHT 
and SSJ, because the Tribunal in that case did not consider article 12 in its 
reasoning. The following sections focus on the influence of equality before law 
to establish a different interpretation of the relationship between the human rights 
to a public hearing and to privacy when applied to mental health civil 
commitment review hearings.  
The explicit recognition of the right to equality before law is expressed in the 
following human rights instruments, tabled below. 
  
                                                










Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with a 
Disability 
Art 12 - Persons with a disability have the right to equal 
recognition before the law. State parties must: recognise those with 
disabilities as persons before the law; recognise that they enjoy 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life; 
implement measures to provide support to exercise legal capacity; 
implement safeguards to prevent abuse of the exercise of legal 
capacity, respecting the rights, will and preferences of the person. 
International Covenant on 
Civil & Political Rights 
Art 16 - Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a 
person before the law.  
Charter of Human Rights 
& Responsibilities (Vic) 
 S 8 - Provides every person with the right to equality and 
recognition as a person before the law; Every person has the right 
to enjoy his or her human rights without discrimination. 
Human Rights Act (ACT)  S 8 - Provides every person with the right to equality and 
recognition   as a person before the law; Every person has the right 
to enjoy his or her human rights without discrimination, including 
on the basis of disability. 
 
A Introduction  
Article 12 of the CRPD provides that all persons with disabilities have the right 
to equality and recognition as persons before the law.725 The Ad Hoc Committee 
on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities (Ad Hoc 
Committee) commented in 2006 that article 12 encompasses article 16 of the 
ICCPR, which provides that everyone has the right to recognition as a person 
before the law.726 The Australian domestic human rights charters also reflect 
article 16 of the ICCPR, providing the right to recognition as a person in similar 
terms.727 The Ad Hoc Committee has commented that persons with a disability 
enjoy the same legal personality as all other persons; thus they are rights-holders 
on an equal basis as all other persons.728 This acknowledges that involuntary 
patients are not purely objects of social paternalism, but subjects with rights, who 
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are presumed capable of enforcing and waiving those rights, and of participating 
in normal activities as members of civil societies.729 The High Commissioner for 
Human Rights has commented that the enjoyment of legal capacity is a 
prerequisite to the full enjoyment of a person’s other human rights,730 asserting 
that persons with disabilities are persons recognised at law, who are presumed to 
have legal capacity including the capacity to act, equally with others.731 This 
requires acknowledgement and respect for an involuntary patient’s right to the 
protection of legal capacity to participate in decision-making processes relating 
to all aspects of his or her life as far as possible.732  
B The CRPD Provision of Article 12 – Equal Recognition Before the Law 
The relevant parts of Article 12 of the CRPD, reproduced in full provides:  
1. States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere 
as persons before the law. 
2. States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal 
basis with others in all aspects of life. 
3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities 
to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. 
4. States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity 
provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with 
international human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the 
exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of 
conflict of interest and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to the person's 
circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a 
competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. The safeguards shall be 
proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person's rights and interests.733 
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1 The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: General 
Comment 1  
Before embarking on an application of the operative provisions of article 12 it is 
important to consider some of the background to the publication of General 
Comment No 1, produced by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD Committee), which attempts to clarify the original CRPD 
provisions. 734 The CRPD Committee is mandated to interpret the CRPD, and has 
attempted to clarify the normative content of article 12, and the state party 
obligations engaged by the CRPD, commenting that given the speculative 
scholarly discussions regarding the precise meanings and scope of article 12’s 
terms, the CRPD Committee felt the need to state as precisely as possible article 
12’s requirements.735 It became clear to the CRPD Committee that there were 
misunderstandings about what article 12, and the CPRD, seeks to achieve. It 
therefore sought to clarify this in its General Comment, although initially, it 
should be noted that this has been met with mixed success given that debate is 
now emerging in relation to the Committee’s interpretation of article 12:736 
Based on the initial reports of the different State parties that it has reviewed so far, the 
Committee observes that there is a general misunderstanding of the exact scope of the 
obligations of State parties under article 12 of the Convention. Indeed, there has been a 
general failure to understand that the human rights-based model of disability implies a shift 
from the substitute decision-making paradigm to one that is based on supported decision-
making.737  … Historically, persons with disabilities have been denied their right to legal 
capacity in many areas in a discriminatory manner under substitute decision-making regimes 
such as guardianship, conservatorship and mental health laws that permit forced treatment. 
These practices must be abolished in order to ensure that full legal capacity is restored to 
persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others. 738 
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Article 12 does not introduce a new model of legal capacity. Although the 
content of the right to legal capacity in article 12 is not entirely new, its 
application is unique because it is directed toward the specific context of 
disability.739 For example, article 12 sets out the right to legal capacity on an 
equal basis as an element of the right to equal recognition before the law; the 
latter given recognition in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).740  
General Comment No.1 and its affirmation that legal capacity is a universal 
attribute, regardless of disability, has potentially wide implications for mental 
health laws that currently authorise involuntary measures based on mental 
capacity.741The CRPD therefore departs from the approach in previous human 
rights instruments, moving away from the medical model of disability towards a 
social model. The CRPD developed in response to an increasing concern that 
people with disabilities have not shared equally in the rights created by existing 
human rights instruments.742 
As mentioned, General Comment 1 is directed toward clarifying the terms of 
article 12. It refers to current restrictions on the exercise of legal capacity based 
on disability. The CRPD Committee clearly expressed the view that mental 
health legislation worldwide is largely discriminatory against people with 
psychosocial disability, because it uses mental disorder as a criterion to limit a 
person’s legal capacity. Article 12 thus reaffirms that persons with a mental 
illness, by inherent humanity, possess legal personality. It is a civil right and one 
that is, in the CRPD’s words: ‘…indispensable for the exercise of other human 
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rights’.743  In the Committee’s words ‘Article 12 does not provide additional 
rights for people with disabilities; it simply describes the specific elements that 
state parties are required to take into account to ensure the right to equality 
before the law for people with disabilities, on an equal basis with others.’744  
The Committee has concluded that certain discriminatory aspects of legal 
frameworks based around substitute decision-making and best interests, must be 
abolished. The Committee characterised such decision-making systems as 
possessing common characteristics including:  
• legal capacity is removed from a person, even if this is just in respect of a 
single decision;  
• A substitute decision-maker can be appointed against a person’s will; 
• A substitute decision-maker’s decisions can be based on an objective 
‘best interests’ basis, rather than a decision based on the concerned 
person’s will and preferences.745  
As a legal concept, substituted decision-making occurs where a third party is 
appointed to make decisions on another’s behalf, usually in and attempt to 
protect the person from potential self-harm or harm to others, and to protect the 
person from exploitation by others. 746  What the CRPD and the Committee 
replaces substituted decision-making with, is a new framework underpinned by 
‘universal capacity’ and ‘supported decision-making’.747 
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C What is Universal Legal Capacity Under Article 12? 
The literature indicates that a consensus that ‘legal capacity’, comprises two 
hitherto separated concepts (1) ‘legal standing’ – the status of personhood at law; 
and (2) ‘legal agency’ – an ability to enforce rights. Cumulatively, article 12 has 
evolved to mean that a person retains legal status, (standing and agency) in 
situations where the person may have impaired decision-making (mental) 
capacity; they thus have ‘legal capacity’.748 Legal capacity is the recognition of 
an individual's relationship with the state as a person who in entitled to 
participate in the creation and extinction of legal relationships. It is thus the 
acknowledgement of legal personhood – a person with rights and responsibilities 
equal to others.749 Legal capacity under the CRPD is different to the concept of 
mental capacity, decision-making capacity, or competence in general law. It now 
accepted that legal capacity encompasses two concepts: ‘legal standing’ – the 
status of being a person before the law; and ‘legal agency’ – an ability to enforce 
certain rights. Thus, the CRPD emphasises that mental capacity is no longer a 
threshold criteria for exercising legal capacity.750Universal legal capacity is thus 
something unmovable embodying two inseparable elements. First, it is the 
capacity to be a holder of rights (legal standing as a person before the law), and 
second, it is the legal capacity to exercise or waive those rights on an equal basis 
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as others (agency).751 Thus, under article 12 those persons who may be assessed 
as lacking mental capacity must nevertheless always retain his or her legal 
capacity.  
The CRPD Committee stated:  
In order to fully recognize “universal legal capacity”, whereby all persons (regardless of 
disability or decision-making skills) inherently possess legal capacity, State parties must 
abolish denials of legal capacity that are discriminatory on the basis of disability in purpose or 
effect.752  
The CRPD recognises legal capacity now as a universal human attribute - no 
person is excluded from possessing it. In contrast, former incapacity-based 
frameworks excluded people according to a a legally constructed test of mental 
decision-making capacity, and thus treated certain people as objects of welfare 
and paternalism. The universal approach places the individual centre-stage as a 
subject with rights, receiving support from others who can assist a person to 
make important decisions that affect his or her life.753     
1 Erasing the Mental Capacity/Legal Capacity Distinction 
The CRPD Committee’s comments essentially confirm the important distinction 
between mental decision-making capacity and legal capacity. Mental capacity is 
a subjective and variable concept contingent on context, relating to a person’s 
individual skills and abilities. The CRPD Committee iterated that any actual 
impairment of a person’s mental capacity does not justify any consequential 
limitation on a person’s legal capacity. Under most current domestic laws, 
mental capacity is an essential `component of legal capacity and is required if a 
decision or action is to attract legal effect. As a central concept to the law and the 
doctor/patient relationship, mental capacity requires the ability to understand and 
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retain relevant information, to use or weigh it in reaching a decision, and to 
communicate it. To be autonomous at law, very broadly stated, a person must 
have the mental capacity required to reach such reasoned decisions. If a person 
has decision-making capacity, the law (generally) gives that person the legal 
capacity to act: it will recognise the legal effect of his or her decisions.754 
The assessment of whether a person lacks capacity has previously relied on 
cognitive testing, which is used in determinations of mental decision-making 
capacity. As such, legal capacity is often conflated with mental capacity. 755 
However, article 12 indicates that the two concepts are independent.756 Thus, a 
person who may fail a mental capacity test - as set out in, for example, the 
Mental Health Acts, may still be able to exercise legal agency if they are given 
adequate supports to help recognise and express their will and preferences.757 
The CRPD Committee asserted that the conflation of mental and legal capacity 
has resulted in protective legal systems that allow a perceived impairment of 
decision-making skills, to remove agency, thereby removing legal capacity. The 
result is substituted decision-making, based upon what the CRPD Committee 
characterises as three out-dated and potentially discriminatory approaches to 
assessing mental capacity: the status, outcomes and functional approaches. The 
result of a mental capacity assessment, regardless of the method, often denies a 
person of legal capacity to make decisions in a variety of contexts, and therefore 
his or her right to equal recognition before the law. The CRPD Committee 
clearly expressed that the use of any of these approaches results in a denial of the 
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person’s human rights, specifically a breach of article 12 of the CRPD.758 To 
redress this, article 12 requires legal capacity to be restored, that is, a person’s 
decisions become respected regardless of his or her mental capacity, even during 
crisis or emergency situations. This effectively transforms the legal, medical and 
service provision landscape underpinning the way in which Australia and the 
world legislate for the participation of persons with a mental illness and others in 
the processes of important decision-making. It also overrides the relevance of 
any previous thematic human rights instruments, such as the MI Principles, 
which itself permitted the use of substitute decision-making, to the extent that the 
CRPD covers areas that those instruments do not.   
D What Support to Exercise Legal Capacity Means in Context Remains 
Unsettled  
Article 12(3) of the CRPD requires the implementation of supports to enable 
each person to exercise his or her capacity. Article 12(4) further requires that 
support measures respect the rights, will and preferences of the person. Quinn, 
and others, have asserted that article 12 makes the ethical principle of autonomy 
meaningful because it requires state parties to effectively restore or ignite a 
person’s residual decision-making capacity, should it be diminished, to enable 
those persons to be as autonomous as possible through the provision of supports 
be directed toward realisation the person’s will and preferences.759   
Since article 12(2) requires that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on 
an equal basis with others ‘in all aspects of life’ this will require reform of many 
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aspects of domestic policy and law (including contract law, criminal law, consent 
to medical treatment and many other areas) to ensure full compliance with article 
12.760 Thus, the nature of the human right to equality and the protection of legal 
capacity is essentially that of a gatekeeper right - the recognition of equality and 
legal capacity is necessary if a person is to make decisions that relate to the 
recognition and enforcement of other rights and freedoms.761  
Although, article 12 is not prescriptive as to what ‘appropriate support’ is or 
constitutes in any detail, though, the CRPD Committee has said that support 
encompasses informal and formal support arrangements, of varying types and 
intensity, affirming that support requirements will inevitably vary from one 
person to another and is very much dependent or contingent on context. The 
Committee gave examples including individual trusted support persons who may 
assist in exercising legal capacity, peer support, advocacy, advance health 
directives or other forms of support.762 An aim of a support framework is to build 
the confidence and skills to enable the exercise of legal capacity with 
diminishing reliance on support over time. 763 A supported decision-making 
regime comprises several support options, though the effect should not be to 
over-regulate lives. To ensure compliance with article 12 the following key 
elements/features are essential: 764 
(a) High support needs should not be a barrier to access;  
(b) Support must be based on will and preference, not best 
interests; 
(c) A person’s mode of communication must not be a 
barrier to obtaining support in decision-making; 
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(d) Legal recognition of the support person/s; and the 
creation of support networks for those without them 
including safeguard mechanisms for identity verification 
and third-party challenges to actions that do not reflect 
will and preference; 
(e) Support must be available at nominal or no cost to 
persons with disabilities and who lack financial 
resources; 
(f) Support in decision-making must not be used as 
justification for limiting other fundamental rights such 
as the right to give consent to medical treatment, and the 
right to liberty; 
(g) The person must have the right to refuse support and 
terminate or change the support relationship at any time; 
(h) Safeguards must be set up for all processes relating to 
legal capacity and support in exercising legal capacity. 
The goal of safeguards is to ensure that the person’s will 
and preferences are respected. 
(i)  The provision of support to exercise legal capacity 
should not hinge on mental capacity assessments; new, 
non-discriminatory indicators of support needs are 
required in the provision of support to exercise legal 
capacity. 
The published literature since the CRPD’s General Comment no 1 (GC1), has at 
times questioned the parameters, scope and practicability of the CRPD’s 
conception of supported decision-making, though it has also focused on its 
application to involuntary treatment decisions rather than the arguably less 
important decisions such as those relating to the operation of the open justice 
principle at review hearings. Callaghan and Ryan recently noted the unsettled 
nature of the interpretation of article 12 in relation to the provision of involuntary 
treatment, while providing a reflection of a consensus amongst scholars of article 
12’s minimum requirements: 
While there is still some debate about exactly what a supported decision-making model would 
entail in mental health, in broad terms it requires that treatment decisions must be made by the 
person themselves as often as possible – rather than through involuntary orders made by 
doctors and tribunals – with support being made available to assist the person in making 
decisions if they wish. It also requires that substituted decision-making, including via 
involuntary treatment orders, may occur only in very limited circumstances, if indeed it is to be 




preferences’ (using the language of the CRPD) rather than paternalistic formulae such as the 
‘best interests’ tests traditionally used in guardianship schemes.765 
Concerns about implementation of article 12 in the field of involuntary treatment 
generally refers to whether article 12(4) allows room for substituted decision-
making in some circumstances. The Australian Law Reform Commission 
(‘ALRC’), in its report on Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth 
Laws, was critical of the nature of scholarly divergent discussions around the 
implementation of the CRPD, and the GC1, has produced conceptual 
confusion.766 There are those who caution that despite the clarification in GC1, a 
form of substituted decision-making, remains relevant and permissible as a 
component of a supported decision-making model. Callaghan and Ryan, for 
example, note that practical and legal dilemmas will inevitably arise where a 
person displays temporary symptoms that may negatively affect a person’s 
functional abilities. In such circumstances, it may be that  respecting and giving 
effect to the person’s will and preferences may manifest in some kind of harm to 
the person.767  
1 ALRC’s Two-Tiered Supported Decision-Making Model 
Shortly after the publication of the CRPD’s General Comment on article 12, the 
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), after undertaking a substantial 
inquiry into the implications of article 12 for Australian federal and state and 
territory laws, recommended a two-tiered decision-making model, which 
includes support for decision-making by the person themselves, but also makes 
provision for ‘representative decision-making’ (a form of substituted decision-
making) where a person is unable (in the so called ‘hard cases’) to make their 
own decisions. Representative decision-making involves proxy consents being 
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given by a decision-maker who is ideally appointed by the person themselves. 
The representative is bound to give effect to the person’s will and preferences so 
far as they can be ascertained. Representative decision-making is still substituted 
decision-making, but attenuated by elicitation of the person’s will and 
preferences as the object towards a decision by proxy must should be made. 
Under this framework, though the framework allows for elements of substituted 
decision-making to remain permissible. Callaghan and Ryan report that several 
recent reviews of mental capacity laws, for example, in Victoria, Ontario, and 
Northern Ireland have resulted in the development of similar frameworks.768  
On the other hand, there are those who argue, for a literal or absolutist 
interpretation of the GC1, that is, that even those persons impaired to the extent 
of severe functional incapacity must retain legal capacity, and should not be the 
subject of substituted decision-making. As a posited universal human right, the 
right to legal capacity applies to all persons and those persons should be 
supported to ultimately elicit a will and reference to make personal decisions. 769   
2 This Chapter Adopts an Absolutist Approach to Decisions of Lesser 
Importance Than Treatment Decisions Such as Open Justice-Related 
Decisions  
To exercise legal capacity, is to have an opportunity to consider one’s choices 
and alternatives, and to then communicate a will and preference in relation to 
decisions that have legal affect, without the process amounting to a form of 
substitute decision-making.770 That is, the support provided to an involuntary 
patient should be provided only with the patient’s consent, and must ultimately 
respect the rights, will and preferences of the person without any coercion or 
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undue influence evident in the patient’s decision-making.771 The issue of consent 
is important because, it may be, as the CRPD Committee points out, that a person 
may legitimately choose not to access any support services in coming to a 
decision. 
Support to exercise legal capacity in the open justice context adopts a relational 
approach, recognising the indispensable reliance that all persons have on others 
for support and assistance in reaching decisions this it is said reflects common 
experience. 772 The CRPD Committee, has however, made special mention of the 
risk of undue influence in decision-making with people with a mental disability 
who rely on support to express their will and preferences.773 Nevertheless, article 
12, and the supported decision-making model, asserts that there is no point 
beyond which legal capacity is lost. Once support has been provided to a person, 
his or her ultimate decision should be respected. In the specific context of open 
justice based decisions, even in cases of severe mental illness, a total lack of 
decision-making capacity will rarely be permanent (it often remains intermittent), 
and where capacity can be identified as impaired, there will usually be some 
residual capacity remaining that allows an impaired person to make certain types 
of important decisions.  
Gerard Quinn, and others, have asserted that article 12 makes autonomy 
meaningful because it requires state parties to effectively restore or ignite a 
person’s residual decision-making capacity, should it be diminished, to enable 
those persons to be as autonomous as possible through the provision of supports 
be directed toward realisation the person’s will and preferences.774  Since article 
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12(2) requires that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis 
with others ‘in all aspects of life’ this will require reform of many aspects of 
domestic policy and law (including contract law, criminal law, consent to 
medical treatment and many other areas such as decisions relating to control of 
one’s personal and confidential information at mental health civil commitment 
review hearings) to ensure full compliance with article 12.775 Thus, the nature of 
the human right to equality and the protection of legal capacity is essentially that 
of a gatekeeper right - the recognition of equality and legal capacity is necessary 
if a person is to make decisions that relate to the recognition of other rights and 
freedoms (not just treatment-based decisions), including the human right to a 
public hearing and the human right to privacy.776  
 
VI THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK OF OPEN JUSTICE AT 
CIVIL COMMITMENT REVIEW HEARINGS TAKING INTO 
ACCOUNT THE IMPACT OF THE CRPD 
A Introduction 
The CRPD Committee has expressed the importance of article 12 as a gatekeeper 
provision of the CRPD by emphasising that equality before the law is a 
precondition to the acknowledgment and protection of other human rights.777 The 
recognition of the right to legal capacity is essential for access to justice in many 
respects, including decisions that pertain to open justice at mental health civil 
commitment review hearings. In order to seek acknowledgment of their rights, 
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freedoms and obligations on an equal basis with others, persons with a mental 
illness must be recognised as persons before the law with equal standing and 
agency in courts and tribunals. And thus Article 12 of the CRPD has significance 
as a gatekeeper right when read in conjunction with the right to a public hearing 
and the right to privacy as explored earlier in this chapter. Taking this into 
account, the next section presents the human rights normative framework 
regulating the operation of open justice at mental health civil commitment review 
hearings.   
The human rights framework requires the implementation of universal legal 
capacity framework that recognises an involuntary patient’s rights to privacy, a 
public hearing, and equality before law. The recognition of these rights must 
again be balanced against the privacy of others, and whether permitting the 
opening or closing of review hearings can be practically and proportionately 
achieved relative to Australia’s position as a first world country and each 
tribunal’s respective resource availability.   
This chapter now argues that in compliance with the human rights framework, 
involuntary patients, regardless of his or her mental capacity status, have the 
right to decide when, and on what terms his or her personal information can be 
put within the public domain. Current human rights jurisprudence supports the 
claim that those persons should have access to formal and informal supports to 
enable each person to make an informed and legally binding decision. For 
example, upon admission as an involuntary patient, mental health services must 
make an informed decision about the support needs, if any, of each patient. 
Where support needs are identified, the mental health service must then provide 
appropriate support to each patient in order to assist the patient to rely on his or 
her rights. This effectively allows each patient to exert some control over the use 
of his or her private information, subject to the physical limitations of hearing 





Article 12 requires Australian parliaments to enact legislation that recognises an 
involuntary patient’s right to equality before the law, which includes recognition 
that each involuntary patient has the right to the protection of his or her legal 
capacity to make decisions pertaining to the maintenance of his or her privacy 
and confidentiality interests. For example, a decision to waive one’s right to 
privacy and to enforce the right to a public hearing shall carry with it a need to 
make decisions in relation to each of the five elements of open justice. A patient, 
for example, may only wish to enforce one of those elements while waiving the 
right to the other four. These decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis. 
Nevertheless, with or without the aid of appropriate supports, those personal 
decisions made by involuntary patients carry legal affect. That is to say, those 
involuntary patients’ decisions are legally enforceable – they are binding subject 
to other considerations such as, for example, the physical resources (limitations) 
of review hearing locations and the privacy of others.  
A Human Rights Regulation of Who May Attend Tribunal Hearings 
Chapter five has established that the tension between open justice and privacy, 
and, a margin of appreciation and state discretion, if proportional, to state parties, 
has resulted in a human rights framework that permits a statutory presumption of 
closed or open civil commitment review hearings. Moreover, article 12 of the 
CRPD provides  for the criteria that should apply in order to open or close a 
hearing through the application of universal legal capacity and a supported 
decision-making model. Thus, the human rights framework shall permit a 
statutory presumption of private or public review hearings, and provide the 




underpinned cumulatively by three human rights: the right to a public hearing,778 
the right to privacy,779 and the right to equality before law.780  
1 Circumstances Permitting a Tribunal to Open or Close a Review Hearing 
The circumstances that permit a tribunal to open or close a review hearing 
require first, that an involuntary patient subject to a review of involuntary status 
make a request to open or close his or her review hearing.781 Upon receipt of that 
request, a tribunal is required to determine whether the patient requires support to 
make this decision, and must not use a mental decision-making capacity test to 
determine his or her support needs. If the patient does not require support to 
make this decision, or does not consent to receiving support, the tribunal must 
respect the patient’s decision and determine what patient’s will and preferences 
with respect to the extent that proceedings be opened or closed, subject to 
whether the request represents and abuse of process, the physical limitations of 
the tribunal, the management of the privacy of others, and whether or not the 
patient’s will and preferences amount to a disproportionate burden of a tribunal’s 
resources.   
B Human Rights Regulation of Reporting What Occurred at Tribunal Hearings 
The human rights framework applicable to public attendance at civil commitment 
review hearings, applies also to the potential publication of information about a 
review hearing. Specifically, the human rights framework requires a presumption 
that information relating to civil commitment review hearings must remain 
private or public in accordance to the respective statutory presumption relating to 
attendance as described above. A reviewing tribunal may allow the publication of 
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information or restrict it depending on the patient’s will and preferences. In order 
to make a determination according to the patient request, a tribunal must 
determine if a patient requires support to make that decision without using a 
mental decision-making capacity test.  
If the patient does not require support, or does not consent to receiving support, 
the tribunal must respect the patient’s decision and determine the patient’s will 
and preferences with respect to the extent he or she wishes to permit the 
publication of information. If a tribunal decides that a requesting patient requires 
support to make a decision, and, the patient consents to receiving support, the 
tribunal must provide the patient with sufficient resources to enable an informed 
decision on the matter. When the patient has made a final decision, the tribunal 
must respect the patient’s decision and determine his or her will and preferences 
with respect to the extent that publication be permitted, subject to whether the 
patient’s will and preferences amount to an abuse of process, the management of 
the privacy of others, and whether or not the patient’s will and preferences 
amount to a disproportionate burden of a tribunal’s resources. 
C Human Rights Regulation of Public Access to Documents Relied on in 
Tribunal Decision-making 
The human rights framework applicable to public attendance at civil commitment 
review hearings, applies also to the presumption of whether or not the public may 
access documents relied upon by reviewing tribunals in making their review 
decisions. Thus, the human rights framework requires a presumption that access 
to documents relied upon by a reviewing tribunal must remain private or public 
in accordance to the respective statutory presumption relating to attendance as 
described above. Thus, a reviewing tribunal, upon application by a member of 
the public, may permit or restrict access to documents on a case by case basis 
depending on the patient’s will and preferences in relation to each application. 




preference, a tribunal must determine if a patient requires support to make that 
decision without using a mental decision-making capacity test.  
If the patient does not require support, or does not consent to receiving support, 
the tribunal must respect the patient’s decision and determine the patient’s will 
and preferences with respect to the extent he or she wishes to allow access to 
documents. If a tribunal decides that a requesting patient requires support to 
make a decision, and, the patient consents to receiving support, the tribunal must 
provide the patient with sufficient resources to enable an informed decision on 
the matter. When the patient has made a final decision, the tribunal must respect 
the patient’s decision and determine his or her will and preferences with respect 
to the extent that access should be provided, subject to whether the patient’s will 
and preferences amount to an abuse of process, the management of the privacy of 
others, and whether or not the patient’s will and preferences amount to a 
disproportionate burden of a tribunal’s resources. 
D Human Rights Regulation of Public Access to Tribunal Reasoning  
Chapter five demonstrated that the human rights framework regarding the 
publication of decisions and reasons for decisions of mental health civil 
commitment review hearings, like all the other elements of the open justice 
principle, derives from the multiple human rights identified above. The Human 
Rights Committee has emphasised that each judgment deriving from review 
hearings should be published regardless of whether a civil proceeding is 
conducted openly or privately.782 In addition, the Committee emphasised that 
judgments should include the essential findings of the hearing, the evidence 
relied upon, and the legal reasoning underpinning the decision.783 The human 
rights requirement to publish judgments is expressed in almost unqualified terms, 
which provides little discretion to keep proceedings entirely confidential.  
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Again, the reviewing tribunal must respect the will and preference of the patient 
in relation to publication. However, regardless of a patient’s will and preference, 
the public interest requires tribunals to employ a test of significance as a means 
of determining whether or not a redacted statement of reasons (to protect 
privacy) should be published. A test of significance requires only selected 
reasons statements be published. For example, a test of significance means that a 
decision is one that involves a new matter of interpretation, or one that has 
involved complex factual circumstances. Moreover, the actual content of such 
publication can be determined with consideration of the nature of each case’s 
subject matter, its special features, and in acknowledgment of a government’s 
margin of appreciation and state discretion, if proportional, in relation to its 
preferred publication methods.  
The European Court of Human Rights has emphasised that the requirement to 
publish judgments is expressed in almost unqualified terms in human rights 
conventions, which provides no discretion to keep proceedings entirely private 
and confidential.784 The Court noted that the content of the actual publication 
must be determined with consideration of the nature of each case’s subject 
matter, its special features, and in acknowledgment of a government’s margin of 
appreciation and state discretion, if proportional in relation to its preferred 
publication methods.785 The human rights framework requires first, the statutory 
implementation of a supported decision-making framework that allows patients’ 
to exercise legal capacity to waive and exercise rights to privacy, a public 
hearing and equality before law, which allows a patient to require the publication 
of reasons for decisions, subject to the privacy of others, and any 
disproportionate burden that such publication may impose on a reviewing 
Tribunal’s resources. Second, it requires that reviewing Tribunals take active 
steps to publish reasons statements, even where a patient has not requested 
publication. In either scenario, publication should occur (in redacted form to 
protect privacy), where a ‘significant’ decision has been made.  
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1. The patient can require publication or reasons that identify their identity 
and personal health related information, and needs to be supported to 
make this decision to publish. 
 
2. But at a minimum, the human rights framework requires that at least 
‘significant’ cases using pseudonyms and redaction be followed by 
publicly available reasons. 
 
3. However, if a patient decides he or she does not wish ‘significant’ 
reasons to be published, the public interest in the open administration of 
justice, requires that those decisions be publicly accessible if the privacy 
of the patient and others can be protected using pseudonyms and 
redaction.  
 
VII  CONCLUSIONS  
Chapter five argues that according to the emerging human rights framework, 
involuntary mental health patients, regardless of mental capacity, have the human 
right to decide when, and on limited terms his or her personal information can be 
released to others or put within the public domain, by waiving or enforcing his or 
her rights to privacy and confidentiality. This argument is underpinned by the 
ethical principles of personal autonomy and access to procedural and substantive 
justice. The emerging human rights jurisprudence described in this chapter 
further supports the claim that mental health involuntary patients should have 
access to formal and informal supports to enable each person to make an 
informed decision. For example, upon admission as an involuntary patient, 
mental health services must make an informed decision about the support needs, 
if any, of each patient. Where support needs are identified, the mental health 
service must then provide appropriate support to each patient in order to assist 
the patient to waive and/or enforce his or her rights. This effectively allows each 
patient to exert some autonomy over the use of his or her private information, 
subject to the physical limitations of hearing rooms, resource availability, and the 




Article 12 requires Australian parliaments to enact legislation that recognises an 
involuntary patient’s right to equality before the law, which includes recognition 
that each involuntary patient has the right to the protection of his or her legal 
capacity to make decisions pertaining to the maintenance of his or her privacy 
and confidentiality interests. For example, a decision to waive one’s right to 
privacy and to enforce the right to a public hearing shall carry with it a need to 
make decisions in relation to each of the five elements of open justice. A patient, 
for example, may prefer to enforce one of those elements while waiving the other 
four. Other combinations comprising one or more elements of the open justice 
principle may be possible, with each decision made on a case-by-case basis 
according to the unique circumstances of each matter. Importantly, mental 
capacity assessments remain relevant, but only to the extent that their outcome 
may assist in determining the type and level of support a patient may need to be 
supported to make a decision.  
Diagram 2 below, provides a simplified version of the human rights framework 
described above, while the subsequent section provides a case example of the 
normative framework in circumstances where a patient requests an open (public) 














Diagram 2: Human rights model of open justice at civil commitment review hearings 














































Human right to a public hearing 
(comprises OJ Elements): 
1. Public free to attend hearing 
2. Public free to report hearing 
3. Public free to identify parties  
4. Public free to inspect 
documents 
5. Obligation to publish reasons 
 
Interests of justice exception 
on basis of right to privacy 
including confidentiality of 
health-related information 
 
But: state discretion (margin of appreciation) permits a statutory presumption of 
closed (private) or open (public) review hearings.  
But: the criteria to open or close a hearing in Diagram 1 is altered by application of 
human right to equality before law, particularly universal legal capacity under the 
CRPD 
 
CRPD Criteria: Does patient, if requesting private or public hearing, require 
support to make the decision? 
NO YES 
Decision respected (Art 12 - 
CRPD) 
Supported decision-making commences but 
patient’s ultimate decision respected (Art 12 - 
CRPD) 
The extent a hearing may be opened or closed depends on each patient’s will and preference 
regarding each open justice element, but subject to whether the privacy of others can be 
managed; and whether patient’s preferences results in a disproportionate burden on 
reviewing tribunal, such as imposing disproportionate costs on overcoming the physical 
limitations on hearing rooms 
 
Notwithstanding patient’s will and preferences, reviewing tribunals are obliged to publish 
reasons of ‘significant’ decisions with redaction to protect privacy, unless patient waives 






Patient consents to 




A Example of a Case Where Involuntary Patient Requests an Open Hearing in 
a Jurisdiction with a Statutory Presumption of Private Hearings 
The human rights framework provides specific criteria to open a presumptively 
private civil commitment review hearing in circumstances where an involuntary 
patient requests a public hearing. The criteria requires the implementation of a 
universal legal capacity and supported decision-making framework, which 
recognises an involuntary patient’s legal capacity to waive and enforce 
fundamental human rights, including rights to privacy and confidentiality, and 
the right to a public hearing.786  
It may be, for example, where a statutory presumption of closed hearings is in 
operation, a patient may prefer one or two other persons to attend a hearing, or, 
allow any member of the public to attend, including the media. If a reviewing 
tribunal decides that a requesting patient requires support, and the patient 
consents to receiving support, the tribunal must provide the patient with 
sufficient resources to enable an informed decision about the extent to which he 
or she wills and prefers the hearing be opened. After the provision of support has 
been provided and a patient has made a final decision, the tribunal must consider 
whether opening proceedings in the requested way constitutes an abuse of 
process and whether or not the tribunal has the physical resources to 
accommodate the request. The tribunal must also consider if the request will 
contravene the privacy rights of other persons and if so, whether those privacy 
concerns can be managed.787 In addition, the tribunal must consider whether 
accommodating the request will impose a disproportionate burden on the 
tribunal’s resources.788 
                                                
786 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 
189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 3 May 2008), art 12(1)-(3); United Nations Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article 12: Equal Recognition 
before the Law (CRPD), UN Doc CRPD/CGC/1 (2014), [25](f). 
787 See AH v West London MHT and SSJ [2010] UKUT 264 (AAC). 




Ultimately, where a statutory presumption of closed hearings is in operation, how 
opening a hearing can be practically and proportionately achieved, if at all, will 
invariably be contingent on the circumstances of each request to open 
proceedings, particularly given a patient’s will and preferences regarding how 
open a hearing should be, will vary, as will each tribunal’s respective resource 
base.  
The normative human rights framework in the case example above is 
summarised below in list form:  
1. Does a patient requesting an open hearing require support to exercise 
legal capacity to make a decision to waive privacy and confidentiality 
rights in order to enforce a right to a public hearing, including support to 
decide the extent to which he or she wills and prefers a review hearing be 
opened?  
2. In determining whether a patient requires support, the decision must not 
be based upon a mental capacity test, which is discriminatory. Non-
discriminatory indicators of support needs are now required. 
Does the patient consent to the provision of support to make the decision? 
3. If the patient does not consent to the provision of support, the reviewing 
Tribunal must respect the patient’s final decision to waive privacy and 
confidentiality rights and to then exercise a right to a public hearing 
including the extent to which the patient wills and prefers the hearing be 
opened, subject to the considerations in 8 and 9.  
4. If the patient consents to the provision of support, the Tribunal should 
direct that the patient be provided with appropriate support to exercise 
legal capacity, at nominal or no cost to the patient, in order to make a 
final decision in relation to the potential exercise of rights to privacy and 
confidentiality, and the right to a public hearing, including the extent to 




final decision should be respected, subject to the considerations in 8 and 
9.  
5. ‘Appropriate support to exercise legal capacity’ is not prescriptive, but 
may encompass a variety of informal and formal arrangements, of 
varying types and intensity, tailored to each patient’s particular needs.  
6. Does opening a hearing to the extent that the patient wills and prefers 
encroach the privacy of others who are involved or would be mentioned 
at a review hearing? 
7. If so, can the privacy of others be managed (protected) through the 
exercise of existing duties of confidentiality, confidentiality orders, 
suppression orders, pseudonyms, redaction of documents and reasons 
statements, or by other means? If so, the Tribunal should respect the 
patient’s decision to open a review hearing to the extent that the privacy 
of others will not be encroached without those other persons’ consent. 
8. Does opening a hearing to the extent that the patient wills and prefers 
impose a disproportionate burden on the resources of the reviewing 
Tribunal? 
9. Given the serious nature of civil commitment (for example, incursions on 
personal autonomy and liberty), additional costs upholding a fundamental 
right such as the right to a public review hearing must reach a high 
threshold to be considered disproportionate, particularly given that 





CHAPTER SIX: AN ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIA’S 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 
UNDERPINNING THE OPERATION OF THE OPEN JUSTICE 




The purpose of chapter six is to analyse Australia’s compliance with the 
normative framework presented in chapter five. It will become evident that all 
Australian mental health legislation is generally compliant with an out-of-date 
expression of the human rights framework represented by diagram 1 in chapter 
five. It will argue though, that the legislation is likely inconsistent with the 
requirements of the most up-to-date human rights framework represented by 
diagram 2 in chapter five, which importantly, includes consideration of how 
article 12 of the CRPD develops human rights law in relation to the operation of 
the open justice principle at mental health civil commitment review hearings. 
Chapter five demonstrated that recent CRPD Committee’s clarifications of the 
content and scope of the human right to equality before law under article 12 of 
the CRPD, alters the human rights framework in the way that decisions about 
balancing the co-existing human rights to a public hearing and to privacy should 
be regulated in the civil commitment review context.  
Chapter six argues that the CRPD’s impact on this area of human rights law 
renders each of Australia’s mental health statutes potentially inconsistent with 
their human rights obligations. That is to say that Australia’s states and 
territories, according to the framework presented in chapter five, are obliged to 
recognise involuntary patients’ right to the protection of their legal capacity 
relating to the opening and closing of mental health civil commitment review 
hearings. Moreover, Australia’s states and territories are obliged to implement a 
form of supported decision-making that may assist involuntary patients to make a 




This chapter will argue that the inconsistencies with the human rights framework 
derive from each Australian mental health statute, which prescribe protective-
based criteria incorporating welfare or best interests tests in relation to decision-
making regarding the opening and closing of review hearings. Accordingly, each 
statutory framework fails to protect the legal capacity of an involuntary patient to 
waive and apply his or her rights to privacy and confidentiality. This is so 
because each reviewing tribunal may override a patient’s will and preference if it 
considers that opening or closing a hearing, in part or in full, will result in 
adverse consequences for the involuntary patient’s health.  
The CRPD requires a move away from this approach. Article 12 requires mental 
health legislation to recognise and to protect an involuntary patient’s legal 
capacity to make decisions relating to public attendance at review hearings, and 
in relation to the potential public access to information about his or her review 
hearing. Article 12 also requires the implementation of appropriate support 
mechanisms that seek to enable a patient to make and express such decisions. 
This chapter argues that the current approach to implementing supported 
decision-making in Australia’s mental legislation is underpinned by soft law 
mechanisms, such as the objectives and principles sections of mental health 
legislation that has done little to advance the protection of an involuntary 
patient’s right to the protection of legal capacity in the open justice decision-
making context.  
Chapter six also demonstrates that only two Australian mental health tribunals 
are currently publishing reasons for decisions, despite the human rights 
framework requiring that all reviewing tribunals should publish such statements 
according to a test of ‘significance’ or, generally, where requested by an 
involuntary patient. 
Chapter six presents the analysis of Australia’s level of compliance with the 




capacity in Part One, by reference to the five elements of open justice within the 
following three categories:  
1. Attendance at tribunal hearings 
• Ability of public to attend a civil commitment review hearing 
2. Publication of information about tribunal hearings 
• Ability of public to report what occurred 
• Ability of public to identify those involved  
• Ability of public to access review hearing documents  
3. Tribunal decisions and reasons 
• Ability of public to access review hearing decisions and statements of 
reasoning 
Part Two then considers the criteria a tribunal may consider in qualifying a 
patient’s decision to open or close a review hearing, in part or in full. Those 
qualifying aspects include whether a patient’s decision will interfere with the 
privacy of other persons, and second, whether it will impose a disproportionate 
burden on the tribunal’s resources, including whether or not the tribunal has 
access to appropriate resources to conduct public or private hearings, and 
whether or not a patient’s decision would amount to an abuse of process.  
Part Three then evaluates the effectiveness of Australia’s current statutory 
approaches to implementing supported decision-making frameworks that 






PART ONE – EVALUATING THE RECOGNITION OF 
LEGAL CAPACITY RELATING TO OPEN JUSTICE 
DECISIONS 
I INTRODUCTION 
Part One is only concerned with evaluating Australia’s compliance with the 
human rights requirements relating specifically to the acknowledgment and 
protection of involuntary patients’ legal capacity, as it relates to and involuntary 
patient’s ability to control the use of his or her personal and confidential health 
related information deriving from mental health civil commitment review 
hearings. It does not consider the criteria that may qualify a patient’s will and 
preferences as expressed in their decisions, which Part Two will consider. Nor 
does it evaluate Australia’s implementation of supported decision-making 
frameworks in mental health legislation that may assist and involuntary patient to 
express his or her will and preferences. Part Three will undertake this task.  
II ATTENDANCE AT TRIBUNAL REVIEW HEARINGS: DO 
AUSTRALIA’S MENTAL HEALTH STATUTORY 
FRAMEWORKS COMPLY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 
REQUIREMENTS?  
Chapter five demonstrated that the human rights framework permits flexibility in 
prescribing either a statutory presumption of public or private review hearings. 
The flexibility arises first, because of the privacy exception expressed within the 
human right to a public hearing under article 14(1) of the ICCPR; second 
because of the stand-alone human right to privacy prescribed by article 22 of the 
CRPD;  and third, because of a state’s discretion, if proportional to competing 




the operation of the open justice principle when applied to the context of mental 
health civil commitment review hearings.789  
A Variance is Permitted in Statutory Presumptions of Public or Private Review 
Hearings 
Each jurisdiction complies with the flexible human rights requirement to 
prescribe civil commitment review hearings via either a public or private 
statutory presumption. In all Australian jurisdictions except New South Wales 
and South Australia (identified below), there is a clearly expressed statutory 
presumption that review hearings be conducted privately,790 and each of those 
jurisdictions provide criteria to open proceedings. In New South Wales, there is a 
clearly expressed statutory presumption that review hearings be conducted 
publicly and that those hearings shall be open to public attendance with criteria 
to close proceedings.791 In South Australia, the mental health legislation is silent 
as to whether review hearings must operate according to a presumption of public 
or private proceedings. However, the South Australian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal (SACAT) has jurisdiction to conduct review hearings,792 and the Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal Act, 793  prescribes a presumption that review 
hearings be conducted in public, with criteria to close proceedings. 794  
1 Human Rights Criteria to Open or Close a Review Hearing  
The human rights framework provides specific criteria to open or close a review 
hearing in circumstances where an involuntary patient requests a public or 
private hearing. The criteria requires statutory recognition of an involuntary 
                                                
789 See, eg,  Campbell and Fell v UK [1985] 7 EHRR 165; Judicial Authority in Sweden v 
Assange [2011] EW Misc 5 (MC) (24 February 2011); Rhona K. M. Smith, Textbook on 
International Human Rights (7th ed), (Oxford University Press, 2016) 179. 
790 Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld), s 741; Mental Health Act 2015 (ACT), 194; Mental Health Act 
2014 (Vic), s 193; Mental Health and Related Services Act (NT), s 135; Mental Health Act 2014 
(WA), s 456; Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas), Sch 4, Part 2(9). 
791 Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), 151(3).  
792 Mental Health Act 2009 (SA), Part 11. 
793 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA).   




patient’s legal capacity to waive or apply his or her human rights to privacy 
(encompassing confidentiality), and the right to a public hearing.795  
Specifically, a reviewing tribunal should allow public attendance at a hearing in 
compliance with an involuntary patient’s will and preferences. For instance, 
where a statutory presumption arises that review hearings should be private, and 
a patient requests that a hearing be publicly accessible, a reviewing tribunal must 
determine if the patient requires support to make that decision. If the patient does 
not require support, or does not consent to receiving support, the tribunal should 
respect the patient’s decision and determine what the patient’s preferences are in 
relation to the extent that he or she would allow attendance. For instance, it may 
be that a patient wishes to allow one other person to attend the hearing, or it may 
be that the patient prefers the general public, perhaps including the media to 
attend.  
The next sections summarise the current Australian criteria to open and close 
review hearings, and then analyses those criteria against the requirements of the 
human rights framework. It is important to note that this section does not 
consider the criteria relating to whether a patient’s decision interferes with the 
privacy of others. Nor does it evaluate the effectiveness of Australia’s supported 
decision-making frameworks. These criteria are considered in Parts Two and 
Three respectively. This section is only concerned with the extent to which the 
statutory frameworks comply with the requirement to respect an involuntary 
patient’s legal capacity to make a decision according to  a patient’s will and 
preferences. 
                                                
795 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 
189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 3 May 2008), art 12(1)-(3); United Nations Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article 12: Equal Recognition 




2 Jurisdictions with a Presumption of Private Hearings  
In Queensland, the Mental Health Review Tribunal may open a review hearing if 
the patient agrees, and it would not result in serious harm to the person’s health 
or risk the safety of others.796 In the Northern Territory, the criteria is similar 
though the legislation adds a statutory duty to ensure the privacy of the parties 
will not be adversely affected.797 In the Australian Capital Territory, the ACAT 
may open a review hearing if satisfied it will not endanger morals, public order 
or national security, or adversely affect the private lives of the parties, or where 
publicity would not prejudice the interests of justice, 798  thus, reflecting the 
exceptions to a right to a public hearing under the International Covenant on 
Civil Political Rights (ICCPR).799 In Victoria, the Mental Health Tribunal may 
only open a review hearing if satisfied it is in the public interest,800 and the 
Tribunal must consider whether a public a hearing would be a serious threat to 
the health and safety of any person, or would prejudice the interests of justice.801 
In Western Australia, the Mental Health Tribunal may permit a person to attend a 
private hearing,802 but has power to exclude any person if satisfied it is not in 
best interests of the patient. 803  These criteria differ from Australia’s other 
jurisdictions noted above in that there is expressly prescribed criteria enabling 
the Tribunal to override a patient’s  request to open a review hearing on best-
interests considerations, which are inconsistent with the requirements of article 
12 of the CRPD to abolish all forms of substitute decision-making based on best 
interests considerations. In Tasmania, the Mental Health Tribunal may only open 
a presumptively private review hearing unless it determines otherwise in a 
particular instance. If the Tribunal opens a hearing, any party may challenge that 
decision, upon which the Tribunal may close (or reclose) the hearing, exclude 
                                                
796 Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld), s 741(3). 
797 Mental Health and Related Services Act (NT), s 135(2). 
798 ACT Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 39-40. 
799 International Covenant on Civil Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), art 14(1),(2). 
800 Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic), s 193(2). 
801 Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic), s 193(4). 
802 Mental Health Act 2014 (WA), s 456(2).  




any person with no direct interest, or exclude any person who has not been 
authorised to attend.804  
3 Jurisdictions with a Presumption of Private Hearings  
In New South Wales, the Mental Health Review Tribunal may close a 
presumptively public hearing if the Tribunal is satisfied it is desirable for the 
welfare of the patient or for any other reason.805 In South Australia, the SACAT 
Tribunal may close and conduct privately, in part or in full, a presumptively 
public hearing if satisfied it is in interests of justice, or by reason of the 
confidential nature of the evidence, or to expedite proceedings, or for any 
sufficient reason.806  
B Analysis of Australia’s Compliance with the Human Rights Criteria to Open 
and Close Review Hearings  
In Queensland and the Northern Territory, the criteria to open a presumptively 
private criteria are (as in all other jurisdictions) effectively objective tests to be 
decided on the balance of probabilities, as chapter four demonstrated. For 
instance, consider that a person may suffer serious harm at a review hearing 
while being its subject, in the company of those persons whom a clear will and 
preference for attending was expressed by the patient. The threshold issue is in 
the degree of the risk of harm to the patient through the attendance of others. The 
Tribunal’s satisfaction of this criteria enables others (the Tribunal), to override 
the patient’s request and to make a decision on his or her behalf – based on 
welfare considerations; for his or her own protection. In this situation, a patient is 
denied an opportunity to waive a right to confidentiality on an equal basis with 
other health consumers. This test can be characterised as encompassing, or at 
least permitting a form of substituted decision-making, and may be considered 
discriminatory under articles 5 and 12 of the CRPD. A patient’s general freedom 
to waive his or her confidentiality in relation to health information is not 
                                                
804 Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas), sch 4, part 2(9). 
805 Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), 151(3),(4). 




controversial; it is common, in fact, for health service consumers to waive 
confidentiality in a myriad of implied and express ways – and it is done on a 
daily basis, for example by discussing a health related problem with a friend, a 
neighbour, a colleague, and so on. Some people choose to broadcast and publish 
personal health related details to vast viewing audiences through several media 
for a variety of reasons that are personal to themselves.  
In the Australian Capital Territory, notwithstanding that the test allows the 
patient to make a request to open proceedings the patient’s request can 
essentially be overridden by the Tribunal if it considers that opening a hearing 
would not be in in the interests of justice. As chapter five demonstrated in AH v 
West London, the interests of justice test in this specific context, effectively 
allows a reviewing tribunal to determine that opening a hearing would result in 
adverse consequences to a patient’s health and their recovery interests and 
therefore his welfare. Thus, like the criteria in Queensland, this statutory test is 
effectively discriminatory because it deprives involuntary patients of legal 
capacity to waive the right to confidentiality as other persons are entitled. The 
patient’s decision in relation to opening a review hearing remains derogable on 
potential welfare and best-interests consideration, even if a patient has clearly 
expressed a will and preference to open a hearing. 
In Victoria, the criteria similarly denies involuntary patients the ability to 
exercise legal capacity to make a decision to open a review hearing, using a 
combination of the criteria prescribed in Queensland and the Australian Capital 
Territory. The legal and practical effect is similar because it prescribes a welfare-
based test and an interests of justice test that enables the Tribunal to override a 
patient’s request to open a review hearing if it first considers that opening a 
hearing would result in a serious threat to the health and safety of the patient, and 




Tasmania’s statutory framework uses the broadest language in allowing the 
Tribunal to deny an involuntary patient the ability to exercise legal capacity in 
this context. The test does not provide express power for a patient to request an 
opened hearing, and in circumstances where a patient may nevertheless do so, the 
Tribunal can effectively override the patient’s will and preference on the issue on 
the basis of welfare or best interests considerations.   
In New South Wales, in which a statutory presumption of private hearings 
operates, the criteria prescribe a welfare based test to close a hearing, and a 
further test that allows closure ‘for any other reason’, which is broad enough to 
allow the Tribunal to deny a patient’s request to close a hearing and to thus 
potentially deny an involuntary patient’s legal capacity to make this decision for 
him or herself. On the other hand, if a patient makes a request to maintain an 
open hearing in circumstances where the Tribunal has ordered a private hearing, 
the statutory criteria denies involuntary patients the ability to exercise legal 
capacity to make a decision in relation to the potential waiving of confidentiality. 
This is because the statutory framework prescribes an express welfare criterion, 
and a further open ended criterion (‘for any other reason…’) that effectively 
allows the Tribunal to consider the patient’s best interests in making its final 
decision.  
Similar to the approach in New South Wales, the criteria in South Australia to 
close a presumptively public hearing provides a test that allows closure ‘for any 
sufficient reason’. The SACAT may therefore override a patient’s request to 
maintain an open hearing if the Tribunal considers that doing so is not in the 
interests of justice, or by reason of the confidential nature of the evidence, or to 
expedite proceedings, or for any other sufficient reason, such as welfare or best 
interests considerations. Therefore, as in all other Australian jurisdictions, the 
statutory framework in South Australia is potentially discriminatory because it 
does not acknowledge and involuntary patient’s legal capacity to waive rights to 




In Australia’s six jurisdictions that provide a statutory presumption of private 
review hearings, none comply with the human rights criteria to acknowledge 
universal legal capacity in relation to decisions relating to the waiving of 
confidentiality rights and in and application for a public hearing. Similarly, in the 
two jurisdictions that provide criteria to close a presumptively open review 
hearing, a universal legal capacity framework is lacking. While using 
inconsistent and varied threshold criteria, each statutory framework, regardless of 
the default statutory presumption, contravenes the requirements of the human 
rights framework presented in chapter five.  
Each Australian jurisdiction provides a decision-making framework that allows a 
reviewing tribunal to override a patient’s will and preferences in relation to who 
may attend a civil commitment review hearing. The statutes provide criteria that 
are often broad enough to encompass welfare or best interests criteria that 
effectively enables each tribunal to override a patient’s request, and are thus 
potentially discriminatory when measured against the requirements of human 
rights framework.  
An involuntary patient’s accessibility to a public (or at least opened to some 
extent) review procedure is not absolute.  A tribunal may hear evidence as to the 
potential for harm or otherwise to a patient in the setting of a public hearing, but 
retains the discretion to override the patient’s will and preference, if satisfied, for 
example, that the public review hearing will adversely affect a patient’s privacy 
or result in harm to the patient’s health or welfare.  
The human rights framework requires a move away from Australia’s welfare 
oriented approach to one that recognises an involuntary patient’s legal capacity 
to make decisions relating to attendance at civil commitment review hearings. 
Accordingly, to achieve compliance with the human rights framework, 
Australia’s states and territories must implement statutory provisions that 




III PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT TRIBUNAL 
HEARINGS: DO AUSTRALIA’S STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS 
COMPLY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS REQUIREMENTS?  
This section analyses Australia’s statutory frameworks that regulate the ability of 
those persons who attend civil commitment review hearings to publish 
information about what occurred at the hearing, regardless of whether there is a 
statutory presumption of open or closed hearings. Discussion is therefore 
confined to the ability of the public to report and publish what occurred at a 
review hearing; the ability to identify those involved or mentioned at a hearing; 
and the public’s ability to access documents relied upon by the reviewing 
tribunals in their decision-making.  
A Human Rights Regulation of Reporting What Occurred at Tribunal Review 
Hearings 
As chapter five demonstrated that the human rights applicable to public 
attendance at civil commitment review hearings also applies to the potential 
publication of information about a review hearing. These elements of the open 
justice principle are similarly governed by the right to a public hearing,807 the 
right to privacy,808 and the right to equality before law.809  
Specifically, a reviewing tribunal should permit the publication or suppression of 
information about a review hearing according to an involuntary patient’s will and 
preferences. For instance, where a statutory presumption arises that information 
should remain confidential, and a patient requests that information be published 
in some way, a reviewing tribunal must determine if the patient requires support 
to make that decision. If the patient does not require support, or does not consent 
                                                
807 International Covenant on Civil Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), art 14(1),(2); European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 11 April 1950,213 
UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953), art 8.  
808 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 
189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 3 May 2008), art 22. 
809 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 




to receiving support, the tribunal should respect the patient’s decision and 
determine what the patient’s preferences are with respect to the extent to he or 
she prefers to allow access to relevant information and to its subsequent potential 
publication. When the patient has made a decision, the tribunal must consider (as 
noted above in relation to public attendance at review hearings), first, whether 
allowing access and publication in the requested way will contravene the privacy 
rights of other persons, and second, whether it will impose a disproportionate 
burden on the tribunal’s resources.  
It is important to note, though, that this section evaluates respect for an 
involuntary patient’s legal capacity. It does not consider the criteria relating to 
the potential qualification of a patient’s decision, such as whether or not his or 
her decision interferes with the privacy of others. Nor does it evaluate the 
effectiveness of Australia’s supported decision-making frameworks. These 
criteria are considered in Parts Two and Three respectively. This section is 
confined to the extent to which Australia’s statutory frameworks comply with the 
requirement to respect an involuntary patient’s legal capacity to make a decision 
according to his or her will and preferences.  
1 Statutory Frameworks Regulating the Ability to Publish Reports of 
Proceedings and to Identify Persons  
In Queensland, the Tribunal may grant leave to publish information about a 
review hearing if satisfied that doing so is in the public interest and is not likely 
to identify a person mentioned or involved in a proceeding.810 In the Australian 
Capital Territory, the Tribunal may restrict publication of information about a 
hearing to protect morals, public order or national security; or because of the 
interest in private lives of parties; or where publicity would prejudice the 
interests of justice, and, the legislation creates an offence for recklessly 
disclosing information in relation to a hearing held in private.811 In Victoria, the 
                                                
810 Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld), s 790, 791. 




legislation prohibits the publication of identifying information about the subject 
of a review hearing without the Tribunal President’s consent.812 In providing 
consent, the relevant factors relating to the publication of information include 
whether such publication would be a serious threat to the health and safety of any 
person, or would prejudice the interests of justice.813 
In the Northern Territory, the statutory framework creates an offence if a person 
publishes information that results in the identification of an involuntary patient. 
without the approval of the Mental Health Review Tribunal, and the involuntary 
patient.814 Similarly, in Western Australia, the statutory framework creates an 
offence if a person publishes information about Mental Health Tribunal 
proceedings that identifies a party or a person associated in any way with a 
matter relating to those proceedings.815  
In South Australia, a person commits an offence by publishing a report of any 
SACAT proceedings. However, the legislation allows the Tribunal to authorise 
publication, upon application by a person with proper interest in matter, if it does 
not tend to identify the person to whom a proceeding relates.816 Moreover, the 
provisions relating to private review hearings are regulated by the Civil & 
Administrative Tribunal Act, which provides that the SACAT may, if satisfied it 
is in interests of justice, or by reason of the confidential nature of evidence, or to 
expedite proceedings or any other sufficient reason, restrict the publication of a 
witness’s name and address, or restrict the publication of evidence or the 
contents of any document provided to the Tribunal.817  
In Tasmania, the statutory framework does not expressly provide direction to the 
Mental Health Tribunal regarding the publication of information deriving from 
review hearings, notwithstanding that the Mental Health Tribunal may publish a 
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record of any proceeding if it is of significance to the operation of the statutory 
framework. However, the Tribunal must suppress information that could 
reasonably disclose the identity of any person.818  
In New South Wales, the statutory framework creates an offence if a person 
publishes or broadcasts the name of any person to whom a matter before the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal relates (such as a witness or a person mentioned 
in a proceedings), without the consent of the Tribunal.819 The Tribunal’s Practice 
Direction provides express provision for a patient to formally request the 
Tribunal’s consent to publish his or her name, though it requires an assessment of 
a patient’s mental capacity to consent to the publication.820  The New South 
Wales Supreme Court has confirmed the relevance of the patient’s mental 
capacity to determine for him or herself the use of personal identifying 
information.821 Moreover, the Court held that a relevant consideration is whether 
there ‘[i]s there a real (as distinct from merely speculative) risk that his mental 
health will be adversely affected by his doing so’.822  
2 Analysis of Australia’s Compliance with Human Rights Requirements in 
Relation to the Ability to Publish Reports and to Identify Persons 
In each of Australia’s jurisdictions, the statutory frameworks provide a 
presumption that a person must not publish a report of a review hearing or any 
information relating to a hearing. Each of the statutory criteria, in their own way, 
provide a decision-making framework that allows a reviewing tribunal to 
override a patient’s will and preferences in relation to the publication of 
information about a review hearing. The statutes provide criteria that are broad 
enough to encompass welfare or best interests criteria that effectively enable 
each mental health tribunal to override a patient’s request. The NSW Mental 
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Health Tribunal for instance, must recognise, given the ruling of the Supreme 
Court, that an objective welfare consideration is a threshold factor in deciding 
whether to permit the publication of information arising from a Tribunal review 
hearing, even if a patient has the decision-making capacity to make a decision 
relating to that publication.  
As with the statutory criteria that applies to public attendance discussed above, 
the human rights framework presented in chapter five requires a move away from 
this protective and welfare oriented approach, to one that recognises an 
involuntary patient’s legal capacity to make decisions relating to the potential 
publication of information deriving from mental health civil commitment review 
hearings. Accordingly, to achieve compliance with the human rights framework, 
Australia’s states and territories should implement statutory criteria that 
acknowledges and protects an involuntary patient’s legal capacity to make 
personal decisions relating to the potential publication of their confidential health 
related information deriving from review hearings, after receiving appropriate 
support to make such decisions as discussed in Part Three, though subject to the 
potential qualifications to a patient’s decision as discussed in Part Two. 
B Human Rights Regulating Public Access to Documents Relied on in Tribunal 
Decision-making 
The human rights applicable to the aforementioned elements of open justice 
apply also to the regulation of public access to documents relied on by reviewing 
tribunals in their decision-making. The human rights framework permits a 
presumption that public access to documents relied upon by reviewing tribunals 
can remain private or public in accordance with the respective statutory 
presumption relating to attendance as described above. Therefore, a reviewing 
tribunal, upon application by a member of the public, should permit or restrict 
access to documents on a case by case basis in compliance with each patient’s 
will and preferences, although subject to any potential qualifications to the 




1 Statutory Frameworks Regulating Public Access to Documents Relied on in 
Tribunal Decision-making 
In New South Wales the Mental Health Act prohibits the disclosure of any 
information obtained in connection with Mental Health Act or the Mental Health 
(Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 without with the consent of person from whom 
the information was obtained, or for other lawful purpose such as research under 
Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW). 823  Access to 
documents is additionally precluded through general duties of patient 
confidentiality under common law and other statutory schemes designed to 
protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal health related information.824 
Moreover, the Mental Health Review Tribunal provides guidance regarding its 
approach to public access in two of its Practice Directions.825 For instance, in 
reflecting the statutory provisions of section 151 (discussed above), in relation to 
the publication of information about a review hearing, the relevant Practice 
Direction restricts the disclosure of documents if the Tribunal satisfied it is 
desirable for the welfare of the patient or for any other reason.826  
Moreover, although the New South Wales Tribunal records all of its proceedings 
using a handheld dicta-phone, given the issues discussed are often intensely 
personal, the Tribunal limits access to audio recordings and transcripts of its 
proceedings with due respect to the prohibition on the publication of the persons 
involved or mentioned in any proceedings, and the disclosure of information 
obtained in the administration or execution of the Mental Health Act 2007 or the 
Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act. 827  Access to audio recordings are 
accessible only where the person requesting the recording can demonstrate a 
                                                
823 Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), s 189. 
824 Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), and, the restrictions on disclosure 
of health related personal documents under provisions of the Government Information (Public 
Access) Act 2009 (NSW).  
825 See New South Wales Mental Health Review Tribunal (July 2015), Practice Direction: 
Procedural Matters; New South Wales Mental Health Review Tribunal, (June 2013) Practice 
Direction: Access to audio recordings of proceedings. 
826 New South Wales Mental Health Review Tribunal (July 2015), Practice Direction: Procedural 
Matters, para 1.3(b); Menaal Health Act 2007 (NSW), 151(4)(c),(d). 
827 New South Wales Mental Health Review Tribunal, (June 2013) Practice Direction: Access to 




legitimate reason for requiring it. The Tribunal will consider an applicant’s 
reasons for requesting access on a case-by-case basis, though ultimately, the 
Tribunal must acknowledge that welfare or best interests considerations are 
threshold factors to consider in relation to allowing public access to documents, 
given that such access may only be granted where the Tribunal is satisfied it is 
desirable for the welfare of the patient, or for any other reason.828 
Each of the other Australian jurisdiction do not provide the level of explicit 
regulation in relation to public access to documents, though in each jurisdiction, 
the presumption that all documents to be relied on by reviewing tribunals are not 
publicly accessible can be implied through the regulation of the elements of the 
open justice provisions discussed above, and by the vast number of ancillary 
provisions within the mental health statutory frameworks that restrict the public 
dissemination of information about a review hearing. In Victoria, for example, 
the statutory framework prohibits the disclosure of health information generally 
(including information in documents) about a patient under the Mental Health 
Act. 829  The legislation also prohibits the publication of the name or other 
identifying details of a person who is the subject of a Tribunal hearing, details 
that would be revealed by the relevant documents, without the Tribunal 
President’s written consent.830  In the Northern Territory, only an involuntary 
patient or a representative of the patient may access records of information about 
the patient including information contained in document.831 In Western Australia, 
a person is not entitled to access medical records including documents that relate 
to a patient if a psychiatrist reasonably believes that a disclosure poses a 
significant risk to the health or safety of anyone, or if disclosure would 
reveal personal information about persons other than the patient. 832  
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In Tasmania, a mental health authority (such as a psychiatrist or an approved 
medical practitioner), in giving information to a patient or to any private person 
in respect of any matter may withhold, defer or qualify that information if it 
could reasonably be expected to seriously harm a patient's health or safety, 
seriously compromise a patient's treatment, or risk the safety of others. 833  
In South Australia, the provisions relating to presumptively private review 
hearings are regulated by the Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act, which 
provides that the SACAT may, on application by any member of public, allow an 
applicant to inspect or obtain a copy of any process relating to proceedings and 
forming part of Tribunal's records including a transcript of evidence and any 
documentary material admitted into evidence.834 However, if satisfied it is in 
interests of justice, or by reason of the confidential nature of evidence, or any 
other sufficient reason, the SACAT may restrict the publication of a witness’s 
name and address, restrict the publication of evidence or the contents of any 
document produced to Tribunal, restrict the disclosure to a party of evidence or 
the contents of any document.835   
Moreover, public access to confidential health related documents is precluded 
through general duties of patient confidentiality under common law, and other 
statutory schemes designed to protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal 
health related information.836    
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1 Analysis Of Australia’s Compliance with Human Rights Regulation of 
Public Access to Documents Relied on in Tribunal Decision-making 
In each of the statutory frameworks, public access to documents relied on in the 
decision-making of reviewing tribunals is heavily regulated toward prohibiting 
public access, and this is justified on the need to protect involuntary patient’s 
privacy and confidentiality, and the ultimate welfare interests of the patient. For 
example, in  New South Wales the regulatory framework restricts the disclosure 
of documents if the Tribunal satisfied it is desirable for the welfare of the patient 
or for any other reason.837  The Tribunal will consider an applicant’s reasons for 
requesting access on a case-by-case basis, though ultimately, the Tribunal must 
acknowledge that welfare or best interests considerations are threshold factors to 
consider in relation to allowing public access.838 
Each of the other Australian jurisdiction do not provide the level of explicit 
regulation in relation to public access to documents, though in each jurisdiction, 
the presumption that all documents to be relied on by reviewing tribunals are not 
publicly accessible can be implied through the regulation of the elements of the 
open justice provisions discussed above, and by the vast number of ancillary 
provisions within the mental health statutory frameworks that restrict the public 
dissemination of information about a review hearing.  
Again, as with the regulation of the other elements of the open justice principle, 
each of the statutory frameworks, permit reviewing tribunals to override a 
patient’s will and preferences in relation to permitting access to tribunal 
documents, on welfare or best interests considerations, which effectively amount 
to a form of substitute decision-making.  Essentially, an objective welfare 
consideration remains a threshold factor in deciding whether to permit the public 
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access to documents,  even in circumstances where a patient has the decision-
making capacity to make a decision to consent to permitting public access.  
The human rights framework presented in chapter five requires a move away 
from this protective and welfare oriented approach, to one that recognises an 
involuntary patient’s legal capacity to make decisions that permit public access 
to documents  deriving from mental health civil commitment review hearings, 
subject to the qualifying considerations considered in Part Two below.  
IV PUBLISHING TRIBUNAL REASONING: DO AUSTRALIA’S 
STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS COMPLY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 
REQUIREMENTS?  
A Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Publishing Review Hearing 
Statements of Reasoning 
Chapter five demonstrated that the human rights framework regarding the 
publication of decisions and reasons for decisions of mental health civil 
commitment review hearings, like all the other elements of the open justice 
principle, derives from the multiple human rights identified above. The Human 
Rights Committee has emphasised that each judgment deriving from review 
hearings should be published regardless of whether a civil proceeding is 
conducted openly or privately.839 In addition, the Committee emphasised that 
judgments should include the essential findings of the hearing, the evidence 
relied upon, and the legal reasoning underpinning the decision.840  
The European Court of Human Rights has emphasised that the requirement to 
publish judgments is expressed in almost unqualified terms in human rights 
conventions, which provides no discretion to keep proceedings entirely private 
and confidential.841 The Court noted that the content of the actual publication 
must be determined with consideration of the nature of each case’s subject 
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matter, its special features, and in acknowledgment of a government’s margin of 
appreciation and state discretion, if proportional in relation to its preferred 
publication methods.842 The human rights framework requires first, the statutory 
implementation of a supported decision-making framework that allows patients’ 
to exercise legal capacity to waive and exercise rights to privacy, a public 
hearing and equality before law, which allows a patient to require the publication 
of reasons for decisions, subject to the privacy of others, and any 
disproportionate burden publication may impose on a reviewing Tribunal’s 
resources. Second, it requires that reviewing Tribunal’s take active steps to 
publish reasons statements, even where a patient has not requested publication. 
In either scenario, publication should occur (with pseudonyms and in redacted 
form to protect the privacy of the patient and third parties), where a ‘significant’ 
decision has been made. In short:  
1. The patient can require publication of reasons that identifies his or her 
identity although he or she needs to be supported to make such a decision, 
with his or her consent. 
 
2. If a patient decides they do not wish ‘significant’ reasons to be published, 
the public interest in the open administration of justice will require that 
such decisions be publicly accessible, if the privacy of the patient and 
others can be protected using pseudonyms and redaction, and such 
publication will not result in a disproportionate burden on the resources 
of the reviewing Tribunal.   
1 Australia’s Statutory Frameworks Regulating the Ability of Tribunals to 
Publish Reasons for Decisions  
In Queensland, the legislation provides that the Mental Health Review Tribunal 
may publish its final decision and reasons for its decision, in ‘…a way it 
considers appropriate’, such as if the Tribunal is satisfied that reasons statements 
may be used as a precedent, but the publication must not identify any person 
involved or mentioned in the review hearing.843 In the Northern Territory, the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal may publish reasons for its decisions, but such 
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publications must not identify persons involved in hearings. The statutory 
framework provides that in determining whether or not to publish reasons 
statements, the Tribunal must consider the patient’s wishes, and be satisfied that 
the privacy of the parties will not be adversely affected, or publication result in 
serious harm to patient’s health, or risk others’ safety. Additionally, such 
publications must be in the public interest. 844 In Western Australia, the statutory 
framework only provides that the Tribunal may publish reports for legal 
educative professional purposes as long as identification of parties or others are 
not identified.845 In Tasmania, the Mental Health Tribunal may publish a record 
of any proceeding if it considers it to be of significance to the operation of the 
statutory framework. However, the Tribunal must suppress information that 
could reasonably disclose the identity of any person, and any subsequent 
publication should be provided to each party to a review hearing.846   
In the Australian Capital Territory, and in South Australia, where the so-called 
‘super tribunals’ provide a mental health division, there are no explicit statutory 
provisions enabling the publication of reasoning, although each of these tribunals 
publish statements of reasons regularly in relation to other divisions under their 
respective generalist jurisdictions.  
In Victoria, the Victorian Mental Health Tribunal publishes ‘selected’ decisions 
in redacted and de-identified form.847 The Victorian Mental Health Tribunal most 
recent Annual Report reports:  
…the vast majority of the Tribunal’s statements of reasons for 2014/15 have been de-identified 
and published on the AustLII website…. The Tribunal has chosen not to publish certain 
statements of reasons as the facts of those cases may lead to the identification of persons 
involved in the proceedings and/or their publication would not be appropriate in the 
circumstances.848  
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The Tribunal also publishes ‘selected statements’ of reasons on its website. It 
selects these publications on the basis that they contain ‘…particular issues and 
questions addressed provide examples of the way the Tribunal has interpreted 
key parts of the Act, which may provide guidance in other matters.’849 
In New South Wales, the statutory framework enables the Tribunal to publish an 
official report of Tribunal proceedings.850 The Tribunal commenced publishing 
‘Official Reports’ in 2013, of what it describes as ‘…important and illustrative 
decisions of the Tribunal’s Forensic Division as part of our drive to enhance the 
transparency of our processes, and the opportunities of others to better 
understand these [processes].’ As of May 2015, the Tribunal has begun to 
publish selected decisions emanating from its Civil Division.851 These reports are 
publicly available on the internet at the AUSTLII website,852 and the Tribunal’s 
website.853  
B Analysis of Australia’s Compliance with Human Rights Requirements 
Regulating the Publication of Decisions and Reasons  
Given that only two Australian tribunals regularly publish decisions and reasons 
statements, and the fact that very few review decisions are appealed, there is 
scant tribunal reasoning publicly available for scrutiny or educative purposes 
other than in Victoria and New South Wales. These publications constitute the 
only significant body of tribunal level reasoning relevant to civil commitment in 
Australia. 854  The current lack of public accessibility to reasons statements 
effectively deprives patients, the wider public, and the legal profession from 
learning accurate interpretations of statutory provisions, and the basis upon 
which decisions are made. Ultimately, all of Australia’s jurisdictions retain 
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statutory provisions that do not require tribunals to publish ‘significant’ reasons, 
and are therefore, not compliant with the human rights framework.   
This chapter argues that the procedures of the New South Wales Mental Health 
Tribunal represents ‘good practice’ in relation to meeting the requirements of the 
human rights framework, notwithstanding that the mental health legislation in 
that jurisdiction does not require the tribunal to do so. The legislation does not 
define ‘official report’ for the purposes of publishing decisions and reasons, 
although the Tribunal’s relevant Practice Directions provide some clarification 
by describing an official report and the circumstances in which the Tribunal’s 
President may authorise publication.855 First, the Practice Direction provides that 
an official report will usually contain the Tribunal’s reasons for a decision, but 
those reasons may be limited to a discussion of those parts of a proceeding, 
which have a broader public interest.856 It also provides that the reasons should 
de-identify the patient, witnesses and other persons involved in a hearing.857 
Moreover, the Practice Direction outlines circumstances in which the President is 
most likely to authorise publication. Those circumstances include:  
• Where the Tribunal has decided questions of legal significance with 
application beyond a particular case; 
• Where the proceedings have considered systemic issues relating to the 
care and treatment, which have application beyond a particular case; 
• Where proceedings have considered matters of concern relating to care 
and treatment; or  
• Other circumstances the President thinks fit. 858   
While the New South Wales Tribunal exhibits ‘good practice’ when measured 
against the human rights framework, this chapter considers that the statutory 
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provisions outlining the circumstances in which the President is most likely to 
authorise publication should enable an involuntary patient to request that a 
statement of reasons emanating from his or her review hearing be published.   
PART TWO – EVALUATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
CRITERIA THAT MAY QUALIFY A PATIENT’S EXERCISE 
OF LEGAL CAPACITY IN RELATION TO OPEN JUSTICE- 
BASED DECISIONS 
I INTRODUCTION 
Part Two considers the criteria a tribunal may consider in qualifying a patient’s 
decision to open or close a review hearing, in part or in full. Those qualifying 
aspects include whether the exercise of a patient’s legal capacity could interfere 
with the privacy of other persons, and second, whether it could impose a 
disproportionate burden on the tribunal’s resources. The next sections evaluate 
these considerations against each of the elements of the open justice principle.   
A Can the Privacy of Others be Managed if Opening a Review Hearing to 
Public Attendance? 
According to the human rights framework, a tribunal may deny an involuntary 
patient’s request to permit the public to attend a review hearing to the extent that 
allowing attendance in the requested way would not encroach the privacy of 
other persons involved or mentioned at a review hearing. Therefore, in cases 
where a patient requests public attendance, tribunals must determine if the 
privacy of others can be managed. There are several existing legal devices 
available to reviewing tribunals to this end, such as (apart from existing duties of 
confidentiality in common law and equity), confidentiality orders under the 
mental health statutory frameworks, or via formal undertakings of those whom 
attend a hearing to maintain confidentiality. These legal devices are discussed 
further in latter sections of this chapter, and include the use of existing statutory 
provisions that effectively prevent the dissemination and publication of 




maintaining confidentiality are longstanding legal devices that have proven 
effective in maintaining the privacy rights of patients who are the subject of 
review hearings, as well as those members of the public whom may attend 
hearings. It follows that in cases where a tribunal can ensure the privacy of the 
patient and others through the use of such mechanisms, a tribunal should respect 
a patient’s decision to open a review hearing to public attendance.  
B Does Opening a Review Hearing to Public Attendance Impose a 
Disproportionate Burden on a Reviewing Tribunal? 
According to the human rights framework, a tribunal may deny an involuntary 
patient’s request to permit the public to attend a civil commitment review hearing 
to the extent that opening a hearing in the requested way would impose a 
disproportionate burden on the tribunal’s resources. Therefore, in cases where a 
patient requests public attendance, tribunals must first determine the extent of the 
patient’s will and preferences, and then whether allowing such attendance would 
require an injection of resources that is proportionate to the patient’s request. 
Ultimately, how opening a hearing can be practically and proportionately 
achieved, if at all, will invariably be contingent on the extent of each patient’s 
specific request and considered on a case-by-case basis. For example, patients’ 
specific wishes regarding how open a review hearing should be will vary 
according to the will and preferences of each requesting patient. It also depends 
on each reviewing tribunal’s resource base and its capacity to provide the 
resources appropriate to support the exercise of legal capacity in the requested 
way.859 For example, a tribunal may cite a lack of facilities to accommodate the 
attendance of members of the public, particularly if the media is expected to 
attend, or a lack of staffing resources to provide appropriate support to a patient 
who will require resources in order to make a final decision. Nevertheless, given 
the serious nature of civil commitment as an institution, which includes 
substantial incursions on personal liberty and autonomy, the additional costs 
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required to implement universal legal capacity and supported decision-making 
frameworks must reach a very high threshold to be considered disproportionate, 
particularly given that requests to open hearings are likely (or at least 
speculatively) to be fairly infrequent.860 
Moreover, in 2001 an English court found that no consideration could be given 
for any alleged constraint on resources when arguing for the resource availability 
argument in the civil commitment review context.861 In that case, the court held 
that the practice of the Mental Health Review Tribunal imposing a routine eight-
week delay before the hearing of appeals by patient application was 'bred of 
administrative convenience' and that it was not lawful to make 'no effort to see 
that an individual application is heard as soon as reasonably practicable'.862 The 
Court found that the practice was in violation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (discussed further below).863 Similar judgment was made in the 
Victorian human rights case of Kracke v Mental Health Review Board and Ors 
(No 2).864   
C Can the Privacy of Others be Managed When Publishing Information About 
a Review Hearing? 
According to the human rights framework, a reviewing tribunal may allow the 
publication of information if an involuntary patient makes a request to publish 
information or to allow others such as the media to publish information, if a 
tribunal can effectively manage the privacy of others. As stated above, there are 
several existing legal devices available that can effectively manage the privacy of 
others, and these mechanisms are currently in operation in New South Wales at 
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its Mental Health Review Tribunal. For example, there are existing duties of 
confidentiality in common law and equity, confidentiality duties arising under 
the mental health legislation, and the ability to require formal undertakings of 
those whom wish to publish information must enter into, in order to protect the 
privacy of others. In circumstances where a tribunal can effectively manage the 
privacy of other persons mentioned in review proceedings through the use of 
existing methods such as those identified above, a reviewing tribunal should 
respect a patient’s decision to publish information or to allow others to publish, 
to the extent that allowing such publication does not impose a disproportionate 
burden on the reviewing tribunal’s resources.     
D Does Allowing Publication of Information Impose a Disproportionate Burden 
on the Reviewing Tribunal? 
According to the human rights framework, a reviewing tribunal may allow the 
publication of information if permitting such publication does not impose a 
disproportionate burden on the reviewing tribunal’s resources. Therefore, in 
cases where a patient requests permission to publish information, tribunals must 
determine the general extent to which the patient wills and prefers to allow 
publication, and whether such publication would require an injection of resources 
that is proportionate to the patient’s request. Ultimately, how allowing 
publication about a hearing can be practically and proportionately achieved, if at 
all, will invariably be contingent on the extent of each patient’s request, and 
should be considered on a case-by-case basis. For example, the specific 
preferences regarding publication will vary according to the will of each 
requesting patient. Therefore, respecting a patient’s decision will depend on each 
tribunal’s respective resource base, and their capacity to provide the necessary 
resources to support the patient’s will and preferences. 865  
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Though, as argued earlier in chapter six, given the serious nature of civil 
commitment as an institution, which includes substantial incursions on liberty 
and autonomy, the additional costs required to implement universal legal 
capacity and supported decision-making frameworks that recognises the right to 
a public hearing, the right to privacy and the right to equality before law, must 
reach a very high threshold to be considered disproportionate, particularly given 
that requests to publish information are at least speculatively, likely to be 
relatively infrequent.866 Thus, in the absence of an overwhelming number of 
requests, the exercise of legal capacity in this context is unlikely to amount to a 
disproportionate burden on Australia’s reviewing tribunals.  
E Can the Privacy of Others be Managed if Allowing Access to Documents 
Relied on in Making a Review Decision? 
According to the human rights framework, a reviewing Tribunal may allow 
public access to documents, if an involuntary patient consents to permitting 
others, such as the media to access those documents, if a Tribunal can ensure the 
privacy of others. As stated earlier in chapter six, regarding other elements of the 
open justice principle, there are several existing legal devices available to 
reviewing Tribunals that can effectively manage the privacy of others, and these 
mechanisms are currently in current in New South Wales by the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal. For example, there are existing duties of confidentiality in 
common law and equity, confidentiality duties arising under statute, and the 
ability to require formal undertakings of those whom wish to access information 
contained in documents must enter into, in order to protect the privacy of others. 
It follows that in cases where a tribunal can ensure the privacy of other persons 
mentioned in review proceedings through the use of existing methods such as 
those currently used by the New South Wales Tribunal identified above, a 
reviewing tribunal should respect a patient’s decision to access documents or 
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allow others, including the media, to access documents to the extent that 
allowing such access does not impose a disproportionate burden on the reviewing 
tribunal’s resources 
F Does Allowing Public Access to Documents Impose a Disproportionate 
Burden on the Reviewing Tribunal? 
According to the human rights framework, a reviewing tribunal may allow public 
access to documents if the measures a tribunal could undertake to protect the 
privacy of others would not impose a disproportionate burden on the reviewing 
tribunal’s resources. Therefore, in cases where a patient requests the 
authorisation of access, Tribunals must determine the general extent to which the 
patient wills and prefers access to occur, and whether allowing such access 
would require an injection of resources that is proportionate to the patient’s 
request. Ultimately, how allowing access to documents about a hearing can be 
practically and proportionately achieved, if at all, will invariably be contingent 
on the extent of each patient’s request, and should be considered on a case-by-
case basis. For example, the specific preferences regarding access will vary 
according to the will and preferences of each requesting patient, and respecting a 
patient’s decision will depend on each tribunal’s respective resource base, and 
thus each tribunal’s capacity to provide the resources appropriate to support the 
exercise of a patient’s legal capacity. 867 And given the nature of the onerous 
process of redaction to protect the privacy of others in releasing documents, it 
may well be that there is a concern amongst tribunals that permitting access to 
documents may impose a disproportionate burden on their resources. 
Again though, as argued earlier in chapter six, given the serious nature of civil 
commitment as an institution, which includes substantial incursions on liberty 
and autonomy, the additional costs required to implement a supported decision-
making framework that recognises the right to a public hearing, the right to 
                                                
867 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 




privacy and the right to equality before law, must reach a very high threshold to 
be considered disproportionate, particularly given that requests for the public to 
access documents are although speculative,  likely to be relatively infrequent.868 
G Can the Privacy of Others be Managed if Publishing Statements of 
Reasoning? 
According to the human rights framework, a reviewing tribunal may allow the 
publication of information if an involuntary patient makes a request to the 
tribunal to publish statements of reasoning, and if a tribunal can effectively 
manage the privacy of others. As stated earlier in chapter six, there are several 
existing legal devices available to reviewing tribunals that can effectively 
manage the privacy of others, and these mechanisms are currently in operation in 
New South Wales at its Mental Health Review Tribunal. In relation the 
publication of reasons, appropriate redaction and the use of pseudonyms are 
commonly used effectively by the New South Wales and Victorian Tribunals. 
Thus, in circumstances where a tribunal can effectively manage the privacy of 
other persons mentioned in review proceedings through the use of such methods, 
a reviewing tribunal should respect a patient’s request to publish statements of 
tribunal reasoning deriving from the patient’s particular hearing.  
H Does an Obligation to Publish Statements of Reasoning Impose a 
Disproportionate Burden on the Reviewing Tribunal? 
Regardless of whether a patient has requested the publication of reasons or not, 
tribunals should be publishing ‘significant’ reasons for decisions. It is 
conceivable that compliance with this requirement may constitute a 
disproportionate on a tribunal’s resources, and it is perhaps thus unrealistic to 
expect tribunals to publish all reasons deriving from review hearings because of 
the extant pressure that resource constraints have brought to bear on mental 
health systems. And, given the volume of decisions that must be made, it is 
potentially an overly onerous burden to publish all of these decisions. The 
requisite level of de-identification and redaction that must occur no doubt incurs 
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significant costs. Although, the serious nature of civil commitment review 
hearings requires that considerations of cost must reach a high threshold to be 
considered disproportionate,869 it may be unrealistic to expect tribunals to publish 
reasons in all cases (even in a relatively prosperous state party such as Australia), 
on the basis that the costs required to publish all reasons would not amount to a 
disproportionate burden on Australia’s Mental Health Tribunals. 
Resource constraints have previously been cited as a significant reason why the 
former Victorian Mental Health Board only provided written reasons to patients 
upon request, rather than automatically.870 Moreover, in email correspondence 
with a Legal Officer of the former Victorian Mental Health Review Board, it 
became clear that resource constraints has at times constituted a significant 
reason why the Victorian Board (now the Mental Health Tribunal which is 
currently publishing a vastly increased number of statements than in the past) has 
at times reduced the number of reasons statements it publishes.871 However, it is 
currently the case the six Australian jurisdictions do not publish any statements 
of decisions and reasons, and it is difficult, given the human rights framework, to 
maintain that the publication of ‘significant’ decisions and the publication of 
reasons where a patient requests publication constitutes a disproportionate 
burden on tribunal resources, particularly when two Australian jurisdictions are 
already publishing statements regularly on a test of ‘significance’.  
The human rights framework has observed that the requirement to publish 
judgments is expressed in almost unqualified terms, which provides no discretion 
to keep proceedings entirely confidential. 872   It is therefore a human rights 
requirement that ‘significant’ reasons be published as currently occurs in Vitoria 
and New South Wales. The content of the actual publication, though, must be 
determined with consideration of the nature of each case’s subject matter, its 
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special features, and in acknowledgment of a government’s state discretion, if 
proportional, in relation to its preferred publication methods.873 
PART THREE – EVALUATING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
SUPPORT TO EXERCISE LEGAL CAPACITY RELATING TO 
OPEN JUSTICE DECISIONS 
I INTRODUCTION 
Part Three applies the general and flexible requirements of supported decision-
making under article 12 of the CRPD, to evaluate how each Australian 
jurisdiction provides access to support in the exercise of legal capacity to make 
open justice based decisions in compliance with the human rights framework.  
A Human Rights Requirements for the Implementation of Support to Exercise 
Legal Capacity are Flexible Given the Developmental Stage of this Field of 
Inquiry 
Article 12(2) provides a new positive right in which the exercise of legal capacity 
must be actively facilitated if necessary. The exact parameters of what a 
‘supported decision-making framework’ would look like through statutory 
implementation and in practice, particularly in relation open justice based 
decisions remain unclear.874 By providing for a flexible interpretation of support, 
the human rights framework provides space for development in - in context. But, 
regardless of context, supporters or appointed representatives will remain bound 
by the will and the preferences of the supported person.875 All support must be 
based on his or her rights, will and preferences.876 .  
Those involuntary patients subject to the review of involuntary status at mental 
health civil commitment review hearings must receive support, first to make their 
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own decisions, and second to express and give effect to their will and preferences 
in relation to open justice based decisions.  The competing interests in these 
decision-making tasks are wholly different to different to decisions relating 
primarily to the involuntary treatment criteria, and how those latter criteria may 
comply with the requirements of the CRPD and particularly article 12. Open 
justice based decisions involve a balancing of rights that are arguably less serious 
than those contemplated within the current focus of academic inquiry that purely 
involves the validity of treatment criteria and not the procedural issue examined 
in this thesis.   
Whichever statutory form of supported decision-making that Australian mental 
health legislation will adopt in relation to open justice based decisions must, at a 
minimum, recognise that involuntary patients have an equal right to control the 
use of their confidential health related information as all other persons; and if the 
patient requires support to make such decisions, they should be given access to 
the support necessary to make them, and to then have their will and preferences 
respected. Moreover, minimum requirements must be safeguarded through the 
effective implementation of those requirements in legislation.  
Article 12(4) of the CRPD imposes obligations on state parties to implement 
procedural safeguards that ensure equality at law and the protection of legal 
capacity. This includes the implementation of measures that respect the rights, 
will and preferences of involuntary patients in the absence of undue influence, 
and which are appropriate to each patient’s specific circumstances. 877  The 
requirement of adequate procedural safeguards effectively imposes obligations 
on state parties to ensure that the protection of legal capacity is reasonably 
accommodated by legal processes.878 This obliges recognition by law, including 
statutory recognition, and procedural adjustments at relevant stages of review 
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processes that may be deficient in respect of those principles. 879  That said, 
Kerslake and Flynn, two of the members of the drafting Committee of the GC1 
have acknowledged the evolving nature of supported decision-making 
frameworks and that the CRPD Committee will take a positive view of those 
state parties who make genuine attempts to comply with the requirements of 
article 12 of the CRPD:  
While the requirements set out in the GC for establishing supports for the exercise of legal 
capacity in domestic legal frameworks may seem relatively ambitious and daunting (especially 
in light of the statement that these rights attach at the moment of ratification), it is anticipated 
that the committee will take a positive view of good-faith efforts by states parties to bring their 
laws into compliance with Article 12, especially where those efforts involve the active 
participation of disabled people's organisations.880  
B Statutory Recognition of Supported Decision-Making in Australian Mental 
Health Legislation is Lacking in Enforceability  
In relation to a supported decision-making framework directly relevant to open 
justice based decisions, all Australian mental health statutory frameworks rely 
upon general provisions contained in the objects and principles sections of the 
respective statutes. They are not focused or geared toward support in that 
context. Rather they are geared toward support for decisions relating mainly to 
the imposition of involuntary status. All of the statutory provisions regulating 
open justice based decisions omit anything resembling what could be construed 
as a requirement that such decisions be guided by the legal capacity of 
involuntary patients and their will and preferences in relation to these decisions.  
Callaghan and Ryan have referred to the implementation of supported decision-
making frameworks in Australian mental health legislation generally as ‘…minor 
process-type accommodations…’, underpinned by statutory principles requiring 
                                                
879 Jeffrey et al, ‘Applying the CPRD to Safeguard the Rights of People with A Disability in 
Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ (2011) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 1, 3. 
880 Anna Arstein-Kerslake and Eilionóir Flynn (2015) ‘The General Comment on Article 12 of 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: a roadmap for equality before the law’ 




that the provision of support enable meaningful participation in general decision-
making.881   
Most jurisdictions provide for a mostly aspirational and ‘principled’ statutory 
approach to the regulation of decision-making, which holds significance for 
many decision-making tasks under the legislation including open justice based 
decisions, but particularly those relating to the involuntary treatment criteria. For 
example, the Victorian principles provides: 
• decision-making capacity is presumed;882  
• objects and principles that promote human rights;883  
• meaningful participation in decision-making;884 
• preference for voluntary treatment;885 
• respect for patients’ views and preferences;886  
• tolerance for decisions that involve a degree of risk,887 and 
• respect and promotion of patients’ autonomy.888 
Callaghan and Ryan have characterised such statutory principles as ‘soft-law’ 
provisions lacking clear obligations to respect a patient’s will and preferences 
because  such principles obligations merely require patients’ to be considered 
rather than respected, and ultimately given effect. 889  Specifically, as Callaghan 
and Ryan argue, a genuine supported decision-making framework requires more 
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substantial provisions beyond the mostly principled approach to fully comply 
with the requirements of the CRPD.890  
C State Party Obligations 
1 Distinction Between Normative Content and State Obligations  
The distinction between individual rights and state obligations is significant. 
Individual rights are entitlements that vest with the individual – for example, the 
right to equal recognition before the law, the right to legal capacity on an equal 
basis and the right to be recognised as a person before the law.891 The right to 
privacy is another. State obligations, on the other hand, determine what the state 
is required to do in order to implement those individual rights. A state obligation 
cannot exist separate from a right.892 For example, the state obligation to provide 
support for the exercise of legal capacity stems from the human right to legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others.893  
As demonstrated by table 3 in chapter five, several human rights instruments 
expressly provide for the right to equality before the law and the right to legal 
capacity. Article 12 of the CRPD and General Comment 1, provides further 
guidance as to its meaning within disability and mental health contexts, despite 
some varying interpretations of the original Convention text.  
State parties have an obligation to take steps to support residual mental capacities 
to enable each person to exercise his or her legal capacity when an important 
decision is required to be made in relation to the operation of the open justice 
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principle. Decisions regarding the open justice principle are clearly important 
decisions, given the privacy and confidentiality implications. This then begs the 
question: what kind of supports are appropriate (that is, that meeting minimum 
standards in compliance with human rights law) in order to shore up residual 
capacity that enables persons to make particular open justice related decisions. 
While much work has to be done to establish what may encompass appropriate 
supports in this context, the following quote from two of the drafting authors of 
the General Comment 1 is informative: 
While the requirements set out in the GC for establishing supports for the exercise of legal 
capacity in domestic legal frameworks may seem relatively ambitious and daunting (especially 
in light of the statement that these rights attach at the moment of ratification), it is anticipated 
that the committee will take a positive view of good-faith efforts by states parties to bring their 
laws into compliance with Article 12, especially where those efforts involve the active 
participation of disabled people's organisations.894 
 
II CONCLUSION 
As chapter four concluded, Australia’s mental health statutory frameworks and 
the associated administrative practices of mental health tribunals indicate that 
mental health civil commitment review hearings have a closed and private 
nature. In most of these jurisdictions (except two), the statutory frameworks 
provide that review hearings shall be conducted on a private basis, and that no 
information presented at a hearing shall be disseminated or published except in 
limited circumstances. The human rights framework permits this varied approach 
through its flexible approach to the operation of the open justice principle, 
according to the margin of appreciation, and state discretion, as long as the 
criteria to open or close hearings does not impinge disproportionately upon a 
patient’s right to a public hearing or upon his or her rights to determine the limits 
of how his or her personal information shall be disseminated through the 
doctrines of confidentiality and privacy.    
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This chapter and thesis has demonstrated that each Australian mental health 
statute permits the overriding a patient’s legal capacity to make personal 
decisions based on either welfare or best-interests considerations, which 
effectively creates a form of substituted decision-making. Essentially, each 
statutory framework derogates from the legal capacity of an involuntary patient 
to waive his or her right to confidentiality, if a tribunal considers that opening or 
closing a review hearing would have an adverse effect on the patient’s health, 
welfare, or best interests.  
The CRPD requires a move away from this approach. In particular, Article 12 
requires mental health legislation to recognise an involuntary patient’s legal 
capacity to make decisions relating to the potential use of his or her confidential 
health related information. Article 12 also requires the implementation of 
appropriate support frameworks that seek to enable a patient to make such 
decisions. In addition, reviewing tribunals are obliged to publish ‘significant’ 
reasons statements according to a model of good practice illustrated, for the most 
part, by the current practice in New South Wales.  
All Australian jurisdictions now have international legal obligations to respect 
the legal capacity of involuntary patients to make autonomous decisions relating 
to their right to a public hearing and their subsequent right to privacy and to have 
that decision respected without the possibility of having that decision overridden 
by others on the basis of welfare or best interests considerations, which amount 
to a form of substitute decision-making.   
The human rights framework requires the implementation of a supported 
decision-making framework that recognises an involuntary patient’s rights to 
privacy, a public hearing, and equality before law, acknowledging that the 
recognition of these rights must be balanced against the privacy of others, and 
whether an involuntary patient’s will and preferences can be practically and 




and each tribunal’s respective resource base. In what ways it is realistic to amend 
Australia’s statutory frameworks to implement human rights compliance will be 
measured inevitably through governments’ and tribunals’ resource availability.895 
A Risk of This Supported Decision-Making Model Allowing Patients to Make 
Potentially Unwise Decisions is Diminished in the Open Justice Context 
Decisions pertaining to open justice related issues before tribunals are not ‘major 
decisions’ – for example when compared to making decisions about medical 
treatment and the imposition of the statutory treatment criteria – and 
consequently the risk of allowing patients to make potentially unwise decisions is 
ameliorated in this context. The proportionality concept is critical because 
although there may be such a risk, it is relatively minor, and therefore, for 
example, while a presumption against an open hearing and the suppression of 
information deriving from a tribunal hearing against the wishes of the 
involuntary patient, may be based in a legitimate state and individual patient 
welfare interest, but it is ultimately a disproportionate step to take, given the 
seriousness of the decisions to be made at a full review hearing.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
I INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of chapter seven is to link the specific research questions to the 
research findings by providing a summary of the thesis. It concludes with brief 
observations, and future challenges and issues, such as resource distributions and 
the evolution of supported decision-making frameworks that may constitute a 
basis for further research.    
This research focused on the procedural issue of the open justice principle at 
Australian civil commitment review hearings in the mental health context, and 
the extent to which human rights law can contribute to the development of a 
normative framework that should underpin the future operation of open justice 
based decisions at review hearings. The research involved the identification, 
analysis and reflection on the existing domestic civil commitment laws and 
comparing those laws with the requirements of the developed human rights 
framework presented in chapter five. It synthesised data derived from Australian 
mental health legislation, case law, human rights documents and jurisprudence, 
domestic policy documents and the secondary literature in the field of civil 
commitment. It then critically evaluated the existing Australian statutory 
frameworks to determine those frameworks’ level of compliance with the 
requirements of the human rights framework. 
II THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A What is the Conceptual and Legal Framework Underpinning the Operation 
of the Open Justice Principle at Common Law?  
This thesis identified the open justice principle’s five main elements, its 
exceptions and the rationales. Open justice at common law claims that it is 
desirable because it maximises the transparency of decision-making in the 




affect in decision-making and an educative affect in allowing the public and the 
legal profession to understand substantive procedural laws.  
The open justice principle at common law encompasses five main elements:  
1. The public should have the freedom to physically witness and hear the 
evidence a court relies on; 
2. Those who attend proceedings should be free to publish reports of what 
occurred at those proceedings; 
3. The public should have the freedom to identify the parties; 
4. The public should have the freedom to access documents relied upon in 
the decision-making process; and  
5. Reasons for decisions should be explicable and publicly accessible. 
However, there are exceptions to the open justice principle acknowledging that 
there may be circumstances where transparency may lead to undesirable health 
and welfare outcomes, and in these circumstances there is a strong case for 
maintaining confidentiality and privacy in tribunal decision-making. At common 
law, chapter two noted the principle’s potential derogation under superior courts’ 
parens patriae jurisdiction, which applies to persons with a mental illness 
(amongst others) who represent a class of vulnerable persons that courts will 
provide privacy protection. In such cases, an exception to the presumption of 
public hearings can be grounded in the status of the person because the common 
law has taken the view that the interests of justice requires that those persons 
who have a mental incapacity be protected from the potentially damaging 
consequences that open hearings might facilitate, such as stigmatisation and 




B How is the Open Justice Principle at Common Law Recognised in Australia’s 
Statutory Frameworks to Regulate the Conduct of Mental Health Civil 
Commitment Review Proceedings?  
Chapter three identified that Australia’s mental health statutory frameworks 
reflect the common law in its protection of an involuntary mental health patient’s 
privacy and confidentiality. Each statute provides a framework of provisions 
designed to protect a patient’s confidentiality of health information. They do this 
is several ways. First the legislation imposes obligations on those persons 
involved in the operation of mental health legislation not to divulge personal and 
health related information obtained in the course of their employment, and this 
those persons involved in the functions of mental health tribunals. Further, the 
legislation similarly prescribes that civil commitment review hearings shall be 
subject to a general privacy orientation.  The legislation regulating mental health 
civil commitment review hearings regulate with respect to each of the five 
elements of the open justice principle. The legislation reflects the common law 
parens patriae jurisdiction, because it is concerned to protect and facilitate the 
welfare of persons with mental illness who are subject to involuntary treatment 
orders and therefore periodic review hearings. Thus, an exception to the principle 
of open justice is clear in this context; it is essentially personal health 
information that is discussed at review hearings. Accordingly, Australia’s mental 
health statutory framework and the associated administrative practices of 
reviewing tribunals indicate that civil commitment review hearings generally 
have a closed and private nature. In all but two of Australia’s mental health 
statutory frameworks, the statutory scheme provides that civil commitment 
hearings shall be presumptively private (closed to public attendance).896 In the 
two jurisdictions that prescribe a presumptively open hearing, the tests in order to 
close a hearing are different, although the practical affect is similar. All 
jurisdiction provide criteria to displace the applicable statutory presumption, and 
generally the criteria includes regard to welfare and best interests considerations. 
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That is to say, that  an involuntary patient’s will and preferences are considered, 
but they are not regarded as presumptively binding.  
C What is the Conceptual and Legal Framework Underpinning the Operation 
of the Open Justice Principle at International Human Rights Law, and What 
Impact Does the Recently Enacted CRPD Impart in the Development of This 
Framework?  
Chapter five demonstrated that the open justice principle can be identified and 
developed from human rights jurisprudence and is capable of application to the 
mental health civil commitment review context. It identified the tension between 
the human right to a public hearing and the human right to privacy, and then 
identified how the CRPD reconciles that tension, completing the normative 
framework, assisted through the interpretative function assigned to the CRPD 
Committee in its General Comment no 1 on the right to equality before the law. 
It demonstrated the way in which human rights jurisprudence balances this 
tension through the application of article 12’s prescription of equality at law for 
persons with a disability, which applies to persons with a mental illness.    
The human rights jurisprudence demonstrated that it is prepared to permit a 
statutory presumption of open or closed review hearings, which arises directly 
from state parties’ deference (or margin of appreciation) as to how they 
determine the precise processes within the wide ambit of the open justice 
principle. This provides wide scope for state parties to determine an appropriate 
default statutory presumption.  
However, the application of article 12 of the CRPD requires Australian 
parliaments to enact legislation that recognises an involuntary patient’s right to 
equality before the law, which includes recognition that each involuntary patient 
has the right to the protection of his or her legal capacity to make decisions 
pertaining to the maintenance of his or her privacy and confidentiality interests. 
For example, a decision to waive one’s right to privacy and to enforce the right to 




the five elements of open justice. These decisions must be made on a case-by-
case basis. That is to say, those involuntary patients’ decisions should be 
respected and given effect after the provision of support to exercise each 
patient’s legal capacity in relation to open justice based decisions, subject to 
qualifying considerations including whether the patient’s will and preferences 
will interfere with the privacy of others, and whether or not those preferences 
will impose a disproportionate burden on the reviewing tribunal’s resources.  
This effectively allows each patient to participate in decision-making and to 
assume some control over the use of his or her private and confidential 
information.  
D To What Extent Does Australia’s Mental Health Legislation Recognise the 
International Human Rights Framework in Regulating the Operation Of the 
Principle of Open Justice at Mental Health Civil Commitment Review 
Proceedings?  
The thesis concludes that Australia’s current mental health legislation does not 
fully comply with the requirements of the most up-to-date  human rights 
framework, which includes the application of article 12 of the CRPD.  Each 
Australian mental health statute, in its own way, permits the overriding of a 
patient’s legal capacity to make personal decisions relating to fundamental 
human rights, based primarily on welfare and best-interests considerations. 
Essentially, each statutory framework denies and involuntary patient of the legal 
capacity to waive and rely on fundamental human if a tribunal considers that 
opening or closing a review hearing would have an adverse effect on the 
involuntary patient’s health.  
The CRPD requires a move away from this approach. Article 12 requires mental 
health legislation to recognise an involuntary patient’s legal capacity to make 
decisions relating to the potential attendance at review hearings, and their 
potential further use, and public access of his or her private health related 
information. Article 12 also requires the implementation of appropriate support 




reviewing tribunals are obliged to publish ‘significant’ reasons statements 
according to a model of good practice illustrated, for the most part, by the current 
practice in New South Wales. 
Given Australia’s ratification of the relevant United Nations human rights 
conventions including the CRPD, all Australian jurisdictions have international 
legal obligations to respect the legal capacity of involuntary patients to make 
autonomous decisions relating to their right to a public hearing and their right to 
privacy and to have their decisions respected without the possibility of having 
that decision overridden by others on the basis of welfare or best interests 
considerations that may amount to forms of substitute decision-making.    
Ultimately, the human rights framework requires the implementation of a 
supported decision-making framework that recognises an involuntary patient’s 
rights to privacy, a public hearing, and equality before law. And, the recognition 
of these rights must again be balanced against the privacy of others, and whether 
permitting the publication of information about review hearings can be 
practically and proportionately achieved relative to Australia’s position as a first 
world country and each tribunal’s resource base. In what ways it is realistic to 
amend Australia’s statutory frameworks to implement human rights compliance 
will be measured inevitably through a governments’ and tribunals’ resource 
constraints.897 
III CONCLUSION 
There remains ongoing concerns with the current operation of mental civil 
commitment in Australia. This thesis has examined one of these concerns, which 
focused on the current operation of open justice at mental health civil 
commitment review hearings. This thesis has made a significant and original 
contribution to knowledge within the field of health law generally and the 
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specific field of mental health law, firstly, by developing of a new normative 
framework to measure decision-making relating to the operation of the open 
justice principle in the mental health law context. It represents the first 
significant human rights evaluation of the operation of the open justice principle 
in the context of mental health based civil commitment review hearings, and the 
first time that article 12 of the CRPD has been applied conceptually and 
doctrinally to develop a human rights framework outlining the operation of the 
principle in this context. It is also the first comprehensive legal analysis of the 
operation of the open justice principle under Australia’s mental health 
legislation, and updates many of the salient elements of the latest generation of 
Australia’s mental health legislation following a period of extensive law reform 
in recent years.  
As noted in chapter five, there are some concepts underpinning the supported 
decision-making model advanced by this thesis that remain contested in the 
literature relating to the interpretation of article 12 provided by the CRPD 
Committee in its GC1. The thesis takes an absolutist approach to this (permitting 
universal legal capacity and supported decision-making regardless of potential 
harm it may cause a person). The literature is still debating the feasibility and 
risks of implementation of such an approach and there is some variation in the 
views expressed on this topic. It should be noted, though, that these views are 
expressed in the context of the involuntary treatment criteria, not open justice 
based decisions. Regardless of those contested issues, the absolutist approach of 
this thesis need not bow to interpretations or models advanced by others. This 
thesis’s argument is based on a view of article 12 that is the subject of debate and 
controversy, but nonetheless has several supporters as expressed by the ALRC 
Report.898 Moreover, decisions about open justice before review tribunals are not 
major decisions when comparing to making decisions about medical treatment. 
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As such, there may be less risk in allowing universal legal capacity and 
supported decision-making in this setting.  
Some forms of support to exercise legal capacity may raise issues regarding 
whether a patient’s decision reflects the will of the person or whether the 
supported person has made a decision as a result of undue influence of a 
supporter.899  This relates to issues outside the scope of this thesis, but it is 
important that the incorporation of any scheme of supported decision-making 
must address these issues to ensure that patients have participated meaningfully 
in the decision-making process and that their ultimate decision truly reflects his 
or will and preference. 900  
This thesis commenced with the hypothesis that human rights law can provide a 
model of good practice that would improve Australia’s statutory approaches to 
the regulation of the common law principle of open justice at Australian civil 
commitment review hearings. This is important because open justice seeks to 
ensure transparent and accountable decision-making processes; however, the 
closed nature of current tribunal processes is concerning given that current lack 
of transparency emanating from civil commitment review hearings. Due to the 
gravity of the decisions made at review hearings, it is important to ensure that 
review hearings are fair, open to the greatest extent possible, and accountable.  
There is currently very little transparency of review hearings in Australia, and 
therefore hearings are subject to limited public and professional scrutiny, for 
instance, when a rare appeal has been lodged. The general restrictions of the 
open justice principle in Australia has inhibited genuine in-depth reporting of 
cases through the mental health system thereby preventing the identification and 
reportage of mental health cases. This has effectively prevented the media from 
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pursuing a widely recognised societal problem. 901  Transparency provides 
individuals and communities with the ability to understand how those individuals 
and institutions with human rights responsibilities have discharged those 
obligations. It also facilitates, more than any other mechanism, the identification 
of what elements of a mental health care system is working and those that are 
not, and provides evidence for the continuation of desirable elements and the 
modification of those that are less desirable. 
The resourcing of mental health systems continues to be a problem. Carney has 
stated that ‘…the standard of mental health care hinges mainly on the level of 
resourcing available to support the range and quality (or otherwise) of 
services’,902  and there is little doubt that the current developments in human 
rights requirements will require the injection of resources to improve 
compliance. Incursions into the re-scheduling and reframing of clinical 
responsibilities of clinical staff, in light of the desirability of full patient 
participation and enhanced transparency in decision-making will most likely add 
to the complexity and cost of tribunal proceedings. Remodelled legislation and 
procedures may result in the diversion of some resources from the provision of 
clinical care. However, Australian governments have international and domestic 
human rights obligations to take active steps to recognise the requirements of the 
human rights framework as far as possible according to its available resources 
base. Given that the available resource base of States may vary, the obligations 
on highly developed and economically sound states, such as Australia, are of a 
higher standard than the obligations imposed on those with lesser resources.903 
Australia is well placed to achieve substantial compliance given its strong 
economic position. Australia, in its current economic position vis a vis other 
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world economies, is better situated that most other economies in terms of its 
ability to comply with human rights obligations, and Australian governments 
should avoid reliance on claims that certain principles cannot be given immediate 
effect on the basis of limited availability of state resources under article 4(2) of 
the CRPD.904 Mental health tribunals should be continually evaluating priorities 
and efficiencies in order to reallocate resources that give effect to human rights 
requirements.905  
In the specific context of mental health civil review hearings, the fair 
administration of justice is the paramount concern given the very serious nature 
of tribunals’ decisions. These hearings constitute a significant component of 
Australia’s justice system, affecting the lives of a substantial number of persons 
beyond the patient concerned. This makes institutional transparency in decision-
making all the more essential, from both individual and community perspectives. 
Though, the private and closed nature of review hearings and their apparent lack 
of transparency effectively hinders effective scrutiny of Tribunal decision-
making thus potentially hindering an involuntary patent’s ability to access 
procedural and substantive justice.  
This research represents the first application of article 12 of the CRPD to analyse 
and measure its influence on the interpretation and operation of the open justice 
principle at mental health civil review hearings. The thesis’s conclusion, 
essentially that involuntary patients should be placed at the centre of the 
decision-making matrix, introduces a new normative framework underpinning 
the operation of the open justice principle in the mental health law context. This 
is particularly important for involuntary patients for several reasons. First, it 
allows persons to exercise the dignity of risk; it allows them to make personal 
decisions, and to then to learn from the consequences of making those decisions.  
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Ultimately, this asserts that it is not necessary, at this point in the development of 
human rights law, to ‘protect’ involuntary patients from the potential 
consequences of open justice related decisions. The point of article 12 of the 
CRPD is to allow persons with a mental illness to enjoy equal recognition at law 
and this extends to the use and potential dissemination of their personal 
information. The normative framework in this thesis allows persons with mental 
illness, who are also involuntary mental health patients, the autonomy to make 
such decisions on an equal basis with others without discrimination. Such people 
enjoy legal standing and agency in relation to the confidentiality and privacy of 
their personal information, regardless of his or her mental capacity, which may 
facilitate such persons to access procedural and substantive justice. That said, 
one of the most important priorities now is to undertake research into the 
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